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Chapter 1
Introduction
4
One of the most influential books in the last decade is entitled “The World Is Flat”.
Thomas L. Friedman chose this title to vividly illustrate a deeply economic phenomenon
that characterizes our daily lifes and shapes firms’ business strategies today: globalization.
Induced by lower transport costs and tariffs or new technologies like the internet, firms’
production networks are nowadays spread around the globe. As a result, trade volumes
have increased dramatically in the last decades and the world economy today is more
globalized than ever before. The underlying question, what actually drives international
trade, has been fundamental in economic analysis for a long time. Economists would
never argue that there is one unique determinant of international trade. However, a
common canon would contain that technology differences, factor endowments, consumer
preferences, institutions and market conditions across countries are important.
One of the earliest insights is Ricardo’s famous theory of comparative advantage.
Trade between countries emerges due to technological differences and countries specialize
in the production of the good for which they have a comparative advantage, i.e., lower
opportunity costs of production. Unsatisfied with the assumption of immobile factors of
production Heckscher and Ohlin developed a complementary theory leading to the famous
Heckscher and Ohlin theorem. It states that countries export goods in which they are rel-
atively abundant, i.e., they export capital-intensive products if they are capital abundant.
Besides the influential impact these early theories had, they are at odds with empirical
facts. They predict large trade flows between countries with different technologies and
factor endowments while trade data reveals large trade flows between countries that are
rather similar. From today’s perspective, those theories also abstract from something
that is central for trade economists today: the firm. Modern trade models put the firm
in the center of the analysis since the data shows that firms’ decisions are heterogeneous
along various dimensions. Starting in the mid-nineties, new detailed firm-level data sets
revealed that, even within a narrowly defined industry, firms differ substantially across
dimensions such as size, productivity, wages paid to workers, organization of production
and the participation in international trade. In particular, those studies highlighted that
only a small fraction of firms export, that exporting firms are larger and more productive
than non-exporters.
The first model that was capable of explaining those stylized facts about firm hetero-
geneity was the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003). It has changed international trade
theory fundamentally and has become the cornerstone working horse of the so called “new”
new trade theory. It forms the basis of all following chapters. To provide intuition why the
model has become so successful I shortly summarize the model. Consider an industry in
which firms produce horizontally differentiated varieties under monopolistic competition
and with increasing returns to scale. The new element that radically separates the Melitz
(2003) model from a standard Krugman model of monopolistic competition is that firms
face ex-ante uncertainty about their firm specific productivity level. Only ex-post firms
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realize, after they have drawn from a productivity lottery, whether they are productive
enough to stay in their domestic industry or are even as productive as to enter new foreign
markets. The timing of events is as follows. To enter the industry firms have to invest
fixed entry costs in order to research and develop their product variety and to take part
at the productivity lottery. After the investment firms discover their product variety and
draw a firm specific productivity from a known productivity distribution. At this stage
the fixed entry costs are sunk. Firms enter the industry until expected operating profits
exactly compensate for the entry costs. To form expectations about operating profits,
firms have to consider the cost structure of production. To serve the domestic market,
firms have to bear fixed costs of production, while exporting to a foreign market is even
more costly. Ice-berg type trade costs lead to higher variable costs since the shipping of
goods from one country to another country leads to a vanishing of goods, while exporting
also involves additional fixed costs. It will become clear that this cost structure will di-
rectly imply a productivity ranking that matches with the empirical evidence. Given this
cost structure, a firm decides on an optimal firm strategy for every given productivity
draw. These strategies specify three scenarios. The first one is the worst case scenario
in which it is optimal for the firm to shut down. This is the case if the productivity
draw is so low, that it is not profitable to invest the fixed costs of production to serve
the domestic market since variable profits are lower. The second scenario is the case of
a medium productivity draw. Here variable profits outweigh fixed costs and firms earn
positive profits by serving the domestic market. The third one is the best case scenario
with a high productivity draw. It is not only profitable to serve the domestic market,
but also profitable to bear additional fixed costs to export. Even though trade is costly
those highly productive firms engage in foreign trade by exporting. This productivity
ranking of firms by export status is a major prediction of the Melitz model. However,
it also provides important predictions of how trade liberalization impacts intra-industry
reallocations.
Consider the thought experiment of lower variable trade costs, e.g. trade liberalization
due to lower tariffs. Having the previous three scenarios in mind lower variable trade costs
are only beneficial for exporters. These highly productive firms increase their export
sales which leads to higher market shares for exporters and lower markets shares for non-
exporters. As a result firms in the domestic market now also face tougher competition
from foreign exporters. Those exporters compete for the only factor of production (labor)
and additionally decrease the firms’ individual demands for their varieties. Now consider
the marginal firm that was indifferent between producing for the domestic market or
shutting down before trade liberalization took place. Afterwards, costs increase and
product demand decreases such that this cutoff firm exits the market. On the contrary,
a firm which chooses to only serve the domestic market but was only marginally less
productive than an exporter now starts exporting after trade liberalization. Hence, the
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Melitz model predicts that trade liberalization leads to the exit of the least productive
firms and to market share reallocations from low-productivity domestic firms to high-
productivity exporters. The industry’s average productivity rises, average prices decrease
and welfare increases in turn. Studies by Tybout and Westbrook (1995) for Mexico,
Pavcnik (2002) for Chile and Trefler (2004) for Canada have found robust empirical
evidence for this selection effect of trade liberalization.
Although the Melitz model has dramatically deepened our understanding of inter-
national trade, it lacks one crucial element that is also prevalent in the data: the or-
ganizational choice of production. The model cannot explain why firms differ in their
organization of production. This is due to the fact that it treats the single firm and the
mapping between factors of production and the final-good as a “black box”. However,
firms’ global sourcing strategies are a major driver of international trade. Intermedi-
ate inputs that are produced in foreign countries and shipped back to the headquarter’s
country of origin impact international trade accounts. It is vertical foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) if the supplier is part of the headquarter’s firm structure, i.e., is integrated
within the boundaries of the firm or arm’s length trade if the supplier is unaffiliated and
independent, i.e., is outsourced. Many scholars examined firms’ organizational choices in
the context of international trade but one recent approach has become very popular as it
can explain the data very well. Building up on the property rights approach of the firm,
Antràs and Helpman (2004) provide a seminal model that combines firm heterogeneity
à la Melitz with organizational choices as in Antràs (2003). The Antràs and Helpman
model forms the basis of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Hence, I consider it useful to provide
a brief non-technical description of the model’s framework in the following.
Consider a final-goods production process with two intermediate inputs, namely head-
quarter services and a manufactured component. Headquarter services are provided by
the final-good producer itself, the firm. With respect to the sourcing of the manufactured
component the firm faces a two dimensional decision. First, the firm chooses the owner-
ship structure, i.e., whether to produce in house with an integrated supplier or outsource
the component production to an unaffiliated and independent supplier. Second, the firm
decides on the global scale of production, i.e., whether to locate component production
in the headquarter’s country of origin or offshore production to a foreign country. In a
setting with incomplete contracts and relationship specific investments those decisions
matter. The explanation of the rational why they matter lies in the timing of events that
can be summarized as follows. First, the headquarter decides on the optimal sourcing
strategy that specifies a contract about the future distribution of the total sales revenue.
Given this distribution of revenue both the component supplier and the headquarter start
to produce the relationship specific components and headquarters services, respectively.
Afterwards, production costs are sunk, and the supplier and the firm meet and rene-
gotiate since contracts are incomplete. This expected ex-post bargaining and hold-up
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problem yields to less than the efficient ex-ante contributions and to an underinvestment
of inputs on both sides. In order to choose an optimal sourcing strategy it is now crucial
to determine which side provides the relatively more important input and therefore is
responsible for the relatively more severe underinvestment problem. As it is intuitive,
the party which is relatively more important for the production process should receive
better property rights to alleviate the underinvestment problem. It is assumed that those
property rights are higher for an unaffiliated outsourced supplier while they are lower
if the supplier is integrated. In the absence of the global scale decision, Antràs (2003)
shows that there exists an unique headquarter-intensity cutoff, i.e., output elasticity of
headquarter services, such that if headquarter services are relatively more important than
components, the supplier should be integrated. Vice versa, if the production process is
component-intensive the firm chooses to collaborate with an unaffiliated one. Now assume
that firms are heterogeneous in their productivities as in Melitz (2003). Furthermore, pro-
duction involves fixed production costs that are higher in a foreign country and if the
supplier is integrated, while variable costs are lower if component production is offshored
to a foreign country. Finally, property rights increase for the component supplier not
only in case of outsourcing, but also if the supplier is offshored. These assumptions imply
that sufficiently high productive firms always prefer foreign over domestic sourcing. The
higher fixed costs of foreign production are outweighed by higher variable profits due to
lower unit costs. Furthermore vertical FDI is most likely in sectors with high headquarter
intensities (to transfer better property rights to the headquarter).
Having discussed the two basic model frameworks Melitz (2003) and Antràs and Help-
man (2004) that are essential for the following chapters, I continue with a brief non-
technical review of the chapters’ results. I have to note that chapter 2 is published as
Schwarz (2011). Chapter 3 is co-authored with Jens Suedekum and available as Schwarz
and Suedekum (2010). Chapter 4 is a work co-authored with Anna Bohnstedt and Jens
Suedekum and available as Bohnstedt et al. (2010). Chapter 5 is joined work with
Kristian Giesen and available as Giesen and Schwarz (2011).
1.1 Chapter 2
In the second chapter I provide a note on the sector definitions proposed in Antràs and
Helpman (2004). I start with a critical reconsideration of the definitions and argue that
they are problematic due to three reasons. First, the definitions may lead to counter-
intuitive sector classifications. Second, they do not classify each sector in principle and
third, they rest on parameters that cannot be empirically observed. Antràs and Helpman
(2004) define a sector as component-intensive (headquarter-intensive) whenever the firm
would ideally like to transfer more (less) property rights to the component supplier as it
is possible by organizational choice. As a result, in a component-intensive (headquarter-
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intensive) sector variable profits are maximized with foreign outsourcing (integration).
This suggests that a component-intensive (headquarter-intensive) sector is characterized
by a low (high) headquarter-intensity. However, with the proposed definition the optimal
organizational choice is not only a question whether the headquarter-intensity is high
or low. It is also crucial to consider how the ownership specific property rights are
distributed. The sector definitions focus only on the headquarter-intensity and neglect
the second dimension of the distribution of property rights. As a result, I show that not
all sectors are classified and moreover small changes in the headquarter-intensity may
lead to counter intuitive sector switches.
As an alternative I propose a purely exogenous parameter based approach of sector
definitions. I define a sector as component-intensive (headquarter-intensive) whenever the
exogenously given headquarter-intensity is lower (higher) than the component-intensity.
This approach overcomes the problems of counter-intuitive or missing sectors. The down-
side is that the clear cut analytical results as derived in Antràs and Helpman (2004) do
not hold anymore. They are robust but a richer set of sourcing choices can arise in equi-
librium. I find, for example, that even in component-intensive sectors integration may
prevail if the supplier’s property rights in case of outsourcing are tremendously high. This
highlights the fact that in order to minimize the underinvestment problem, it is crucial
not only to consider which side is responsible for the relatively more important input,
but also what the distribution of the ownership specific property rights is. The major
advantage of my approach is that the empirical literature also relies on parameter based
sector classifications. Henceforth, it is important to show that the Antràs and Helpman
(2004) results are robust such that the empirical evidence can be seen as a valid test of
the theory.
1.2 Chapter 3
In the third chapter I provide a sourcing model in the spirit of Antràs and Helpman (2004).
The novelty of the model is that firms decide not only on the organization (whether the
supplier is integrated or outsourced) and the location (production in the home country
or abroad) but also endogenously choose the number of inputs used in the production
process. The latter decision refers to the “complexity” of production. This additional
complexity decision is motivated by recent empirical evidence that firms actually rely not
only on one single sourcing mode for all inputs but rather organize production using a
variety of different sourcing modes, see e.g. Jabbour and Kneller (2010) or Kohler and
Smolka (2009). Furthermore, firms that choose from a variety of sourcing modes are
systematically more productive than firms that rely only one single mode, see Tomiura
(2007). For those new empirical patterns the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model cannot
account for since it relies on only one single component. The literature still misses such
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a rich sourcing model that can explain these new stylized empirical facts.
The presented model provides a first step to analytically explain those empirical facts,
since it allows for heterogeneity in the number of inputs used in the production process.
The model actually predicts that even within a single firm such hybrid sourcing with a
variety of different sourcing modes is possible, i.e., some inputs are outsourced while others
are kept within the boundaries of the firm. This hybrid sourcing prevails in intermediate
intensive sectors that are neither component-, nor headquarter-intensive and in firms that
are highly productive. Within a given sector, I find that more productive firms increase
complexity. For a given productivity, complexity is highest in component-intensive sectors
like the automotive industry. With respect to the location, only the high productive firms
take advantage of lower variable costs abroad. In this context, I find that opening up for
trade boosts complexity and inputs are more likely to be outsourced.
In the second part of the chapter I relax the assumption of symmetric inputs that was
convenient for the previous results. I rather study a production process where the com-
plexity is fixed exogenously to two input suppliers. However, the suppliers may not only
differ in their input intensities, but also in their respective ownership specific property
rights. These asymmetries between inputs can provide a rational for the empirical evi-
dence provided by Alfaro and Charlton (2009), which states that firms tend to outsource
low-skill inputs from the early stages, while high-skill inputs from the final stages of the
production process are likely to be manufactured in house.
1.3 Chapter 4
The model presented in the fourth chapter is motivated by the growing importance of
public research and development (R&D) spending in modern economies. First and fore-
most in the political discussion there seems to be a widespread perception that public
R&D spending is crucial to maintain the global competitiveness of domestic firms. To
study the governmental incentives of strategically investing into a country’s technological
potential, I develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heteroge-
neous firms, where countries can invest into basic research to improve their technological
potential.
The model is closely related to the Melitz (2003) framework. Firms can enter a mo-
nopolistically competitive sector subject to entry costs. Afterwards entry costs are sunk
and firms randomly draw their productivity level from a known distribution. In contrast
to a standard Melitz (2003) model countries may differ in the technological potential. In
particular, the government of either country can invest into basic research. These research
investments raise the country’s technological potential, which is modeled as a right-shift
of the support of the distribution from which the domestic entrants draw. Given that the
countries can invest into basic research the model leads to endogenous technology differ-
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ences across countries. Under autarky governments invest into basic research since the
increase in the technological potential leads to tighter firm selection and higher average
productivity of firms. As a result welfare increases since a higher average productivity im-
plies lower prices. The government’s strategic motive arises if countries open up for trade.
Investments into basic research lead to the following negative cross-country externality: If
one country invests more than the other, this yields tougher selection in the technological
leading and softer selection in the laggard country. Exporting becomes easier for firms
from the leading country, as the export market is now easier to capture. Firms from the
laggard country face tougher competition in their home market, and exporting becomes
more difficult.
From the normative perspective the model predicts that there are supranational gains
from coordinated public research investments. The negative cross-country externality
of investments induces single countries to over-invest and this more, the higher trade
openness is. However, with considering direct R&D spillovers across countries, i.e., R&D
spending raises also and at least partly the technological potential of the other country,
this over-investment is reduced. Nevertheless, a brief look in the data reveals that the
cross-sectional relationship between public R&D spending and trade intensity is positive
and consistent with the prediction of the model. More open countries tend to invest more
into basic research.
1.4 Chapter 5
The focus of the last chapter is set on horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). The
data reveals that FDI is an important determinant of international trade. In particular its
growth rates in the last decade are remarkable and outpaced the growth in the worldwide
gross domestic product, domestic investments and even exports. There is a widespread
perception among politicians that there are positive welfare effects of FDI. The common
arguments given are that FDI leads to industry knowledge spillovers or technology trans-
fers and lower consumer prices due to cross-border transport cost savings. Therefore,
politicians actively try to attract FDI with tax holidays, job-creation or facility subsidies.
I contribute to the discussion by developing a general equilibrium model of interna-
tional trade with heterogeneous firms and horizontal greenfield FDI. In the spirit of Melitz
(2003), firms choose, conditional on their productivity, whether to serve their domestic
market and/or a foreign market. In the latter case they can do so either through exports
or horizontal greenfield FDI. I use this framework to study the welfare effects of FDI. It is
important to note that this framework is especially suitable to analyze the welfare effects
of FDI, since it not only features endogenously determined firm entrants, wages, and
productivity cutoffs but also allows for wage differentials across countries in equilibrium
and flexible price markups.
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I discuss two policy scenarios to examine a country’s incentive to attract FDI. In
the strategic FDI policy scenario, a country chooses the welfare maximizing degree of
FDI-liberalization, while taking the FDI policy in the other country as given. In the
cooperative scenario both countries jointly choose the total welfare maximizing degree of
FDI-liberalization. If only one single country attracts FDI, this leads to a higher mass
of consumed varieties and a lower price index. However, the other foreign country faces
a decrease in the mass of consumed varieties and higher average prices. Welfare in the
attracting country increases while it decreases in the other country. This cross-country
comparison clearly illustrates that in the strategic Nash-equilibrium countries compete
for FDI. Compared with the cooperative solution this strategic incentive to attract FDI
leads to over-attraction. Hence, from a normative perspective there are welfare gains from
supranational coordination of FDI-liberalization policies. However, since coordination is
difficult to achieve, it is likely that countries over-attract FDI. For policy makers this is
an important result as besides the indisputable positive aspects of FDI, it implies that
there are also potential welfare losses from over-attraction.
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Chapter 2
Global Sourcing - A Critical
Reconsideration of Sector Definitions
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2.1 Abstract
I introduce an alternative parameter-based definition of component- and headquarter-
intensive sectors into the seminal model of global sourcing by Antràs and Helpman (2004).
This approach overcomes problems of the original sector definition like counter intuitive
classifications or industries that are not classified as either component- or headquarter-
intensive. The strong empirical evidence for the model’s predictions is also based on a
similar sector definition. With a numerical approach I show that a richer set of sourcing
modes can arise in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the main results of Antràs and Helpman
are robust.
2.2 Introduction
In their seminal contribution Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduce a North-South model
of international trade where firms choose from a variety of organizational forms, depend-
ing on their individual productivity and sector characteristics. Their framework, which
combines firm heterogeneity in spirit of Melitz (2003) with organizational structures as
in Antràs (2003), is especially helpful for coming to grips with newly emerged empirical
facts about arm’s length outsourcing and intra-firm trade. The main result by Antràs and
Helpman is that firms in headquarter-intensive sectors are more likely to choose integra-
tion strategies, whereas in component-intensive sectors they solely focus on outsourcing
strategies.
To derive their main result Antràs and Helpman (2004) study how the contract choice
varies for different levels of productivity, given the following two exogenous parameters:
i.) the headquarter intensity (i.e., the headquarter’s input share in the assumed Cobb-
Douglas production function) and ii.) the share of ex post gains from the contract rela-
tionship (i.e., the bargaining power of the final-good producer). The derivation of their
main result is potentially problematic, however, because their sector cutoffs solely focus
on only one of the two parameters, the headquarter’s input share. This leads to the fact
that sectors with a very low (high) factor share in components may actually be defined
as component-intensive (headquarter-intensive). Furthermore and more importantly, the
parameter regions classified as either component- or headquarter-intensive may be quite
small. I consider it intuitive to define a sector as component-intensive when the exogenous
factor share of components is high, and vice versa. With my parameter-based definition
all possible sectors can be classified without having to refer to the ex post gains.
Empirical evidence for sourcing modes of multinational firms is scarce due to the fact
that firm-level data on outsourcing is rare. Nevertheless, recent empirical literature on
multinational firms provides strong empirical evidence for the theoretical predictions of
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the Antràs and Helpman model.1 However, since the ex post gains from the contract
relationship are hard to observe those studies also rely on a parameter-based sector defi-
nition.
With the alternative sector definitions the main results of Antràs and Helpman remain
robust. Using numerical methods I derive the organizational forms in equilibrium. In
sectors with low headquarter intensity firms tend to focus on outsourcing while in sectors
with high headquarter intensity a coexistence of integration and outsourcing prevails.
Concerning the location high productive firms tend to engage in foreign sourcing while
the low productive firms centre the production in their home country. Yet, my approach
allows for a richer menu of possible outcomes. For example, I discover that firms may
choose an integration strategy although the sector is component-intensive. Hence, the
orginal classification where only outsourcing prevails in component-intensive sectors may
be misleading as to the relationship between firm productivity and contract choice.
2.3 Analysis
I start with a brief review of the Antràs and Helpman model. Output x of the final-good
is given by a Cobb-Douglas type production function
x = θ ·
￿
h
η
￿η
·
￿
m
1− η
￿1−η
with η ∈ (0, 1) (2.1)
and depends on the two inputs headquarter services h and manufactured components m.
The productivity θ is firm-specific whereas the sector specific parameter η is the input
intensity in headquarter services. Headquarter services h can exclusively be provided by
the final-good producer while for the production of the component m the final-good pro-
ducer faces a two dimensional decision. Firstly, component production can be integrated
within the boundaries of the firm or outsourced to an unaffiliated supplier. Secondly,
component production can be accomplished in the domestic or a foreign country.
The final-good producer’s share β of ex post gains differs for the sourcing modes. The
final-good producer receives a higher fraction in case of integration than under outsourc-
ing. When integration takes place, this fraction is lower in the foreign country than in
the home country. The ranking of the ex post shares is given by
βNV =
￿
δN
￿α
+ β
￿
1− ￿δN￿α￿ ≥ βSV = ￿δS￿α + β ￿1− ￿δS￿α￿ > βSO = βNO = β (2.2)
with α ∈ (0, 1) and 1 > δN ≥ δS > 0. The index V and O indicates whether the
1See Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Yeaple (2006), Defever and Toubal (2007), Tomiura (2007), Nunn
and Trefler (2008), Jabbour (2008), Corcos et al. (2008), Kohler and Smolka (2009), Alfaro and Charlton
(2009), Bernard et al. (2010) and Federico (2010) for recent empirical studies.
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intermediate input production is integrated (V ) or outsourced (O). Foreign production
is denoted by S while domestic production is denoted by N . If the final-good producer
could freely choose the fraction β∗ (η) that maximizes the total value of the relationship
(total revenue), β∗ (η) would be given by
β∗ (η) =
η (αη + 1− α)−￿η (1− η) (1− αη) (1 + αη − α)
2η − 1 . (2.3)
Antràs and Helpman define a sector as component intensive (see p.565) whenever the
headquarter-intensity η is so small, such that β > β∗ (η) holds. A sector is considered
headquarter intensive (see p.567) whenever η is large enough such that β∗ (η) > βNV holds.
I use the ordering of revenue shares (2.2) to rearrange the condition β∗ (η) > βNV , which
is then equivalent to
β <
β∗ (η)− ￿δN￿α
1− (δN)α ≡ β¯ (η). (2.4)
Each possible sector is a point in the (β, η) plane. The set of sectors is therefore the whole
surface indicated in Figure 2.1. I provide β∗ (η) and β¯ (η) in Figure 2.1 to illustrate the
two main theoretical criticisms of the sector definitions: Firstly, it is obvious that for
medium levels of η and β no sector classification as Antràs and Helpman propose is valid.
Take for example point X where both conditions β > β∗ (η) and β∗ (η) > βNV are simul-
taneously violated. Secondly, the definition of sectors can lead to a quite counterintuitive
classification of sectors. Consider, e.g., the point Y in Figure 2.1. Antràs and Help-
man would consider this sector as component-intensive, even though the headquarter-
intensity η is very high. It is natural to argue that the set of sectors which are not
classified have medium levels of headquarter intensity η. Hence, it is suggestive to only
consider sectors with either a very high or a very low headquarter intensity. However,
since limη→0,η→1 ∂β∗/∂η →∞, an arbitrary small change in η may lead to a switch in the
sector classification. Take for example point A and B in Figure 2.1. The sector associated
with point A is component-intensive although only a small increase in η to point B leads
to a sector switch.2
Parameter-based sector definitions
Due to the rationale above, I propose an alternative parameter-based definition of sectors.
I consider it intuitive to define a sector as component intensive when the exogenous
factor share of components is high, i.e. if η < 0.5. A sector is defined headquarter-
intensive when it is not component-intensive. This definition of sectors avoids counter
intuitive sector characterizations and classifies each sector. The empirical evidence for
the model’s predictions are also based on an parameter-based sector definition. I call
2However, it is clear that for any cutoff in continuous parameter space an infinitesimal parameter
change can alter the resulting sector classification.
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Figure 2.1: Sector classifications
the following numerical example “benchmark” case since all sorting patterns Antràs and
Helpman derive for their headquarter- and component-intensive sector are incorporated.
Figure 2.2 depicts for each (β, θ) pair the sourcing mode with the highest profits.3
Consider the left graph in Figure 2.2 with η = 0.25. For a β within the black bars β >
β∗ is fulfilled and this is the case which Antràs and Helpman consider as their component-
intensive sector. All firms that do not immediately exit due to a low productivity draw
θ choose either domestic or foreign outsourcing. The relatively more productive firms
within these bars outsource in the foreign country (see, e.g., point X) and the not so
productive firms outsource domestically (see, e.g., point Y ). Notice however, that a richer
pattern of possible sourcing modes is valid. In particular, if β is below the lower bound
of the bars even in component-intensive sectors firms may choose integration strategies
(see, e.g., point Z). Next, I discuss the headquarter-intensive sector. Consider the right
graph in Figure 2.2 with η = 0.75. For a β within the black bars the sorting pattern is
identical to the one Antràs and Helpman identify for the headquarter-intensive sector.
The most productive firms use foreign direct investment while slightly less productive
firms use foreign outsourcing. Within the home country the relatively low productive
firms use outsourcing while the high productive firms integrate. Yet again, a richer set
of possible organizational forms can arise in equilibrium. In particular, if β is high even
in headquarter-intensive sectors firms may only choose outsourcing strategies (e.g., point
P ). If β is below the lower bounds of the bars firms may solely focus on integration (e.g.,
point Q). Hence, a sufficiently low β leads to integration regardless of the headquarter
3I use η = 0.25 for the component-intensive sector and η = 0.75 for the headquarter-intensive sector.
Other parameters: fSV = 0.15, fSO = 0.095, fNV = 0.05, fNO = 0.025, ωN = 1, ωS = 0.7, δN = 0.5,
δS = 0.4 and α = 0.75.
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Figure 2.2: Profit maximizing sourcing modes
intensity η. In this case β∗ > βNV ≥ βSV > βSO = βNO = β holds and the final-good producer
supplies less than efficient headquarter services, regardless of the contract choice. This
underinvestment problem is magnified in case of outsourcing and relatively less severe
with integration. In both benchmark sectors sufficiently high productive firms offshore
the component production.4
2.4 Conclusion
The numerical results illustrate that the prevalence of integration strategies increases
with the headquarter intensity. For a given bargaining power β and input intensity η suf-
ficiently high productive firms prefer foreign sourcing while the low productive firms focus
on domestic production. Yet, my approach delivers a richer set of possible outcomes. I
find, e.g., that firms in component-intensive sectors may also choose integration strategies
if β is sufficiently low. This leads to the fact that the original sector classification may
be misleading as to the relationship between firm productivity and contract choice.
My results have direct implications for the related empirical studies. Due to the
fact that the bargaining powers are hard to observe, empirical studies that examine the
theoretical predictions of the model also rely on an parameter-based sector definition.
They find strong empirical evidence for the prediction that foreign integration is largest
when both headquarter intensity and productivity is high.
4Note that both graphs of Figure 2.2 could be easily drawn for higher levels of productivity. In this
case foreign sourcing dominates domestic sourcing for every given β. However, the graphical indication
of the Antràs and Helpman headquarter-intensive sector would then be unnecessarily tiny.
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Chapter 3
Global Sourcing of Complex
Production Processes
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3.1 Abstract
We develop a theory of a firm in an environment with incomplete contracts. The firm’s
headquarter decides on the complexity, the organization, and the global scale of its pro-
duction process. Specifically, it decides: i) on the mass of symmetric intermediate inputs
that are part of the value chain, ii) if the supplier of each component is an external con-
tractor or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if the supplier is offshored to a foreign low-wage
country. Afterwards we consider a related scenario where the headquarter contracts with
a given number of two asymmetric suppliers. Our model is consistent with several styl-
ized facts from the recent literature that existing theories of multinational firms cannot
account for.
3.2 Introduction
The production of most final goods requires intermediate inputs. How thinly the value
chain is “sliced”, i.e., how many different inputs are combined in the production process
for a particular final product, is a choice made by firms (Acemoglu et al., 2007): Some
choose a setting with multiple highly specialized components and narrowly defined tasks,
while other firms from the same industry rely on a substantially lower division of labor.
We refer to the chosen mass of intermediate inputs as the degree of complexity of a
firm’s production process. For each component, a firm then needs to decide whether to
manufacture that input inhouse or to outsource it to an external contractor. As is well
known since Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), these organizational
decisions (“make or buy”) matter in an environment with incomplete contracts, as they
affect the suppliers’ incentives to make relationship-specific investments. Finally, in a
globalized world, firms also need to decide on the international scale of their value chain.
Some firms only source domestically, while others collaborate with foreign suppliers either
through arm’s length transactions or through intra-firm trade (Grossman and Helpman,
2002).
An example that illustrates those different dimensions of a global value chain is the
“Swedish” car Volvo S40, as discussed in Baldwin (2009). The production of this final good
certainly is a complex process that consists of multiple intermediate inputs. A substantial
share of those inputs is produced by independent suppliers, many of them from foreign
countries: the navigation control is made by Japanese contractors, the side mirror and
fuel tank by German, the headlights by American ones, and so on, while the airbag and
the seats are outsourced domestically within Sweden. Yet other inputs are manufactured
inhouse. Of those tasks, some are performed within the Swedish parent plants, while
other components are manufactured by foreign subsidiaries which are directly owned
and controlled by Volvo. Further examples of global sourcing strategies of multinational
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enterprises (MNEs) include Nike, which relies heavily on foreign outsourcing, or Intel
which mainly engages in vertical foreign direct investment (FDI), see Antràs and Rossi-
Hansberg (2009).
In this paper, we develop a theory of a firm which decides on the complexity, the orga-
nization, and the global scale of its production process. We build on the seminal approach
by Antràs and Helpman (2004), who were the first to study global sourcing decisions un-
der incomplete contracts. Their model is restricted to a setting with a headquarter and
one single supplier, however. We extend that framework and consider multiple interme-
diate inputs. Our model is consistent with several stylized facts from the recent empirical
literature that neither Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008), nor other papers on the struc-
ture of MNEs can account for. It therefore further reconciles the theory and the empirics
of multinational firms.1
Specifically, we first consider a model where the headquarter (the “producer”) decides
on the mass of (differentiated but symmetric) intermediate inputs that are part of the
value chain, similar as in Ethier (1982) or Acemoglu et al. (2007). The larger this
mass of components is, the more sliced is the value chain and the more specialized is
the task that each single supplier performs. This specialization leads to efficiency gains,
but it also generates endogenously larger fixed costs as it necessitates contracting with
more input suppliers. The producer furthermore decides, separately for each component,
if the respective supplier is an external contractor or an integrated affiliate, and if the
supplier is offshored to a (low-wage, low-cost) foreign country. Our model firstly predicts
that firms differ in the complexity of their production process, both within and across
industries. Higher productivity and lower headquarter-intensity tend to increase the
mass of suppliers that a firm chooses to contract with. Second, firms may outsource
some of their inputs but vertically integrate others. This “hybrid sourcing” mode is
prevalent in firms with medium-to-high productivity from sectors with low-to-medium
headquarter-intensity. Third, firms may decide to offshore only some components, and
this offshoring share tends to be higher in more productive firms and in less headquarter-
intensive industries.
Afterwards, we turn to a related scenario where the producer contracts with a given
and discrete number of two suppliers providing asymmetric components. These com-
ponents can differ along two dimensions: i) the technological importance for the final
product as measured by the input intensity, and ii) the bargaining power of the respec-
tive supplier. We show that firms from sectors with high (low) headquarter-intensity tend
1Spencer (2005) provides a survey of the literature on international sourcing under incomplete con-
tracts. In this literature, there has been no contribution that jointly analyzes the complexity, the
organization, and the global scale of MNEs. A different model of multinational firms is Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008). That model focuses particularly on the offshoring decision, but it is not based
on incomplete contracts and it neglects the complexity and organizational choices of MNEs. Helpman
(2006) presents a comprehensive overview of the recent literature on trade, FDI and firm organization.
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to integrate (outsource) both suppliers, particularly if the asymmetry across components
is not too strong. With intermediate headquarter-intensity and for stronger asymmetries
there is “hybrid sourcing”, i.e., one integrated and one external supplier. The component
with the higher input intensity is per se more likely to be outsourced, as this reduces the
underinvestment problem for the supplier. Yet, that supplier is also likely to have higher
bargaining power vis-a-vis the producer. If this latter effect is sufficiently strong, which
may be the case for highly sophisticated and specific intermediate inputs, our model then
predicts that the producer keeps the “more important” component, which generates more
value added, within the boundaries of the firm.
The predictions of our model are then discussed in the light of the recent empirical
literature on multinational firms.2 That literature has started to carefully explore the
internal structure of MNEs, and also to test particular aspects of the baseline model by
Antràs and Helpman (2004) and the extension in Antràs and Helpman (2008). Several
predictions of these models are supported by the empirical evidence.3 Other features of
the data are harder to understand with those baseline frameworks, however, while our
model can account for these stylized facts.
For example, Kohler and Smolka (2009), Jabbour (2008) and Jabbour and Kneller
(2010) show that most MNEs collaborate with many suppliers and often choose different
sourcing modes for different inputs – as in the Volvo-example discussed above. In partic-
ular, Tomiura (2007) finds that firms which outsource some inputs while keeping others
vertically integrated are more productive than firms which rely on a single sourcing mode
in the global economy. Furthermore, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that firms tend
to outsource low-skill inputs from the early stages, while high-skill inputs from the final
stages of the production process are likely to be manufactured inhouse. Consistently,
Corcos et al. (2009) find that inputs with a higher degree of specificity are less likely to
be outsourced.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.3 we present the basic
structure of our model. Section 3.4 is devoted to the scenario with an endogenous mass of
2The empirical literature has emphasized the significance of MNEs for world trade, which according
to Corcos et al. (2009) are involved in about two thirds of all current international trade transactions.
Feenstra (1995) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996) show that trade in intermediate inputs has increased
much faster than trade in final goods over the last decades, which suggests a substantial increase in
international outsourcing. The importance of intra-firm trade is stressed by Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
and Badinger and Egger (2010), who consistently find that vertical FDI tends to dominate horizontal
FDI.
3Consistent with Antràs and Helpman (2004), the study by Nunn and Trefler (2008) finds that intra-
firm trade is most pervasive for highly productive firms in headquarter-intensive sectors, and Defever and
Toubal (2007) find that highly productive firms tend to choose foreign outsourcing for components with
high input intensity. Consistent with Antràs and Helpman (2008), who consider partial contractibility
and cross-country differences in contracting institutions, the study by Corcos et al. (2009) finds that
firms are more likely to offshore in countries with good contracting institutions, and Bernard et al. (2010)
report that institutional improvements favor foreign outsourcing. The studies by Feenstra and Hanson
(2005), Yeaple (2006), Marin (2006), and Federico (2010), among others, are also concerned with the
internal structure of MNEs and obtain empirical findings broadly in line with those baseline models.
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symmetric components, while section 3.5 looks at the case with two asymmetric inputs.
In section 3.6 we conclude and contrast the predictions of our model with stylized facts on
the structure of MNEs. In that section, we also point out some further testable predictions
that have not yet been explored, in order to motivate future empirical research.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Demand and technology
We consider a firm that produces a final good y for which it faces the following iso-elastic
demand function:
y = Y · p1/(α−1). (3.1)
The variable p denotes the price of this good, and Y > 1 is a demand shifter. The demand
elasticity is given by 1/(1 − α) and is increasing in the parameter α (with 0 < α < 1).
Production of this good requires headquarter services and manufacturing components,
which are combined according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
y = θ ·
￿
h
ηH
￿ηH
·
￿
M
1− ηH
￿1−ηH
. (3.2)
The parameter θ > 0 is a productivity shifter; the larger θ is, the more productive is the
firm. Headquarter services are denoted by h and are provided by the “producer”. The
parameter ηH (with 0 < ηH < 1) is the exogenously given headquarter-intensity, and re-
flects the technology of the sector in which the firm operates. Consequently, ηM = 1−ηH
is the overall component-intensity of production. There is a continuum of manufacturing
components, with measure N ∈ R+. Each component is provided by a separate sup-
plier. The supplier i ∈ [0, N ] delivers mi units of its particular input, and the aggregate
component input M is given by:
M = exp

N￿
0
ln
￿
mi
ηi
￿ηi
di
 . (3.3)
The parameter ηi ∈ (0, 1) reflects the intensity of component i within the aggregate M ,
with
￿ N
0 ηjdj = 1. The total input intensity of component i for final goods production is
therefore given by ηM · ηi.4 Using equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), total firm revenue can
4If all components are symmetric, as will be assumed in Section 3.4, then each one has an individual
input intensity equal to (1− ηH)/N .
23
be written as follows:
R = θα · Y (1−α) ·
￿￿
h
ηH
￿ηH
·
￿
M
ηM
￿ηM￿α
, (3.4)
which is increasing in the firm’s productivity and demand level.
3.3.2 Firm structure
The producer decides on the structure of the firm, and this choice involves three aspects:
i) complexity, ii) organization, and iii) global scale of production. Complexity refers to
the mass of components that are part of the production process. Recall that overall
component-intensity ηM is exogenous and sector-specific. For example, intermediate in-
puts generally account for a larger share of total value added in the automobile than,
say, in the software industry. Yet, within a sector, a producer can still decide on how
thinly she wants to slice the value chain. If she chooses a “low” level of complexity, she
relies on a setting with relatively few and broad components with a high average input
intensity ηi. An increase in complexity lowers the average input intensity across the single
components at constant overall component-intensity ηM . The inputs then become more
specialized, and the respective suppliers have more narrowly defined tasks. For example,
the carburetor system in car production may then no longer be provided by a single sup-
plier, but different parts (like the choke and the throttle valve) are provided by different
suppliers.
Secondly, turning to the organizational decision, the producer decides separately for
each component if the respective supplier is integrated as a subsidiary within the bound-
aries of the firm, or if that component is outsourced to an external supplier. The crucial
assumption is that the investments for all inputs are not contractible, as in Antràs and
Helpman (2004). This may be due to the fact that the precise characteristics of the
inputs are difficult to specify ex ante and also difficult to verify ex post. As a result of
this contract incompleteness, the producer and the suppliers end up in a bargaining sit-
uation, at a time when their input investments are already sunk. Following the property
rights approach of the firm, see Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990),
we assume that bargaining also takes place within the boundaries of the firm in the case
of vertical integration. This bargaining leads to a division of the total firm revenue as
given in eq.(3.4) among the producer and the suppliers, where the bargaining power of
the involved parties depends crucially on the firm structure, as will be explained below.
Finally, the producer decides on the global scale of production, i.e., on the location
where each component is manufactured. The headquarter itself is located in a high-wage
country 1, where final assembly of good y is carried out. Both under outsourcing and
vertical integration, the respective input suppliers may either also come from country
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1, or from a foreign low-wage country 2. In terms of the cross-country trade pattern,
there is an arm’s length transaction if the producer outsources a component to a foreign
contractor, and intra-firm trade (vertical FDI) if a foreign supplier is vertically integrated.
3.3.3 Structure of the game
We consider a game that consists of seven stages. Our aim is to solve this game by
backward induction for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The timing of events is
as follows:
1. The final goods producer enters and learns about the firm-specific productivity θ.
2. The producer decides whether to exit immediately, or to remain active in the mar-
ket.
3. If the firm remains active, the producer simultaneously decides on: i) the com-
plexity, ii) the organization, and iii) the global scale of the production process. In
particular, i) she chooses the mass N of manufacturing components. ii) For each
i ∈ [0, N ] the organizational choice is given by ξi = {O, V }. Here, ξi = O denotes
“outsourcing” and ξi = V denotes “vertical integration” of supplier i. We order
the mass N such that each supplier j ∈ [0, NO] is outsourced, and each supplier
k ∈ (NO, N ] is vertically integrated. Then, ξ = NO/N (with 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1) denotes
the outsourcing share, and (1 − ξ) = NV /N is the share of vertically integrated
suppliers/components. Finally, iii) for each i ∈ [0, N ] the producer decides on the
country r = {1, 2} where that component is manufactured. We order the mass of
outsourced suppliers NO such that each supplier j ∈ [0, NO2 ] is offshored to the
low-wage country 2, and each supplier k ∈ (NO2 , NO] is located in the high-wage
country 1. Then, ￿O = NO2 /NO denotes the offshoring share among all outsourced
suppliers (with 0 ≤ ￿O ≤ 1). Similarly, ￿V = NV2 /NV (with 0 ≤ ￿V ≤ 1) is the
offshoring share among all integrated suppliers, and the total offshoring share of
the firm is given by ￿ = ξ · ￿O + (1− ξ) · ￿V .
4. Given the choice {N, ξ, ￿O, ￿V }, the producer offers a contract to potential input
suppliers for every component i ∈ [0, N ]. This contract includes an upfront payment
τi (positive or negative) to be paid by the prospective supplier.
5. There exists a large pool of potential applicant suppliers for each manufacturing
component in both countries. These suppliers have an outside opportunity (wage)
equal to wMr in country r = {1, 2}. They are willing to accept the producer’s
contract if their payoff is at least equal to wMr . The payoff consists of the upfront
payment τi and the revenue share βi that supplier i anticipates to receive at the
bargaining stage, minus the investment costs (which may differ across applicants).
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Potential suppliers apply for the contract, and the producer chooses one supplier
(either from country 1 or from country 2) for each component i ∈ [0, N ].
6. The producer and the suppliers independently decide on their non-contractible input
levels for the headquarter service (h) and the components (mi), respectively.
7. Output is produced and revenue is realized according to (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4). The
producer and the suppliers bargain over the division of the surplus value.
Starting with stage 7, following Grossman and Hart (1986) we assume that the pro-
ducer and the suppliers cannot write down enforcable contracts that specify the division of
revenue. The producer rather has to decide on the structure of the firm (complexity, orga-
nization, global scale) in order to affect the revenue distribution, since the firm structure
pins down the bargaining power of the involved agents. We assume that the bargaining
process follows a generalized simultaneous multi-party Nash bargaining.5 The surplus
value over which the N + 1 agents bargain is the total revenue R as given in eq.(3.4),
and the agents receive revenue shares that are reflective of their respective bargaining
power. The revenue share of component supplier i is given by βi, and βM =
￿ N
0 βjdj
denotes the joint revenue share of all component suppliers. The revenue share realized
by the producer is written as βH , and we have βH = 1 − βM . The headquarter revenue
share βH reflects the effective bargaining power of the producer vis-a-vis the component
suppliers. How the firm structure influences the bargaining power of the involved parties
is analyzed later.
In stage 6, each component supplier i chooses mi so as to maximize βiR − cMi,rmi for
each i ∈ [0, N ], where cMi,r denotes the unit cost level of the supplier for component i
that the producer has offered the contract. The producer chooses h in order to maximize
βHR− cHh, where cH denotes the unit cost of providing headquarter services. We show
in Appendix A.1. that the agents choose the following levels of input provision:
m∗i = α · ηM · ηi · βi ·R∗ / cMi,r and h∗ = α · ηH · βH ·R∗ / cH , (3.5)
with total revenue given by
R∗ = (αθ)α/(1−α) · Y ·
￿βH
cH
￿ηH
·
exp

N￿
0
ln
￿
βj
cMj,r
￿ηj
dj

ηM

α
1−α
. (3.6)
Everything else equal, the investment by supplier i relative to that of some other supplier
j, (m∗i /m∗j), is increasing in supplier i’s revenue share βi and input intensity ηi. Similarly,
the producer invests relatively more the higher βH and ηH are.
5We propose a Nash bargaining as in Antràs and Helpman (2004), since the mass of suppliers N is
already determined at stage 7. We rule out the possibility of partial cooperation as in Acemoglu et al.
(2007), where the Shapley value is used to account for potential coalition formation.
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Next, in order to receive applications for each desired component input in stage 5,
the producer must offer contracts in stage 4 that satisfy the suppliers’ participation
constraints. For supplier i this implies that the individual payoff from forming the rela-
tionship, given (3.5) and (3.6), must at least be equal to the attainable outside wage:
βiR− cMi,rmi + τi ≥ wMr . (3.7)
In stage 3, the producer then chooses the structure of the firm so as to maximize her
individual payoff, βHR − cHh − ￿ N0 τjdj, subject to the revenue given in eq.(3.4), the
incentive compatibility constraints (3.5), and the participation constraints (3.7). Since
the producer can freely adjust the upfront payments τi, these participation constraints are
satisfied with equality for all suppliers i ∈ [0, N ]. Rearranging τi = wMr − βiR + cMi,rmi,
substituting this into the individual payoff of the producer, and recalling that βM =
1 − βH , it follows that the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the total
payoff for all N+1 involved parties, i.e.: π = R∗−￿ N0 cMj,rm∗jdj−cHh∗−f , where f is the
outside opportunity wMr aggregated across all (domestic and foreign) suppliers. Notice
that the term f is increasing in N as long as wMr > 0, i.e., the participation constraints
generate a “fixed cost” that is endogenously increasing in complexity, as this necessitates
contracting with more suppliers.6 We additionally allow for exogenous fixed costs f¯ which
arise independently of the participation constraints, e.g. for general overhead costs. With
overall fixed costs given by F = f + f¯ , we can rewrite the total payoff as follows by using
(3.4) and (3.5):
π = Θ · Y ·Ψ− F, (3.8)
Ψ ≡
1− α
βHηH + ηM N￿
0
βjηjdj

￿βH
cH
￿ηHexp

N￿
0
ln
￿
βj
cMj,r
￿ηj
dj

η
M
α
1−α
, (3.9)
where Θ = (αθ)α/(1−α) is an alternative productivity measure.
Finally, similar as in Melitz (2003), a firm learns about its productivity level θ upon
entry, which is drawn from some density function g(θ) with support [θ,∞], where θ > 0
denotes a lower bound. The firm only stays in the market (in stage 2) when the variable
payoff Θ · Y ·Ψ is sufficiently large to cover the fixed costs F .
3.4 Symmetric components
In this section we consider the case of symmetric components. We assume that the
individual input intensities of the single components are given by ηM · ηi =
￿
1− ηH￿ /N
6We assume that outside opportunities may differ across countries, but not across suppliers from the
same country. This assumption could be relaxed without affecting our main results. Our main results
only require that overall fixed costs for the firm are increasing in complexity N .
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for all i ∈ [0, N ]. We first abstract from the global scale dimension, and focus on the
complexity and organization decision when all suppliers are located in country 1.
3.4.1 Closed economy
Notice that an increase in the complexity level N is associated with a uniform reduction
of the individual input intensities of all suppliers, as each supplier now performs a more
narrowly defined task. We assume that this specialization leads to efficiency gains, similar
as in Acemoglu et al. (2007). Specifically, we assume that unit costs are the same for
all suppliers, and are given by cM = c/N s, with 0 < s < 1. The unit costs cM are thus
decreasing in N for all suppliers, and these cost savings are more substantial the larger s
is. Without loss of generality, we normalize the parameter c to unity (c = 1).
With symmetric components, and using (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9), the producer’s problem
is to maximize the following total payoff:
π = Θ · Y ·Ψ−N · wM1 − f¯ , (3.10)
Ψ ≡
￿
1− α
￿
βHηH +
βMηM
N
￿￿￿βH
cH
￿ηH N s · exp
 1N
N￿
0
ln (βj) dj

η
M
α
1−α
. (3.11)
In subsection 3.4.1.1 we first study the case where enforcable contracts on the ex ante
division of revenue are possible. In that case, the producer maximizes eqs.(3.10) and
(3.11) simultaneously with respect to N and βH . In subsection 3.4.1.2 we then study
the incomplete contracts scenario where the producer cannot freely decide on the ex ante
division of the surplus, but has to choose the complexity and the organization of the
production process in order to affect the division of revenue that results in the bargaining
stage.
3.4.1.1 Optimal mass of suppliers and revenue division
When the producer can freely choose the headquarter revenue share βH , then each sup-
plier receives a revenue share βi = (1−βH)/N due to symmetry. Using (3.10) and (3.11),
the firm’s variable payoff Θ · Y ·Ψ ￿N, βH￿ can then be simplified as follows:
Θ · Y ·Ψ = Θ · Y ·
￿
1− α
￿
βHηH +
￿
1− ηH￿ ￿1− βH￿
N
￿￿￿￿
βH
cH
￿ηH ￿
1− βH
N1−s
￿1−ηH￿ α1−α
.
(3.12)
a) Zero outside opportunity. When setting the suppliers’ outside opportunities to
zero (wM1 = 0), the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the variable payoff as
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given in (3.12). For this case, we can derive the following unique solution (see Appendix
A.2.1.i):
N∗
￿
wM1 = 0
￿
=
ρ− s ￿1− ηH￿ ￿1 + αηH￿
2 (1− s) ηH ≡ N
∗
0 , (3.13)
βH∗
￿
wM1 = 0
￿
=
2ηH − ρ+ s ￿1− ηH￿ ￿1− αηH￿
2ηH
≡ βH∗0 (3.14)
with ρ =
￿
s (1− ηH) (1− αηH) (4ηH + s (1− ηH) (1− αηH)). Notice that 0 < βH∗0 < 1
and N∗0 > 0 for all 0 < s < 1, 0 < ηH < 1, and 0 < α < 1. It directly follows from the
solution in (3.13) and (3.14) that:
∂βH∗0
∂ηH
> 0,
∂N∗0
∂ηH
< 0,
∂βH∗0
∂s
< 0,
∂N∗0
∂s
> 0.
Higher headquarter-intensity of final goods production leads to a larger optimal rev-
enue share for the producer. The intuition for this result is similar as in Antràs and
Helpman (2004, 2008): both the headquarter and the suppliers underinvest in the pro-
vision of their respective inputs, and this underinvestment problem is more severe for
the headquarter (the mass of suppliers) the smaller (the larger) the revenue share βH is.
Ensuring ex ante efficiency requires that the producer should receive a larger share of the
surplus in sectors where headquarter services are more intensively used in production.
The basic trade-off with respect to the complexity choice N is novel in our framework.
It can be seen from (3.12) that the impact of N on the variable payoff is, a priori,
ambiguous. Intuitively, higher complexity leads to stronger specialization (i.e., lower unit
costs cM), which tends to increase the firm’s revenue and payoff. On the other hand,
for a given share βH , higher complexity also “dilutes” the investment incentives for every
single supplier, because the individual input intensities decrease and the overall revenue
share βM = 1− βH has to be split among more parties. This negatively impacts on the
firm’s payoff. The optimal complexity N∗0 balances the “cost saving” and the “dilution”
effect. Higher headquarter-intensity ηH leads to a lower optimal complexity. The reason
is the following: The optimal joint revenue share for the suppliers (βM∗) is decreasing in
ηH , which tends to jeopardize their investment incentives. To countervail this problem,
the producer can concentrate on relatively few components with a high individual input
intensity. Although the gains from specialization are smaller in that case, the resulting
increases of βi and ηi again raise the suppliers’ incentives (see eq. (3.5)).7
7It is, thus, not clear if the optimal revenue share of a single supplier (β∗i0) is increasing or decreasing in
headquarter-intensity ηH ; there is a larger joint revenue share βM when ηH is low (“component-intensity
effect”), but this share is then split among many suppliers (“complexity effect”). Using (3.13) and (3.14),
it can be shown that β∗i0 = (1 − βH∗0 )/N∗0 is in fact hump-shaped over the range of ηH and achieves a
maximum at some level ηHcrit (see Appendix A.2.1.ii). In other words, single suppliers receive the highest
revenue shares in sectors with medium headquarter-intensity.
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The stronger the cost savings from specialization are (the larger s is), the more prof-
itable is it to add components to the value chain, i.e., the higher is N∗0 . This increase in
complexity is then accompanied by a decrease in the optimal revenue share βH∗0 , since
the incentives for all component manufacturers must be maintained.8 When s becomes
very small, so does N∗0 . Intuitively, the “cost saving” effect disappears if s tends to zero.
The “dilution effect” for the suppliers is still present, however, so that the optimal mass
of components would then also become very small.9 Notice that this is true even though
contracting with more suppliers leads to no increase in fixed costs as long as wM1 = 0.
Finally, notice that the payoff-maximizing choices (3.13) and (3.14) do not depend
on Θ. Still, a firm needs to be sufficiently productive in order to remain in the market,
since the variable payoff must be large enough to cover the fixed costs f¯ . Hence, only
such firms survive whose productivity level is above some threshold Θˆ0 given in Appendix
A.2.1.v.
b) Positive outside opportunity. Turning to the case with wM1 > 0, recall that
a more complex production process leads to larger fixed costs f = N · wM1 , since the
suppliers’ participation constraints must be taken into account. With a positive outside
opportunity there is thus an additional endogenous “complexity penalty” embedded in
our model.
With wM1 > 0, we cannot explicitly solve for N∗ and βH∗. However, using the two
first-order conditions for payoff maximization, it is possible to solve ∂π/∂βH = 0 for
βH (N) with ∂βH/∂N < 0, which does not depend on wM1 (see eq.(3.23) in Appendix
A.2.2.i). Substituting this into the other first-order condition, we can derive the following
function:
∂π
∂N
= Θ · Y · ∂Ψ
∂N
￿￿
βH=βH(N)￿ ￿￿ ￿
≡Ψ￿
−wM1 = 0 ⇔ Ψ￿ =
wM1
Θ · Y .
Ψ￿ depends only on N and represents the marginal change in the total payoff when
raising complexity, taking into account that βH(N) is optimally adjusted. We know that
Ψ￿ = 0 is solved by N∗0 as given in (3.14). With wM1 > 0, the optimal mass of producers
N∗ is determined by setting Ψ￿ equal to wM1 /(Θ ·Y ) > 0, and since ∂Ψ￿/∂N < 0 it follows
8We show in Appendix A.2.1.iii that N∗0 = 1 if s is equal to some scrit. Suppose for the moment
that the set of suppliers N is discrete, by assuming that the unit mass of inputs on the interval [0, 1]
is provided by a single supplier. In fact, if s = scrit, choosing a unit mass of inputs is optimal for the
producer. The corresponding optimal revenue share βH∗0 (s = scrit) in that case is identical to eq. (10)
in Antràs and Helpman (2004), where it is imposed exogenously that there is just one single component
supplier. Their baseline model is thus included in our framework as a special case. When s is smaller
(larger) than scrit, it is optimal to have less (more) than a unit mass of inputs.
9See Appendix A.2.1.iv for an analytical decomposition that illustrates the trade-off between these
effects more formally.
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that 0 < N∗ < N∗0 and 0 < βH∗0 < βH∗ < 1, with:
∂N∗
∂Θ
> 0,
∂N∗
∂ηH
< 0,
∂N∗
∂wM1
< 0,
∂βH∗
∂Θ
< 0,
∂βH∗
∂ηH
> 0,
∂βH∗
∂wM1
> 0.
The downward-sloping thick curve in Figure 3.1 illustrates the function Ψ￿. The op-
timal mass of suppliers is where this curve cuts the horizontal line. An increase of wM1
leads to an upward shift, and an increase of Θ to a downward shift of this horizontal
line. For given values of wM1 and ηH , more productive firms thus collaborate with more
suppliers, since they can easier cope with the requirement to match their outside oppor-
tunities. Still, all firms choose a complexity level below N∗0 , i.e., the optimal complexity
N∗ is bounded. Furthermore, the Ψ￿-curve shifts to the left as ηH increases. Hence, when
comparing equally productive firms, those from headquarter-intensive industries have
lower optimal complexity than those from component-intensive industries (see Appendix
A.2.2.i).
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Figure 3.1: Optimal complexity with (N∗) and without (N∗0 ) increasing fixed costs.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of revenue
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In Figure 3.2 we illustrate the corresponding optimal headquarter revenue share. The
figure firstly depicts the βH∗0 -curve for the benchmark case with wM1 = 0. Since we know
from the first-order conditions that ∂βH/∂N < 0 (see Appendix A.2.2.i), it is clear that
the βH∗-curve stretches out to the left if wM1 > 0, which implies a higher βH∗ throughout
the entire range of ηH . The reason is that an increase in wM1 , by reducing the optimal
complexity level, leads to a higher individual input intensity ηi = ηM/N for each supplier.
This raises the suppliers’ incentives and thereby allows for a larger optimal revenue share
βH∗. Yet, this share is lower in firms with higher productivity, i.e., the firm-specific βH∗-
curve moves closer to the βH∗0 -curve. The intuition is that more productive firms operate
more complex production processes, and to maintain the investment incentives, they need
to leave a larger revenue share βM for the suppliers. In the limit, βH∗ converges to βH∗0 .
A stronger cost saving effect s naturally leads to more suppliers (a higher N∗) and,
thus, to a lower βH∗.10 Furthermore, higher productivity implies a higher total payoff
π, despite the fact that more productive firms have more complex production processes
and, thus, higher fixed costs. Higher productivity thus raises the variable payoff Θ ·Y ·Ψ
stronger than the fixed costs F = N∗ · wM1 + f¯ (see Appendix A.2.2.ii). Ultimately,
a firm only survives if it is sufficiently productive to cover these fixed costs, which are
unambiguously larger than in the previous case with wM1 = 0. It is thus clear that
the threshold productivity Θˆ is larger than the benchmark level Θˆ0 given in Appendix
fA.2.1.v, even though we cannot solve for Θˆ in closed form.
3.4.1.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
We now turn to the incomplete contracts scenario where the producer cannot “freely”
decide on the ex ante division of the surplus, but has to choose the complexity and the
organization of the firm in order to affect the division of revenue that results in the bar-
gaining stage. Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that external suppliers
are in a better bargaining position than integrated suppliers vis-a-vis the producer. This
is due to the fact that the producer has no ownership of the assets of external suppliers,
while she does have residual control rights over the assets of those suppliers that are
integrated within the boundaries of the firm.
Specifically, we assume that if the producer has outsourced all suppliers (ξ = 1), she is
able to realize an exogenously given revenue share βHmin. Vice versa, if she has integrated
all suppliers (ξ = 0), she is able to realize a larger revenue share, βHmax > βHmin, as a result
of her asset ownership. For intermediate cases with 0 < ξ < 1, her realized revenue share
(her “effective bargaining power”) can be written as:
βH = ξ · βHmin + (1− ξ) · βHmax. (3.15)
10Graphically, the Ψ￿-curve in Figure 3.1 shifts to the right as s increases. In the corresponding Figure
3.2, both the βH∗0 - and the βH∗-curve stretch out to the right.
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The producer can thus affect her revenue share via the outsourcing share ξ = NO/N ,
but she is contrained to the range between βHmin and βHmax.11 The remaining share
βM = 1−βH is left for the suppliers, and the individual revenue share of an outsourced and
an integrated supplier is denoted by βOi and βVi , respectively. Since βM = NO·βOi +NV ·βVi
must hold, it follows that NO · βOi = ξ · (1 − βHmin) is the revenue share of the external
contractors, and NV · βVi = (1− ξ) · (1− βHmax) the share of the integrated affiliates.12
a) Zero outside opportunity. As before we start with the case where the suppliers’
outside opportunities are set to zero (wM1 = 0). In this case, the producer’s problem is
equivalent to maximizing the variable payoff Θ · Y ·Ψ ￿N, βH(ξ)￿ with respect to N and
ξ, subject to the constraint (3.15). The term Ψ is given by eq.(3.11).
As long as the constraint βH ∈ ￿βHmin, βHmax￿ is not binding, this maximization problem
leads to an equivalent solution as described in subsection 3.4.1.1 In particular, if the
producer is able to choose the outsourcing share ξ in such a way that βH exactly matches
βH∗0 as given in (3.14), she would target this payoff-maximizing revenue distribution with
her organizational choice, and hence the corresponding complexity N∗0 given in (3.13).
Since ξ · βHmin + (1− ξ) · βHmax = βH∗0 in that case, this implies the following outsourcing
share:
ξ∗0 =
￿
βHmax − βH0 ∗
￿
/
￿
βHmax − βHmin
￿
for βHmin ≤ βH∗0 ≤ βHmax. (3.16)
Notice, however, that this outsourcing share is feasible if and only if βHmin ≤ βH∗0 ≤ βHmax.
Otherwise, if βH∗0 < βHmin or βH∗0 > βHmax, she cannot achieve the unconstrained payoff-
maximizing firm structure. She would then aim for an outsourcing share ξ that aligns
the βH given in eq. (3.15) as closely as possible with the optimal βH0 ∗, and for the
corresponding constrained optimal complexity level – also see Appendix A.3.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this problem. The figure depicts the payoff-maximizing βH∗0
that the producer aims for. If the firm operates in a headquarter-intensive sector, more
precisely a sector with ηH > η¯H0 where the threshold η¯H0 is defined in Appendix A.3.1.,
we have βH0 ∗ > βHmax so that the producer cannot achieve βH∗0 . Firms from those sectors
choose complete vertical integration, ξ˜0 = 0, as this leads to the maximum possible rev-
11Notice that βHmin and βHmax are independent of N . The complexity of the production process,
therefore, does not directly affect the bargaining power of the producer, which is plausible since the
headquarter-intensity is also exogenous and independent of N . It is possible to analyze cases where
complexity systematically affects the bargaining power (the realized revenue share) of the headquarter,
but this complicates the analysis without adding many further insights.
12The joint revenue share of all suppliers (βM ) is thus unambiguously larger with complete outsourcing
(ξ = 1) than with complete integration (ξ = 0). However, a single outsourced contractor in the first
scenario does not necessarily obtain a larger revenue share than a single integrated affiliate in the second
scenario. That is, βOi with ξ = 1 need not be larger than βVi with ξ = 0, because NO and NV need
not be the same. Yet, in a constellation where outsourcing and integration coexist, it is clear that an
external supplier receives a larger revenue share than an integrated supplier (βOi > βVi with 0 < ξ < 1).
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enue share βHmax for the headquarter; the corresponding constrained optimal complexity
level is analyzed soon. Vice versa, if the firm operates in a component-intensive sector,
more precisely a sector with ηH < η¯H0 where the threshold η¯H0 is defined in Appendix
A.3.1., the producer also cannot achieve βH∗0 , and she then aims for the highest possible
revenue share for the suppliers by choosing complete outsourcing (ξ˜0 = 1). In sectors
with η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 , the producer is not constrained by βHmin ≤ βH∗0 ≤ βHmax, and she
therefore sets ξ˜0 = ξ∗0 as given in (3.16). In those sectors with medium headquarter-
intensity we thus observe a coexistence of both organizational forms within the same firm
(hybrid sourcing), with a higher outsourcing share in relatively more component-intensive
industries within that range (∂ξ∗0/∂ηH < 0 since ∂βH0 ∗/∂ηH > 0).13
Turning to the corresponding complexity decision, let N˜0 denote the complexity choice
under incomplete contracts for the case with wM1 = 0. To compute N˜0, notice that in
sectors with ηH > η¯H0 and ηH < η¯H0 , firms choose the same organizational form for
all suppliers (complete vertical integration and, respectively, complete outsourcing). For
these cases with a uniform organizational structure, we can simplifyΨ as given in eq.(3.11)
by setting βj = (1 − β˜H0 )/N where β˜H0 = {βHmin, βHmax}. Solving Ψ￿ = ∂Ψ/∂N = 0 then
yields:
N˜0 =
￿
1− β˜H0
￿ ￿
1− sα ￿1− ηH￿− αηH￿
(1− s)
￿
1− αβ˜H0 ηH
￿ . (3.17)
It follows directly from (3.17) that N˜O0 ≡ N˜0
￿
β˜H0 = β
H
min
￿
> N˜0
￿
β˜H0 = β
H
max
￿
≡ N˜V0 .
That is, vertical integration is endogenously associated with less complexity than out-
sourcing, as the producer can reduce the underinvestment problem for the suppliers
by choosing fewer intermediate inputs. Next, for the unconstrained firms in sectors
with medium headquarter-intensity η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 , where βH = βH∗0 and 0 ≤ ξ˜0 ≤
ξ∗0 < 1 holds, the mass of suppliers is given by (3.13), since it can be shown that
N˜0
￿
β˜H0 = β
H∗
0
￿
= N∗0 .14
Figure 3.3 summarizes the results. Active firms in sectors with low headquarter-
intensity have a huge mass of suppliers (N˜O0 ), all of which are outsourced. Gradually
moving to more headquarter-intensive sectors, we first see no change in the firms’ organi-
zational structures or the producer’s revenue shares, since ξ˜0 = 1 and βH = βHmin as long
as ηH < η¯H0 . Yet, such a gradual increase of ηH leads to a decreasing mass of suppliers N˜O0 ,
hence the most complex production processes prevail in the most component-intensive
sectors.15 Once we turn to sectors with a headquarter-intensity above η¯H0 , there is a
13Du, Lu and Tao (2009) consider an extension of Antràs and Helpman (2004) where the same input
can be provided by two suppliers. “Bi-sourcing” (one supplier integrated and the other outsourced) can
arise in their model out of a strategic motive, because it systematically improves the headquarter’s outside
option and, thus, her effective bargaining power. Our model relies on an entirely different (non-strategic)
mechanism why firms may choose different organizational modes for different inputs.
14N˜0 is continuous in ηH and β˜H0 , so that it can be easily shown that N˜O0 > N∗0 > N˜V0 holds.
15For a given ξ, higher headquarter-intensity is thus inversely related to complexity, similar as in
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coexistence of both organizational forms within the same firm. The headquarter revenue
share is gradually increasing, and the outsourcing share is gradually decreasing in ηH .
Complexity N˜0 continues to decrease in ηH and is equal to N∗0 in that range. Finally, once
ηH goes beyond η¯H0 , further increasing the headquarter-intensity has again no impact on
organizational structures or the producers’ revenue shares, since ξ˜0 = 0 and βH = βHmax
if ηH > η¯H0 . It still leads to a decreasing mass of suppliers, which is now given by N˜V0 .
Firms in the most headquarter-intensive sectors are thus the least complex ones, and fully
vertically integrated.
0N
HηHη
0ξ
1
0
0 0
Hη 0Hη0 0Hη 0Hη 1 1
Figure 3.3: Organization and complexity decision for the case with wMr = 0.
The complexity and the organizational decision therefore have opposite incentive ef-
fects for the suppliers. Complete outsourcing (vertical integration) leaves a large (small)
combined revenue share for the suppliers, but this share is then divided among many
(few) of them. A stronger cost saving effect (a higher value of s) is associated with a
larger mass of suppliers, other things equal.16 Moreover, the βH∗0 -curve in Figure 3.2
stretches out to the right, and both η¯H0 and η¯H0 go up when s increases (see Appendix
A.3.1.i). Complete outsourcing is then chosen over a larger, and complete integration
over a smaller domain of ηH the larger s is, as it becomes relatively more attractive to
choose the organizational form that is endogenously associated with higher complexity,
i.e., to choose outsourcing.
Finally, it is important to note that, as long as the suppliers’ outside opportunities
are set to zero (wM1 = 0), there are no intra-sectoral differences in the complexity and
the organization of firms. That is, for a given headquarter-intensity, all active firms
in that industry (regardless of productivity) would choose the same mass of suppliers
and the same outsourcing share. This is shown in the left panel of Figure 3.4. Here
we depict the total payoff π as a function of Θ and ηH . A darker color indicates a
higher complexity level. Within every sector (i.e., moving parallel to the Θ-axis), we
see that higher productivity implies a higher total payoff, but it does not affect the
subsection 3.4.1.2 where we have shown that the optimal mass of suppliers N∗0 also depends negatively
on ηH . Formally, ∂N˜O0 /∂ηH < 0 only holds if s < (1− β˜H0 )/(1−αβ˜H0 ). To avoid undue case distinctions,
we assume that the exogenous βHmax is sufficiently small so that this restriction on s is satisfied.
16Formally, eq.(3.17) implies ∂N˜0/∂s > 0 which applies for the ranges ηH < η¯H0 and ηH > η¯H0 , and
eq.(3.13) implies ∂N∗0 /∂s > 0 which applies for the range η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 .
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firms’ complexity or organization. Both differ only across sectors, such that a higher
headquarter-intensity is associated with less suppliers and more vertical integration (as
also shown in Figure 3.3). Figure 3.4a furthermore illustrates the decision whether to
remain active in the market. For all firms in the hybrid range η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 , the
threshold producitivity for survival, Θ˜0, is identical to Θˆ0 given in Appendix A.2.1.v,
while Θ˜0 > Θˆ0 must hold for all other firms, as they face the binding constraint βH ∈￿
βHmin, β
H
max
￿
and cannot achieve the unconstrained payoff maximum. They hence need a
higher productivity to break even.
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Figure 3.4: Total firm payoff, complexity and organization.
b) Positive outside opportunity. We now focus on the case with endogenous fixed
costs (wM1 > 0). We cannot explicitly solve for N˜ and ξ˜ in this case, but similar as in
subsection 3.4.1.1 it is again possible to infer important comparative static results.
As in the previous case with wM1 = 0, a single producer chooses the outsourcing share
ξ so as to realign the revenue share βH from eq. (3.15) as closely as possible with the
payoff-maximizing revenue share βH∗, which then implies a corresponding complexity
choice N˜ . Comparing βH∗ with the available range of revenue shares, βH ∈ ￿βHmin, βHmax￿,
we can classify every firm into one of the following three groups:
1. firms with βH∗
￿
ηH , wM1 ,Θ
￿
> βHmax,
2. firms with βH∗
￿
ηH , wM1 ,Θ
￿
< βHmin,
3. firms with βHmin ≤ βH∗
￿
ηH , wM1 ,Θ
￿ ≤ βHmax.
For the firms in group 3, the constraint βH ∈ ￿βHmin, βHmax￿ is not binding. These firms
can choose an outsourcing share ξ˜ = ξ∗ =
￿
βHmax − βH∗
￿
/
￿
βHmax − βHmin
￿
so as to exactly
match βH∗. For the other groups the constraint is binding, and all firms in group 1 choose
complete vertical integration, while all firms in group 2 choose complete outsourcing.
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The corresponding complexity choice can then be derived as follows: From eqs.(3.10)
and (3.11) we know that N˜ is determined according to Ψ￿ = wM1 /(Θ · Y ). For the uncon-
strained firms, which are able to achieve βH∗ by setting ξ˜ = ξ∗, their complexity choice N˜
is thus equivalent to the payoff-maximizingN∗ described above. For the constrained firms,
we can define the following functions: ΨO ￿ ≡ Ψ￿ ￿N, βH = βHmin, βj = (1− βHmin)/N￿ and
ΨV ￿ ≡ Ψ￿ ￿N, βH = βHmax, βj = (1− βHmax)/N￿, which depend negatively on N and depict
the marginal change in the variable payoff for fixed values of βH that correspond to the
headquarter revenue share under complete outsourcing and integration, respectively. In
Figure 3.5 we illustrate the curves ΨO ￿ and ΨV ￿, and it can be easily shown that the
former curve always runs to the right of the latter (see Appendix A.3.2.).17
The complexity choice that corresponds to every possible organizational decision is
determined by the intersection point of the respective downward-sloping Ψ￿-curve with
the horizontal line at wM1 /(Θ · Y ). In Figure 3.5 we depict two firms from the same
industry, one with “high” and one with “low” productivity. Suppose both firms have
the same organizational structure. The highly productive firm then collaborates with
more suppliers. More importantly, for given Θ and ηH , we have N˜O > N˜0<ξ<1 > N˜V >
0. Hence, vertical integration is endogenously associated with lower complexity. The
intuition is similar as above: Since the suppliers receive a relatively small joint revenue
share with vertical integration, decreasing complexity is a device to countervail their
underinvestment problems.18
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Figure 3.5: Payoff-maximizing mass of suppliers: The complexity decision.
To pin down the final complexity and organization decisions of firms in different
industries, it is crucial to note that the three groups of firms defined above can no longer
be delineated by the sectoral headquarter-intensity ηH alone. Recall from Figure 3.2 that
the βH∗0 -curve is increasing in ηH , and that wM1 > 0 leads to an increase of βH∗ that is
17Since Ψ is continuous in βH , it follows immediately that the Ψ￿-curves for the intermediate cases
with 0 < ξ˜ < 1→ βHmin < βH < βHmax are located in between the ΨV ￿- and the ΨO ￿-curve.
18Notice that N˜ always remains below the respective N˜0 for the same organizational structure, which
is located at the intersection of the respective Ψ￿-curve with the horizontal axis. Furthermore, it can be
shown that an increase in the headquarter-intensity ηH shifts all Ψ￿-curves to the left and, thus, leads
to a smaller mass of suppliers for all possible productivities and organizational forms.
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larger for less productive firms. In other words, βH∗
￿
ηH , wM1 ,Θ
￿
is no longer the same
for all firms from the same industry (with the same ηH), but it is now firm-specific as it
depends on Θ. Hence, firms from the same industry no longer need to choose identical
firm structures.
The final complexity and organization decisions are summarized above in the right
panel of Figure 3.4. First, consider headquarter-intensive sectors with ηH > η¯H0 . All
firms from those sectors belong to group 1, and thus choose complete vertical integration.
This is for two reasons. This organization leads to the highest possible revenue share
βHmax for the producer. Now this choice is reinforced, since vertical integration is also
associated with fewer suppliers and with lower fixed costs. There is, hence, no change in
the organizational decision of firms in headquarter-intensive industries compared to the
previous case with wM1 = 0, which is depicted in Figure 3.4a. In other words, in sectors
with ηH > η¯H0 , all firms (regardless of productivity) choose complete vertical integration.
Figure 3.4b also shows that not only the total payoff π, but also the complexity level
N˜V is now increasing in Θ. That is, within a given headquarter-intensive sector, more
productive firms vertically integrate more suppliers. Furthermore, comparing two equally
productive firms from two industries A and B with ηHA > ηHB > η¯H0 , it turns out that the
firm in sector A chooses less complexity than the firm in the relatively more component-
intensive sector B.
Now consider component-intensive sectors where ηH < η¯H0 . Without the endogenous
“complexity penalty”, all firms in those sectors would belong to group 2 and choose
complete outsourcing (see Figure 3.4a). With wM1 > 0, we observe that some firms now
switch to group 1, and this is more likely: i) the lower productivity is, since the increase
of βH∗ is then most substantial, and ii) the closer ηH is to the upper bound η¯H0 , since the
βH∗ can then easier exceed βHmax. Those firms now choose complete vertical integration,
and this organizational form is chosen to keep the fixed costs f low. There are also firms
whose βH∗ increases by less, so that it now falls inside the range between βHmin and βHmax.
These firms then belong to group 3, and can choose the unconstrained payoff-maximizing
ξ∗ (with 0 ≤ ξ∗ ≤ 1) and N∗. This is more likely to occur for firms with medium
productivity, and in sectors with headquarter-intensity not too close to the upper bound
η¯H0 . For firms with high productivity, the increase of βH∗ due to wM1 > 0 is negligible,
and they remain in group 2 and continue to choose complete outsourcing. Intuitively,
the higher fixed cost under outsourcing play a minor role for these highly productive
firms. Their main aim is to maximize the residual rights of the suppliers, whose inputs
are intensively used in those sectors. Similarly, firms from highly component-intensive
sectors are also more likely to remain in group 2, i.e., to choose complete outsourcing.
Summing up, the organization of firms in component-intensive industries now varies over
the range of Θ, particularly if ηM is not too low. Low productive firms have few suppliers
which are fully vertically integrated. With rising productivity, there is a gradual increase
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of complexity N˜ and the outsourcing share ξ˜, and the most productive firms collaborate
with a huge mass of suppliers and choose complete outsourcing.19
Finally, the organizational decision of firms from sectors with medium headquarter-
intensity, η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 , is now also tilted towards more vertical integration. More
precisely, all firms in those industries decrease their outsourcing share in response to an
increase of wM1 . Firms with low productivity see a larger increase in βH∗, so they are more
likely to become constrained by βHmax and thus choose ξ˜ = 0. This switch from group 3
to group 1 is also more likely to happen in sectors where ηH is only slightly below η¯H ,
since the outsourcing share was already low there. Firms with high productivity and with
headquarter-intensity relatively close to η¯H are, in contrast, more likely to continue to
remain in the range between βHmin and βHmax. Those firms would then still belong to group
3 and choose hybrid sourcing. Yet, since βH∗ has increased, this necessarily implies
an outsourcing share ξ∗ = (βHmax − βH∗)/(βHmax − βHmin) < ξ∗0 .20 Overall, Figure 3.4b
suggests that the coexistence of integration and outsourcing is most pervasive in firms
with medium-to-high productivity in sectors with low-to-medium headquarter-intensity.
3.4.2 Open economy
We now incorporate the global scale dimension into the producer’s problem, who now
also decides on the country r ∈ {1, 2} where each component i ∈ [0, N ] is manufactured.
We assume that unit costs of foreign suppliers are lower than for domestic suppliers,
while the efficiency gains from specialization do not depend on the suppliers’ country of
origin. Specifically, domestic and foreign suppliers have unit cost equal to cM1 = 1/N s and
cM2 = δ(￿)/N
s, respectively, with 0 < δ(￿) < 1.
We assume the following specification for the “offshoring gain”: δ(￿) =
￿
1 + δ¯ · ￿￿−1/￿,
with δ¯ > 0 (also see Appendix B.1.).21 Using δ(￿) and eq.(3.5), the producer’s problem
is to maximize the total payoff π = Θ · Y ·Ψ− (1− ￿)N ·wM1 − ￿N ·wM2 − f¯ , where Ψ is
19Antràs and Helpman (2004) obtain the opposite result, namely that headquarter-intensive sectors
are those where organizational structures are different across the productivity spectrum. That result is
driven by the ad-hoc assumption that integration is associated with exogenously higher fixed costs than
outsourcing. Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) consider the alternative ad-hoc assumption that
outsourcing is associated with exogenously higher fixed costs. Our model is qualitatively more consistent
with the latter paper, but in our model fixed cost differences between organizational modes emerge
endogenously as they imply different optimal complexity levels. We could generate a similar sourcing
pattern as Antràs and Helpman (2004) when assuming that f¯ is sufficiently higher under integration
than under outsourcing.
20If an increase of wM1 overall leads to more or less hybrid sourcing is unclear, since there is exit from
group 3 to group 1 but also entry from group 2 to group 3. To unambiguously sign the overall change
would require more specific assumptions about the distribution of Θ and ηH across firms.
21This particular functional form is chosen for analytical simplicity only. It implies that there are
decreasing marginal returns from offshoring, i.e., the reduction of unit costs are most substantial for the
first offshored component, and then become smaller as the offshoring share ￿ is increased. The strength
of the offshoring gain is also stronger the larger the parameter δ¯ is. Our qualitative results would be
similar for other specifications of the offshoring gain, though mathematically the model would become
more difficult.
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now given by:
Ψ≡
￿
1− α
￿
βHηH +
βMηM
N
￿￿￿βH
cH
￿ηH (1 + δ¯￿)N s · exp
 1N
N￿
0
ln (βj) dj

η
M
α
1−α
(3.18)
3.4.2.1 Optimal mass of suppliers, revenue division, and offshoring share
Analogous to the closed economy case, we first analyze the scenario where the producer
can freely assign the ex ante distribution of revenue. Taking into account that the optimal
N∗ and βH∗ pin down β∗i = (1 − βH∗)/N∗ due to symmetric input intensities, we can
simplify the variable payoff Θ · Y ·Ψ ￿N, βH , ￿￿ from eq. (3.18) as follows:
Θ·Y ·Ψ = Θ·Y ·
￿
1− α
￿
βHηH +
￿
1− ηH￿ ￿1− βH￿
N
￿￿￿βH
cH
￿ηH ￿￿1− βH￿ · (1 + δ¯￿)
N1−s
￿1−ηH α1−α.
Suppose the outside opportunity in both countries is equal to zero (wM1 = wM2 = 0).
In that case, the producer’s problem is equivalent to maximizing this variable payoff. We
show in Appendix B.2. that the optimal complexity N∗0 and revenue share βH0 ∗ are iden-
tical to their closed economy counterparts given in eqs.(3.13) and (3.14). Furthermore,
it directly follows that the variable payoff is unambigiously increasing in the offshoring
share, i.e., ∂Ψ/∂￿ > 0. Hence, in that case where endogenous fixed costs play no role,
the optimal decision is to offshore all suppliers (￿∗0 = 1) in order to take advantage of
the lower unit costs in the foreign country. Now suppose that wM1 = wM2 > 0, i.e., fixed
costs matter but there are no cross-country differences in the endogenous “complexity
penalty”. In that case we would also obtain analogous results for N∗ and βH∗ as in the
closed economy case, and again have ￿∗ = 1 since offshoring only generates advantages
but no disadvantages.
However, as is widely known, offshoring in fact has disadvantages in terms of higher
communication and transportation costs, more expensive managerial oversight, and so
on. To take this into account, we assume that there is an extra fixed cost fX > 0 per
offshored component, capturing those higher transaction costs for the firm. Overall fixed
cost are then given by F = wM1 · (1 − ￿)N + (wM2 + fX) · ￿N + f¯ , and we assume that
∆ ≡ wM2 +fX−wM1 > 0, which allows us to rewrite fixed costs as F = (wM1 +￿∆)N+ f¯ .22
When it comes to the maximization of the total payoff π = Θ · Y ·Ψ−F with respect to
￿, there is thus a trade-off between the higher variable payoff (∂Ψ/∂￿ > 0) and the larger
fixed costs (∂F/∂￿ > 0) under offshoring. The positive effect on the variable payoff is
stronger the higher the productivity level is, while the fixed cost increase does not depend
22Suppliers from country 1 probably have a better outside opportunity than those from the poor
country 2. Assuming ∆ > 0 ensures that the offshoring cost fX outweighs the difference in outside
opportunities.
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on Θ. This suggests that offshoring is relatively more attractive for highly productive
firms. In fact, in Appendix B.2.2. we formally prove the following results:
∂N∗
∂Θ
> 0,
∂βH∗
∂Θ
< 0,
∂￿∗
∂Θ
≥ 0, ∂N
∗
∂ηH
< 0 ,
∂βH∗
∂ηH
> 0,
∂￿∗
∂ηH
≤ 0.
More productive firms thus have a higher optimal offshoring share ￿∗ (with 0 ≤ ￿∗ ≤ 1).
Furthermore, as in the closed economy, they have a smaller optimal headquarter revenue
share and more suppliers, hence larger fixed costs. Still, it can be shown that the total
payoff is increasing in productivity, ∂π/∂Θ > 0. Second, firms from more headquarter-
intensive industries have less suppliers and a larger optimal headquarter revenue share,
as in the closed economy case. Other things equal, the optimal offshoring share is also
lower in firms from more headquarter-intensive industries. Finally, it is also possible to
show that ∂￿∗/∂∆ ≤ 0, ∂N∗/∂∆ < 0, and ∂βH∗/∂∆ > 0 (see Appendix B.2.2.). That
is, lower offshoring costs ∆ (holding domestic fixed costs wM1 constant) not only lead to
a higher optimal offshoring share, but they also boost complexity and thereby imply a
lower optimal headquarter revenue share.
3.4.2.2 The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts
Turning now to the incomplete contracts environment, first suppose that fixed cost con-
siderations play no role at all (i.e., wM1 = wM2 = fX = 0). In that case, the producer
would offshore all components (￿˜O = ￿˜V = 1) while making the exact same complex-
ity and organization decisions as shown in Figure 3.4a.23 Put differently, all firms with
ηH < η¯H0 would completely rely on arm’s length transactions, those with ηH > η¯H0 on
intra-firm trade, and those with η¯H0 ≤ ηH ≤ η¯H0 on a combination of the two global
sourcing modes. Suppose now that fixed costs matter, wM1 > 0, but there are no cross-
country differences in overall fixed costs, ∆ = 0. In that case, the same pattern as in
Figure 3.4b emerges, where more productive firms choose higher complexity and where
the organizational decisions are tilted towards vertical integration in order to keep fixed
costs low. Yet, all firms (regardless of productivity or headquarter-intensity) would only
have foreign suppliers in that case.
The case with with wM1 > 0 and ∆ > 0 is the most interesting one. We then have
the aforementioned trade-off between higher fixed costs and higher variable payoffs under
offshoring. The higher Θ is, the more important is the latter aspect, hence productivity
and offshoring are positively related (∂￿˜/∂Θ ≥ 0, see Appendix B.3.2.). Furthermore,
since this trade-off does not depend on whether a supplier is external or internal, there are
no differences in the organization-specific offshoring shares in our model with symmetric
components, but ￿˜ = ￿˜O = ￿˜V holds. Summing up, the overall sourcing pattern in the
23This follows from the facts that: i) N∗0 and βH∗0 are the same as in the closed economy, and ii) that
the available range βH ∈ ￿βHmin,βHmax￿ also does not change – see Appendix B.3.1. for more details.
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open economy can be described as follows:
i.) Headquarter-intensive industries : All firms choose complete vertical integration of all
suppliers. The least productive among the surviving firms collaborate with few suppliers
and only source domestically. As productivity rises, firms gradually increase the mass of
suppliers and the offshoring share. The most productive firms collaborate with a huge
mass of foreign suppliers that are integrated into the firm’s boundaries.
ii.) Component-intensive industries : The least productive among the surviving firms
have few suppliers, all of which are domestic and vertically integrated. As productivity
increases, firms tend to increase the complexity N˜ , the outsourcing share ξ˜, and the
offshoring share ￿˜. The most productive firms collaborate with a huge mass of suppliers,
all of which are outsourced and offshored.
iii.) Industries with medium headquarter-intensity : Low productive firms collaborate
with few suppliers and tend to choose vertical integration and domestic sourcing. For
given headquarter-intensity, increasing productivity is then associated with an increasing
offshoring share and higher complexity. With respect to the organizational decision,
firms in those sectors tend to choose hybrid sourcing, i.e., a coexistence of outsourcing
and vertical integration within the same firm. Both the outsourcing and the offshoring
share tend to be lower in relatively more headquarter-intensive industries within that
range. The most productive firms have many suppliers and completely rely on foreign
suppliers; they choose a combination of foreign outsourcing and intra-firm trade.
If this pattern with respect to N˜ and ξ˜ is similar as in the closed economy, it must still be
noted that the possibility to engage in offshoring is positively correlated with complexity
and outsourcing. To see this, consider a firm with given Θ and ηH , and compare the
complexity and organization decision of that firm under autarky (with wM1 > 0 and
where ￿ = 0 is imposed) and in the open economy (with the same wM1 > 0, and given
∆ > 0). As shown in Appendix B.3.2., no firm would choose a lower mass of components
or a lower outsourcing share after the economy has opened up, while some firms would
choose a higher N˜ and ξ˜. In other words, opening up to trade in intermediate inputs
boosts the slicing of the value chain and favors outsourcing. Notice that this “time series”
correlation (identical firms tend to choose more outsourcing after the economy has opened
up to trade) is consistent with a “cross-sectional” pattern across firms, where many choose
vertical integration and domestic sourcing in order to keep fixed costs low.
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3.5 Asymmetric components
In this last step of the analysis we consider a discrete setting with two asymmetric suppli-
ers denoted by a and b.24 These suppliers can differ along two dimensions in our model:
i) with respect to their input intensities ηM ·ηi for i = a, b (with ηa+ηb = 1), and ii) with
respect to their bargaining powers βξi , where ξ = O, V , which pin down the revenue shares
that they ultimately receive. With our Cobb-Douglas production function, ηM · ηi is the
partial output elasticity of component i and thus measures its technological importance
for final goods production. If components differ in their input intensities, this is likely
to be reflected in the bargaining power of the respective suppliers as well. Suppose one
component is technologically more important than the other. The supplier of the more
important input is then also likely to reap a larger revenue share from the producer than
the supplier of the less important component.
To give a real world example, consider the production of perfume. Alcohol is the base
material in this production process, and is needed in large quantities. But even though
the quality of the alcohol (the binder) also matters, it still generates low value added as it
is rather standardized. More value added is generated by the tiny amounts of the essential
oils and aroma compounds (such as ambra) which are highly specific and characteristic
as they differentiate the fragrances. In terms of our model, if a and b stand for ambra
and alcohol in perfume production, we thus have ηa > ηb and βξa > β
ξ
b . That is, ambra
is not only the technologically “more important” input, but its supplier also has higher
bargaining power (and receives a larger revenue share) due to the indispensability of this
particular component for the final product. Specifically, we assume that the exogenous
revenue shares are such that βVi > βOi for i = a, b, and βξa > β
ξ
b for ξ = O, V . That
is, outsourcing yields a larger revenue share than integration for each supplier, and the
“more important” supplier a reaps a larger revenue share than b in either organizational
form.25
It is useful to first analyze the impact of these two types of asymmetries separately,
before considering them jointly. For brevity, we abstract from the global scale dimension
in this last section and assume that both suppliers are located in country 1.26 Given eqs.
24It is straightforward to transform our model structure with a continuum of intermediate inputs into a
discrete notation. Divide the intervall [0, N ] into X equally spaced subintervalls with all the intermediate
inputs in each subintervall of length N/X performed by a single supplier. We restrict our attention to
the case where complexity is exgenously given by N = 2, so that we neglect the cost saving effect s.
25Notice that this assumption is consistent both with βVa > βOb and βVa < βOb . In Figures 3.19 and 3.7b
below we depict the latter case, but all results would be similar with the alternative ranking βVa > βOb .
26It is possible to embed this model in an open economy context, where the producer may offshore
both, one or none of the components to the low-wage country 2. One can again split the total payoff
into two parts: the variable payoff and the fixed costs, which are both higher under offshoring. Yet, the
former effect is magnified by firm productivity while the latter effect is not. This again implies that low
productive firms source only domestically, while highly productive firms offshore both suppliers. Firms
with medium productivity would offshore one component, and we can show that the producer would
first tend to offshore the component with the higher input intensity.
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(3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) with cH = ca = cb = 1, the producer’s problem is to optimize the
total firm payoff π = Θ · Y · Ψ − 2 · wM1 − f¯ , where the term Ψ can now be written as
follows:
Ψ ≡ ￿1− α ￿βHηH + βaηMηa + βbηMηb￿￿ ￿￿βH￿ηH (βηaa · βηbb )1−ηH￿ α1−α . (3.19)
The producer has to choose among four possible organizational forms, which we denote
as follows: {O,O}, {O, V }, {V,O} and {V, V }, where the first (second) element depicts
the organizational decision for input a (input b). This decision then pins down βξi and,
residually, the producer’s revenue share βH = 1− βξa − βξb .
First suppose that the input intensities ηa and ηb are the same, but that supplier a is
ahead in terms of the exogenous bargaining power. We show in Appendix C.1. that β∗i
is identical for both suppliers since ηa = ηb = 1/2. Furthermore, β∗i = (1− βH∗)/2 is in-
creasing in the overall component-intensity ηM = 1−ηH , as this raises the suppliers’ total
input intensity ηM/2. The producer’s problem is equivalent to choosing the organization
that aligns the βξi as closely as possible with the optimal revenue shares β∗i . Figure 3.19
illustrates this problem. If component-intensity is sufficiently low, the producer vertically
integrates both suppliers, {V, V }, as this leaves them with the lowest possible revenue
shares and, in turn, maximizes βH = 1−βVa −βVb ≡ βHmax. Conversely, if ηM is sufficiently
high, she outsources both suppliers ({O,O}) as this leads to βH = 1−βOa −βOb ≡ βHmin. For
intermediate component-intensity the producer chooses hybrid sourcing, and she would
then always outsource the “less important” input b while keeping the “more important”
input a within the boundaries of the firm. That is, with βξa > β
ξ
b and ηa = ηb = 1/2 there
can be hybrid sourcing of the type {V,O} but never of the type {O, V } . Asymmetry in
bargaining powers thus favors integration of the “more important” input, as it increases
the domain where the supplier can be properly incentiviced as an affiliated subsidiary.
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Figure 3.6: Revenue shares with two asymmetric components
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Now consider the other case where the inputs a and b differ only in their input in-
tensities, while the suppliers have identical bargaining powers βOa = βOb > βVa = βVb . In
Appendix C.2. we provide an algorithm to derive closed form solutions for the optimal
shares that the producer would choose if she could freely assign the ex ante revenue
distribution (with β∗a + β∗b = 1 − βH∗). These solutions show that ∂βH∗/∂ηH > 0,
∂β∗a/∂ηa > 0, and ∂β∗b /∂ηb > 0, which corroborates one key mechanism at work in this
model: the higher the input intensity of a component, the higher is the optimal revenue
share that should be assigned to its supplier. Clearly, with ηa > ηb we have β∗a > β∗b .
When the available revenue shares βO and βV are identical across suppliers, however,
the producer would then easier outsource the “more important” component a in oder to
reduce the underinvestment problem for the respective supplier.
This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.7. On the horizontal axis we depict the
headquarter-intensity of production, and on the vertical axis the technological asymmetry
across inputs (where ηa = 1/2 is the symmetric benchmark case). The different colors
indicate which organizational mode is payoff-maximizing. As before, the producer would
vertically integrate (outsource) both suppliers for sufficiently high (low) values of ηH .
Hybrid sourcing is chosen in sectors with intermediate headquarter-intensity, and within
this range the producer tends to choose {O, V } if ηa > 1/2.27
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Figure 3.7: Organizational decision with two asymmetric components
The two different asymmetries thus have different implications for the firm structure in
the hybrid range: While the asymmetry in bargaining powers favors vertical integration,
the asymmetry in input intensities favors outsourcing of the “more important” component.
As argued above, in practice both asymmetries are related and likely to emerge together.
In the right panel of Figure 3.7 we consider such a case and illustrate the implications for
27Note that the producer’s share is the same in both hybrid sourcing modes, βH = (βHmax + βHmin)/2.
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the final organizational decision. In this example, we have (βξa − βξb ) = 0.2 for ξ = O, V ,
and we focus on the range of intermediate headquarter intensity where hybrid sourcing can
occur. As can be seen, for high values of ηa the producer would choose the mode {O, V }
and thus outsource input a, because the asymmetry in input intensities is relatively
stronger than the asymmetry in the suppliers’ bargaining powers. Yet, if the technological
asymmetry is smaller (closer to 1/2), there is instead vertical integration of the “more
important” input a and outsourcing of the “less important” input b, i.e., the mode {V,O}.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theory of a firm which decides on the complexity,
the organization, and the global scale of its production process. The main results of our
model can be summarized as follows:
i.) Complexity : Within a given industry, more productive firms choose to have more
suppliers, i.e., more thinly sliced value chains or – in the terminology of our paper – more
complex production processes. When comparing equally productive firms, we show that
complexity is higher in more component-intensive industries, and higher in firms that
choose outsourcing than in vertically integrated firms.
ii.) Organization: The organizational structure differs across firms, both within and
across industries. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), higher component-intensity tends
to favor outsourcing. Yet, in contrast to that model, our framework predicts that firms
may also choose a hybrid sourcing mode where some components are outsourced while
others are vertically integrated within the firm’s boundaries. This hybrid sourcing mode
is most prevalent in firms with medium-to-high productivity from industries with low-to-
medium headquarter-intensity.
iii.) Global scale: More productive firms tend to offshore more components, but only the
most productive firms rely completely on foreign suppliers. Firm with medium produc-
tivity offshore some components but keep others domestic. For a given productivity, the
offshoring share tends to be higher in more component-intensive industries. Furthermore,
our model predicts that “globalization” boosts the slicing of the value chain and is pos-
itively correlated with outsourcing. More specifically, moving from an autarkic scenario
to an open economy setting where trade in intermediate inputs is possible, we show that
identical firms would choose more complexity and outsourcing in the open economy.
iv.) Asymmetric components : Finally, different asymmetries across components have dif-
ferent implications for the organizational structure of firms. A technological difference
per se favors outsourcing of the “more important” input, as this reduces the underinvest-
ment problem for the respective supplier. Yet, that supplier is also likely to have a higher
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bargaining power vis-a-vis the producer. Provided this latter effect is sufficiently strong,
which may be the case for highly sophisticated and specific intermediate inputs, our model
predicts that the producer keeps the “more important” component, which generates more
value added, within the boundaries of the firm.
Several of those predictions are consistent with stylized facts from the recent empirical
literature on multinational firms. For example, recent empirical work by Jabbour (2008)
and Jabbour and Kneller (2010) shows that most MNEs are, in practice, characterized by
a high degree of complexity (i.e., multiple suppliers) and by hybrid sourcing. Consistently,
Kohler and Smolka (2009) emphasize that MNEs often choose different sourcing modes for
different suppliers. In particular, Tomiura (2007) shows that firms which rely on hybdrid
sourcing tend to be more productive than firms which rely on a single sourcing mode in the
global economy. This finding is consistent with our framework for the case of intermediate
headquarter-intensity, which is likely to encapsulate many industries in the data. Finally,
Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show that firms tend to outsource low-skill inputs from the
early stages, while high-skill inputs from the final stages of the production process – which
generate a large share of total value added – are likely to be integrated. In line with this
result, Corcos et al. (2009) find that inputs with a higher degree of specificity are less
likely to be outsourced. Our theoretical framework is consistent with this finding if the
technological importance of particular inputs is materialized in a high bargaining power
of the respective suppliers. Our model may also motivate future empirical research, as it
leads to several predictions that have – to the best of our knowledge – not been confronted
with data yet. For example, it would be interesting to explore if trade integration has led
to a stronger unbundling of the production chain, or if (conditional on productivity) firms
from headquarter-intensive industries systematically have fewer suppliers than firms from
component-intensive sectors.
The model in this paper is about single firms. It could potentially be embedded into
a general equilibrium framework where firm interactions within and across industries
are taken into account. Such a framework would be useful to explore more fully the
repercussions of trade integration with cross-country differences in market conditions,
factor prices and incomes, as well as their implications for global sourcing decisions.
Furthermore, our model is based on a simple static Nash-bargaining. In practice, suppliers
may care about long-term relationships, or may try to collude with other suppliers in
order to induce pressure on the headquarter. Finally, we focus on horizontal “slicing” of
the production chain in this paper, neglecting the fact that many components in reality
consist themselves out of multiple intermediate inputs, as recently argued by Baldwin
and Venables (2010). Exploring these and other extensions of our framework is left for
future research.
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3.7 Appendix
Appendix A: Closed Economy
Remark. To simplify notation, we denote the first-order partial derivative of a function f with re-
spect to the argument x as f ￿x in this Appendix. Analogously, the second-order partial derivative
with respect to the argument y is denoted as f ￿￿xy.
A.1. Input provision. Supplier i ∈ [0, N ] chooses the level of input provision mi so as to
maximize πi = βiR − cMi mi. Using eqs.(3.3) and (3.4), the first-order-condition (FOC) for the
maximization problem of supplier i can be written as follows:
π￿mi = βi ·R￿mi − cMi,r = βi · α · ηM · ηi ·R/mi − cMi,r = 0. (3.20)
It directly follows that m∗i = α · ηM · ηi ·βi ·R∗/ cMi,r solves the FOCs, with R∗ given by eq. (3.6).
It remains to be shown that the second-order-conditions (SOC) are satisfied. Using the FOCs
given by eq. (3.20), the SOCs simplify to
π￿￿mimi = βi · α · ηM · ηi ·
￿
mi ·R￿mi −R
￿
/m2i = −βi · α · ηM · ηi ·R ·
￿
1− α · ηM · ηi
￿
/m2i < 0,
and are thus satisfied. Using a similar approach, it can be shown that h∗ = α · ηH · βH ·R∗/ cH
maximizes the payoff for the producer, πH = βHR− cHh.
A.2. Optimal mass of supplers and revenue division.
A.2.1. Zero outside opportunity
i.) Maximization problem: The first-order-conditions (FOCs) are given by π￿N = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N = 0
and π￿βH = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿βH = 0. Using (3.12), the FOCs can simplified to:
Ψ￿N
Ψ
=
αηM
￿
N (1− s) ￿1− αβHηH￿− βM ￿1− sαηM − αηH￿￿
N (1− α) (αβMηM −N (1− αβHηH)) = 0, (3.21)
Ψ￿βH
Ψ
=
α
￿
βH
￿
N −βM￿−￿N ￿1−βH ￿βM −α￿￿−βM￿α+βH￿￿ηH−α ￿βM−NβH￿ηH2￿
(1− α)βHβM (αβMηM −N (1− αβHηH)) = 0.
(3.22)
With eqs. (3.21) and (3.22) it is straightforward to show that N∗0 and βH0 ∗ as given in (3.13)
and (3.14) solve the FOCs. The matrix of SOCs can be expressed as follows:
Γ =
￿
π￿￿NN , π
￿￿
NβH
π￿￿βHN , π
￿￿
βHβH
￿
= Θ · Y ·
￿
Ψ￿￿NN , Ψ
￿￿
NβH
Ψ￿￿βHN , Ψ
￿￿
βHβH
￿
.
We now show that the matrix Γ is negative definite. We define Ψ∗0 ≡ Ψ
￿
N = N∗0 ,βH = βH0 ∗
￿
for notational convenience. The first diagonal element is given by Ψ￿￿NN = −Ψ∗0 · (T1 / T2), with
T1 = 4 (1−s)3 αηMηH2
￿
1− α ￿sηM + ηH￿￿ > 0, T2 = (1− α)2 ￿ρ− sηM ￿1 + αηH￿￿2 > 0.
Hence, Ψ￿￿NN is negative. The second diagonal element is given by Ψ￿￿βHβH = −Ψ∗0 ·(T3 / T4), with
T3 = 16η
MηH2
￿
1− αηH￿ ￿s3ηM 2 ￿1− αηH￿2 − ηH2ρ− s2ηM ￿1− αηH￿ ￿ηH ￿−5 + 2ηH￿+ ρ￿￿
+16
￿
sηH
￿
ηMηH
￿
5− αηH￿− 3ρ+ 2ηHρ￿￿ < 0
T4 = (1− α)2
￿
sηM
￿
1− αηH￿− ρ￿3 ￿2ηH + sηM ￿1− αηH￿− ρ￿2 < 0.
Hence, Ψ￿￿βHβH is also negative. The determinant can be written as |Γ| = (Ψ∗0)2 · (T5 · T6 / T7),
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with
T5 = −128 (1− s)3 s2α2ηM 3ηH4
￿
1− αηH￿ < 0
T6 = −s3ηM 3
￿
1− αηH￿3 + s2ηM 2 ￿1− αηH￿2 ￿ηH ￿−7 + αηH￿+ ρ￿
+ηH2
￿
5ρ+ ηH
￿−4 + 4αηH − 3αρ￿￿+ sηMηH ￿1− αηH￿ ￿4ρ+ ηH ￿−13 + 5αηH − αρ￿￿ > 0
T7 = − (1− α)3
￿
2ηH + sηM
￿
1− αηH￿− ρ￿2 ￿−sηM ￿1− αηH￿+ ρ￿4￿
sηM
￿
1− αηH￿+ ρ￿2 < 0.
It directly follows that |Γ| > 0. Hence, Γ is negative definite, so that N∗0 and βH0 ∗ maximize
(3.12).
ii.) Optimal revenue share of a single supplier. It is straightforward to show that β∗i0 is given
by β∗i0 =
￿
(1− s) ￿s ￿1− ηH￿ ￿1− αηH￿− ρ￿￿ /￿s ￿1− ηH￿ ￿1 + αηH￿− ρ￿. It can be verified
that β∗i0￿ηH > 0 for η
H < ηHcrit and β∗i0￿ηH < 0 for η
H > ηHcrit, where
ηHcrit =
￿
2−
￿￿
4− 4√s+ s (1− α)￿ (−1 + α)−√s (1 + α)￿ /￿2 ￿1−√s￿α￿
Hence, β∗i0 is hump-shaped over the range of ηH . Note that ηHcrit is unambigiously decreasing in
s.
iii.) Antràs and Helpman (2004) is a special case of our framework : We claim in footnote 8
that there exists a scrit such that N∗0 = 1. This critical level is given by
scrit = η
H/
￿￿
1− α ￿1− ηH￿￿ ηH +￿(1− α (1− ηH)) (1− ηH) (1− αηH)￿ ,
and it can be verified that the optimal revenue share βH0 ∗ (s = scrit) is identical to eq. (10) in
Antràs and Helpman (2004): βH0 ∗ (s = scrit) =
ηH(αηH+1−α)−
√
ηH(1−ηH)(1−αηH)(αηH+1−α)
2ηH−1 .
iv.) Cost saving versus dilution effect. In the following we restate operating profits as profit
margin times the sold quantity. Profits are given by π = Θ ·Y ·Ψ = R−C where C denotes total
variable costs. It follows from eq.(3.12) that optimal variable costs can be expressed as C∗ =
α
￿
βHηH +
￿
1− βH￿ ￿1− ηH￿ /N￿ · R∗. We rewrite Ψ = (1− C∗/R∗) · R∗ = (p∗ − C∗/y∗) · y∗
where y∗ and p∗ denote the optimal quantity and price, respectively, and C∗/y∗ are the average
variable costs. The profit margin is given by margin∗ ≡ (p∗ − C∗/y∗). Furthermore, R∗ is given
by
R∗ =
￿￿
βH
cH
￿ηH ￿
1− βH
N1−s
￿1−ηH￿ α1−α
,
so that we can restate p∗ and y∗ as: y∗ = (R∗)1/α Y (α−1)/α and p∗ = (R∗)(α−1)/α Y (−α+1)/α,
and the average costs as C∗/y∗ = α
￿
βHηH +
￿
1− βH￿ ￿1− ηH￿ /N￿ · p∗.
To shed light on the two countervailing effects of raising complexity, we now we discuss
comparative statics with respect to N for a given βH . Since R∗N ￿ < 0 it directly follows y∗N ￿ < 0
and p∗N ￿ > 0. The profit margin can be written as
margin∗ =
￿
1− α ￿βHηH + ￿1− βH￿ ￿1− ηH￿ /N￿￿ · p∗,
which is unambigiously increasing in N . Hence, higher complexity leads to a smaller quantity
but a larger profit margin. For s→ 1, both y∗N ￿ → 0 and p∗N ￿ → 0. However, the profit margin
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is still strictly increasing in N . Hence, we have N∗0 →∞ for s→ 1. Although the dilution and
the cost saving effect cannot be strictly decomposed analytically, we can still conclude that the
cost saving effect dominates the dilution effect when we trace the impact of an increase in N on
the profit margain, while the dilution effect dominates the cost saving effect when tracing the
impact on the quantity.
v.) Cutoff productivity : The productivity threshold for survival is given by:
Θˆ0 =
￿
f¯
Y
￿
·
￿￿
βH0
∗
cH
￿ηH ￿1−βH∗0
N∗0 1−s
￿1−ηH￿−α/(1−α)
1− ￿αβH∗0 ηH + ￿1− βH∗0 ￿ (1− ηH) /N∗0 ￿
with N∗0 and βH∗0 given in (3.13) and (3.14). Note that Θˆ0 is increasing in f¯ and decreasing in
Y .
A.2.2. Positive outside opportunity
i.) Maximization problem: The FOCs are given by π￿N = Θ · Y · Ψ￿N − wM1 = 0 and
π￿β
H = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿βH = 0. We can solve Ψ￿βH = 0 for
βH (N) =
N − 1 + (1 +N) (1− α) ηH + (1 +N)α ￿ηH￿2 − ρ˜
2 (ηH (1 +N)− 1) (3.23)
with ρ˜ =
￿
(1− ηH) (1− αηH)
￿
(1−N)2 − (1 +N) (1 +N (−3 + α) + α) ηH + (1 +N)2 α (ηH)2
￿
.
Note that βH (N) as stated in eq. (3.23) does not depend on wM1 . Furthermore, it directly
follows that βH￿N < 0. Using βH (N) in Ψ￿N = 0 allows us to derive the implicit condition
Ψ￿ = wM1 / (Θ · Y ), which we can solve for N∗. It then directly follows from Appendix A.2.1.i),
and from the fact that Ψ￿￿NN < 0 in the relevant domain, that N∗ solves the first- and second-
order conditions and is, thus, the optimal complexity level. This N∗ (as depicted in Figure 1) is
then associated with an optimal headquarter revenue share βH∗ = βH(N = N∗) from (3.23) (as
depicted in Figure 2) that solves Ψ￿βH = 0. From the condition Ψ
￿ = wM1 / (Θ · Y ) it also directly
follows that N∗Θ￿ > 0 and N∗wM1
￿ < 0 with N∗ < N∗0 , and hence (since βH
￿
N < 0): βH∗Θ ￿ < 0 and
βH∗
wM1
￿ > 0 with βH∗ > βH∗0 . Finally, notice that Ψ￿￿NηH < 0, hence N
∗￿
ηH < 0 and, thus, β
H∗￿
ηH > 0.
ii.) Total profits: We claim that more productive firms earn a higher total payoff π, despite
that they have higher fixed costs. Total profits are given by π = Θ · Y ·Ψ−wM1 N . The optimal
mass of suppliers is implicitly given by π￿N = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N −wM1 = 0. It then directly follows that
π￿θ = Y ·Ψ+N ￿Θ
￿
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N − wM1
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
=0
= Y ·Ψ > 0.
A.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
Maximization problem: We know from Appendix A.2. that βH∗ and the associated N∗ (βH∗0
and the associated N∗0 for the case with wM1 = 0) are payoff-maximizing if the producer is
unconstrained in the choice of the revenue shares. Under incomplete contracts, since π￿βH > 0 if
βH < βH∗ and π￿βH < 0 if β
H > βH∗, it follows from continuity that the choice of ξ that aligns
βH = ξ · βHmin + (1− ξ) · βHmax as closely as possible with βH∗ must be payoff-maximizing, given
the constraint βH ∈ ￿βHmin,βHmax￿.
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A.3.1. Zero outside opportunity
Definition of headquarter- and component-intensive industries: η¯H0 and η¯H0 are given by
η¯H0 =
1 + (s (1 + α)− 2)βHmax +
￿
βHmax
￿2 −￿(1 + βHmax (s (1 + α)− 2 + βHmax))2 − 4s2α (βHmax)2
2sαβHmax
η¯H0 =
1 + (s (1 + α)− 2)βHmin +
￿
βHmin
￿2 −￿￿1 + βHmin ￿s (1 + α)− 2 + βHmin￿￿2 − 4s2α ￿βHmin￿2
2sαβHmin
with βHmin < βHmax → η¯H0 < η¯H0 . Furthermore, η¯H
￿
0βHmax
> 0, η¯H￿
0βHmin
> 0, η¯H0s￿ > 0, and η¯H0s￿ > 0.
A.3.2. Positive outside opportunity
Notice from eq.(3.11) that Ψ￿￿NβH = T8/T9, with:
T8 = −N (1− s)αβH + (1− sα)βMβH + α
￿
βH2 − 1 + sβM ￿α+ βH￿￿+
αηHN (1− s) ￿βM + βH ￿α+ βH￿￿+ (1− s)α2 ￿1− βH (1 +N)￿ η2 > 0,
T9 = (1− α)βMβH
￿−βM ￿1− sαηM − αηH￿+N (1− s) ￿1− sβHηH￿￿ < 0.
Hence, Ψ￿￿NβH < 0. Since β
H = βHmax for ΨV
￿ and βH = βHmin for ΨO
￿ , the former curve must
thus run to the left of the latter in Figure 5. Hence, we have N˜V < N˜O. The comparative static
results for N˜ are similar as for N∗ where the restriction βH ∈ ￿βHmin,βHmax￿ is not binding, see
Appendix A.2.2.i). In particular, we have N˜ ￿Θ > 0, N˜ ￿wM1 < 0 and N˜
￿
ηH < 0 with N˜ < N˜0.
Appendix B: Open Economy
B.1. Cross-country cost difference. We assume the following specification for the “off-
shoring” gain: δ (￿) =
￿
1 + δ¯ · ￿￿−1/￿ with δ¯ > 0. We have positive but decreasing marginal
returns from offshoring since
δ￿￿ = −
￿
1 + δ¯ · ￿￿−(1+￿)/￿ < 0 and δ￿￿￿￿ = (1 + ￿) ￿1 + δ¯ · ￿￿−(1+2￿)/￿ > 0.
It directly follows from δ (￿ = 0) = e−δ¯ and δ (￿ = 1) = 1/
￿
1 + δ¯
￿
that 0 < δ (￿) < 1. Further-
more, the strength of the offshoring gain is stronger the larger the parameter δ¯ is.
B.2. Optimal mass of suppliers and revenue division.
B.2.1. Zero outside opportunity
Maximization problem: Using eq.(3.18) we have: π￿N = Θ · Y · Ψ￿N , π￿βH = Θ · Y · Ψ￿βH , and
π￿￿ = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿. Since Ψ￿￿ = Ψ ·
￿
α
￿
1− ηH￿￿ / ((1− α) (1 + ￿)) > 0, we hence have ￿∗0 = 1. It is
then straightforward to see that the other two FOCs, π￿N = 0 and π￿βH = 0, can be expressed as
in eqs.(3.21) and (3.22) from Appendix A.2.1.i.), since the ￿ cancels out from those expressions.
Hence, N∗0 and βH0 ∗ are the same as in the closed economy case. Furthermore, using a similar
approach as in Appendix A.2.1.i, we can show that the SOCs are also satisfied.
B.2.2. Positive outside opportunity
i.) Maximization problem: Total profits are given by π = Θ · Y · Ψ − ￿wM1 + ￿∆￿N + f¯ . The
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three FOCs are given by:
π￿N = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N −
￿
wM1 + ￿∆
￿
= 0, π￿βH = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿βH = 0 , π￿￿ = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿ −∆N = 0.
As in the closed economy, it is possible to solve Ψ￿βH = 0 for β
H (N) with βHN < 0, which does
not depend on wM1 or ∆. Substituting βH (N) into the other two FOCs leads to:
π￿N = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N
￿￿￿βH=βH(N)￿ ￿￿ ￿
≡Ψ￿N
− ￿wM1 + ￿∆￿ = 0, π￿￿ = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿ ￿￿￿βH=βH(N)￿ ￿￿ ￿
≡Ψ￿￿
−∆N = 0. (3.24)
For sufficiently productive firms we have π￿￿ > 0 for all ￿ ∈ [0, 1], since Ψ￿￿ > 0 and N∗ approaches
N∗0 and is bounded from above. Hence, the global maximum is given by ￿∗ = 1. Vice versa, for
firms with sufficiently low productivity, π￿￿ < 0 and hence ￿
∗ = 0.
We are now interested in the SOC for the case where ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1). Assume that N∗ and ￿∗
solve the system of FOCs given in (3.24). The SOCs are given by the following matrix K:
K =
￿
π￿￿NN , π
￿￿
N￿
π￿￿￿N , π
￿￿
￿￿
￿
=
￿
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿NN , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆ , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿￿
￿
,
For negative definiteness of K we have to ensure that π￿￿￿N = Θ · Y · Ψ￿￿￿N − ∆ is small, which
can be achieved by setting the exogeneous parameter ∆ sufficiently high. If this parameter
restriction holds, Ψ￿￿NN and Ψ￿￿￿￿ are negative while the determinant |K| = Θ2 · Y 2 · Ψ￿￿NNΨ￿￿￿￿ −
(Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆)2 > 0 is positive, so that the SOCs are unambiguously satisfied.
ii.) Comparative statics: We now use the implicit function theorem to derive the comparative
statics N∗Θ￿ and ￿∗Θ￿:
N∗Θ
￿ =
￿￿￿￿ −Y ·Ψ￿N , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆−Y ·Ψ￿￿ , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
|K| =
−Θ · Y 2 ·Ψ￿N ·Ψ￿￿￿￿ + Y ·Ψ￿￿ (Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆)
|K| > 0
￿∗Θ
￿ =
￿￿￿￿ Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿NN , −Y ·Ψ￿NΘ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆ , −Y ·Ψ￿￿
￿￿￿￿
|K| =
−Θ · Y 2 ·Ψ￿￿NN ·Ψ￿￿ + Y ·Ψ￿N · (Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆)
|K| ≥ 0.
In words, more productive firms have more suppliers and a non-decreasing offshoring share
(strictly increasing if ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1)). We can use these results to derive a relationship between
the endogenous variables N∗ and ￿∗. With the help of the chain rule we can conclude that
N∗￿∗
￿ = N∗Θ
￿/￿∗Θ
￿ > 0 if ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1) and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we know from solving the
FOCs that βHN < 0. Hence, it directly follows that βH
∗
N∗
￿ < 0, and since N∗￿∗
￿ > 0, it also follows
that βH∗￿∗
￿ ≤ 0 if ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1) and zero otherwise. For the comparative statics with respect to Θ it
thus follows that βH∗Θ ￿ < 0, i.e., more productive firms have a lower headquarter revenue share.
Next, we derive the comparative statics of N∗ with respect to ηH :
N∗ηH
￿ =
￿￿￿￿￿ −Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿NηH , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆−Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿ηH , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿
|K|
=
−Θ2 · Y 2 ·Ψ￿￿NηH ·Ψ￿￿￿￿ +Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿ηH · (Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆)
|K| < 0,
since Ψ￿￿NηH < 0. The optimal complexity is thus lower in more headquarter-intensive industries.
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The comparative static results for βH∗ and ￿∗ follow directly, since βH∗N∗ ￿ < 0 implies βH∗ηH
￿ > 0,
and N∗￿∗
￿ > 0 implies ￿∗ηH
￿ < 0 if ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1) and zero otherwise. In words, the optimal offshoring
share is smaller, while the optimal headquarter revenue share is larger in more headquarter-
intensive industries. Finally, we derive
N∗∆
￿ =
￿￿￿￿ ￿ , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆N , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿
|K| =
Θ · Y · ￿ ·Ψ￿￿￿￿ −N (Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆)
|K| < 0.
The comparative static results for βH∗ and ￿∗ follow again directly, since βH∗N∗ ￿ < 0 implies
βH∗∆
￿ > 0, and N∗￿∗
￿ > 0 implies ￿∗∆￿ < 0 if ￿∗ ∈ (0, 1) and zero otherwise.
iii.) Total profits: We claim that more productive firms earn a higher total payoff π, despite that
they have higher fixed costs. The total payoff is given by π = Θ·Y ·Ψ−￿wM1 + ￿∆￿N+f¯ . Recall
that the FOCs are π￿N = Θ ·Y ·Ψ￿N −
￿
wM1 + ￿∆
￿
= 0 and π￿￿ = Θ ·Y ·Ψ￿￿−∆N = 0. It directly
follows that π￿θ = Y ·Ψ+N ￿Θ
￿
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N −
￿
wM1 +∆￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
=0
+￿￿Θ
￿
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿ −∆N
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
=0
= Y ·Ψ > 0.
B.3. The make-or-buy decision under incomplete contracts.
B.3.1. Zero outside opportunity
Maximization problem: As shown in Appendix B.2.1., N∗0 and βH∗0 are identical to the closed
economy case, see eq. (3.13) and eq. (3.14). The constraint βH ∈ ￿βHmin,βHmax￿ is also indentical
as in the closed economy case. The constrained optimal complexity and organization choices are
thus identical to the closed economy case, while the global scale choice is given by ￿˜0 = 1. The
thresholds η¯H0 and η¯H0 as given in Appendix A.3.1. apply.
B.3.2. Positive outside opportunity
Maximization problem: In sectors with medium headquarter-intensity (η¯H0 < ηH < η¯H0 ) the
producer can set the outsourcing share ξ˜ = (βHmax − βH∗)/(βHmax − βHmin) such that βH = βH∗.
This implies N˜ = N∗ and ￿˜ = ￿∗. The comparative static results are derived in Appendix
B.2.2.ii. Since βH∗￿ηH > 0 and ξ˜
￿
βH∗ < 0 the outsourcing share is relatively lower the more
headquarter-intensive the industry is. In headquarter-intensive (ηH > η¯H0 ) and component-
intensive industries (ηH < η¯H0 ), the outsourcing share is constant and given by ξ˜ = 0 and ξ˜ = 1,
respectively. Conditional on ξ˜ = 0 or ξ˜ = 1 with βH = βHmin and βH = βHmax, respectively, the
optimal complexity level N˜ and offshoring share ￿˜ are determined according to
π￿N = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿N −
￿
wM1 + ￿∆
￿
= 0 and π￿￿ = Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿ −∆N = 0. (3.25)
As in Appendix B.2.2., for sufficiently highly productive firms we have π￿￿ > 0 for all ￿ ∈ [0, 1],
since Ψ￿￿ > 0 and N˜ approaches N˜0 and is bounded from above. Hence, the global maximum is
given by ￿˜ = 1. Vice versa, for firms with sufficiently low productivity: π￿￿ < 0 so that ￿˜ = 0.
We are now interested in the SOC for the case where ￿˜ ∈ (0, 1). Assume that N˜ and ￿˜ solve
the system of FOCs given in (3.25). The SOCs are given by the following matrix K˜:
K˜ =
￿
π￿￿NN , π
￿￿
N￿
π￿￿￿N , π
￿￿
￿￿
￿
=
￿
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿NN , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿N￿ −∆
Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆ , Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿￿
￿
,
For negative definiteness of K˜ we have to ensure that π￿￿￿N = Θ · Y · Ψ￿￿￿N − ∆ is small,
as in Appendix B.2.1.i, which can be achieved by setting ∆ high enough. If this parame-
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ter restriction holds, the diagonal elements Ψ￿￿NN and Ψ￿￿￿￿ are negative while the determinant￿￿￿K˜￿￿￿ = Θ2 · Y 2 · Ψ￿￿NNΨ￿￿￿￿ − (Θ · Y ·Ψ￿￿￿N −∆)2 > 0 is positive, so that the SOCs are unambigu-
ously satisfied. Furthermore, if this parameter restriction holds, it is straightforward to prove
the following comparative static results, which can be derived in a similar way as in Appendix
B.2.2.ii: N˜ ￿Θ > 0, β˜HΘ ￿ < 0, ￿˜￿Θ ≥ 0; N˜ ￿ηH < 0, β˜HηH ￿ > 0, ￿˜￿ηH ≤ 0; N˜ ￿∆ < 0, β˜H∆ ￿ > 0, ￿˜￿∆ ≤ 0.
Appendix C: Asymmetric components
C.1. Symmetric input intensities. The unique closed form solution for β∗a = β∗b = β
∗
i is
given by:
β∗i =
3
￿
1− αηH￿ ￿1− ηH￿−￿(1− ηH) (1− αηH) (16− 3ηH (5 + 3α (1− ηH))
12 (1− ηH)− 8 . (3.26)
It directly follows from (3.26) that β∗i ￿ηH < 0→ β∗i ￿ηM > 0. Notice that β∗i =
￿
1− βH∗ (N = 2, s = 0)￿ /2,
with βH∗ as given in eq. (3.14), leads to the same solution as (3.26).
C.2. Asymmetric input intensities. The FOCs reduce to Ψ￿βH = 0 and Ψ
￿
βa
= 0. It is
possible to solve Ψ￿βH = 0 for β
H (βa). Using βH (βa) in Ψ￿βa = 0 leads to Ψ
￿
βa
|βH=βH(βa) = 0
and solely depends on βa. To illustrate the alogrithm we assume in the following ηH = α = 1/2.
Then Ψ￿βa |βH=βH(βa) = 0 is equivalent to finding a root β∗a of the polynominal R given by
R = β3a − β2a ·
−2 + (ηa)2 (4 + ηa)
2 (1− ηa) (1− 2ηa) + βa ·
9 (ηa)
2 (3 + ηa)
16 (1− ηa) (1− 2ηa) −
3 (ηa)
2 (3 + ηa)
16 (1− ηa) (1− 2ηa) .
We propose the following change in variables that eliminates β2a in R: β3a = Z − A/3 with
A =
￿
2− (ηa)2 (4 + ηa)
￿
/ [2 (1− ηa) (1− 2ηa)] . This leads to R = Z3 +Z · P +Q where P and
Q are given by:
P =
(ηa)
2
￿
145 + ηa
￿
ηa
￿
17 + 22ηa − 4 (ηa)2
￿
− 200
￿￿
− 16
48
￿
1− 3ηa + 2 (ηa)2
￿2 ,
Q = −(4− ηa)
2 (ηa (−2 + ηa (84 + ηa (−205 + ηa (148 + ηa (1 + 2ηa) (4ηa − 3)))))− 4)
864
￿
1− 3ηa + 2 (ηa)2
￿3 ,
respectively, which solely depend ηa. Cardano’s formula leads to the solution Z∗ that solves
R = 0. Since the discriminant D = P 3/27 +Q2/4 is negative, the unique closed form solutions
is piecewise defined from:
Z∗1 =
￿
−4P
3
cos
￿
1
3
arccos
￿
−Q
2
￿
− 27
P 3
￿￿
,
Z∗2 = −
￿
−4P
3
cos
￿
1
3
arccos
￿
−Q
2
￿
− 27
P 3
+
π
3
￿￿
,
Z∗3 = −
￿
−4P
3
cos
￿
1
3
arccos
￿
−Q
2
￿
− 27
P 3
− π
3
￿￿
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valid in corresponding ηa-domains which can be explicitly solved. Then, Z∗1 , Z∗2 and Z∗3 can
be subsituted to yield β∗a,1, β∗a,2 and β∗a,3. Taken together, these β∗a,1-β∗a,3 define the unique
piecewise solution for β∗a. The corresponding optimal share βH
∗ can then be derived by using
β∗a in βH (βa), derived from Ψ￿βH = 0. The optimal share is then given by β
H∗ = βH (βa = β∗a).
The optimal share β∗b for the other supplier is the residual share given by β
∗
b = 1− βH∗ − β∗a.
We have here illustrated the alogrithm for the example of ηH = α = 1/2. Other parameter
examples also reduce to a similar term as given by R (with polynomial degree of 3) and can be
solved analogously with the help of Cardano’s formula. Upon request we provide a Mathematica
file with the algorithm.
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Chapter 4
Globalization and Strategic Research
Investments
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4.1 Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms,
where countries can invest into basic research to improve their technological potential.
These research investments tighten firm selection and raise the average productivity of
firms in the market, thereby implying lower consumer prices and higher welfare. In an
open economy, there is also a strategic investment motive since a higher technological
potential gives domestic firms a competitive advantage in trade. Countries tend to over-
invest due to this strategic motive. There are thus welfare gains from coordinating re-
search investments. The over-investment problem turns to an under-investment problem
if there are sufficiently strong cross-country spillovers of basic research investments.
4.2 Introduction
Investments into research and development are an important spending item. Table 4.1
reports the gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) as a share
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 21 OECD countries. These R&D spending shares
differ vastly even within the OECD: some countries spend just about 1 per cent, while
countries like Sweden, Finland or Korea devote much larger shares of their national income
to R&D expenditures. A substantial share of these expenditures is financed publically
with taxpayers’ money. This includes purely public research projects and higher education
spending, as well as subsidies to private R&D, innovation funds, and so on. Typically, the
public share of the total GERD exceeds one third and moves up to more than two thirds
in some countries, which adds up to considerable per-capita amounts that governments
spend annually for R&D purposes. As Table 4.1 shows, this public research expenditure
has increased in almost all OECD countries during the recent time period from 2000 to
2007/08, the Netherlands and Japan being two exceptions. That is, public spending on
research and development has apparently become more important over time, and now
looms higher on policy agendas than it was the case about 10 years ago.
It is well understood that R&D investments are a key ingredient of sustained eco-
nomic growth, as they raise the amount of innovation in an economy (Grossman and
Helpman 1991). It is also well understood why governments are heavily involved in the
financing of basic research, since the public good characteristics of knowledge and ideas
tend to jeopardize private investment incentives (Nelson 1950). What is less well un-
derstood in the literature, however, is how international trade affects the incentives of a
government to strategically invest into the country’s technological potential by support-
ing basic research or conducting public R&D. There seems to be a widespread perception
among policymakers that such public R&D investments become increasingly important in
a world with falling trade barriers, since developed countries perceive the need to support
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2007/2008 2000
GERD PubGERD GERD PubGERD
% GDP per capita in USD % GDP per capita in USD
United States 2.8 381.3 2.4 293.3
Norway∗∗∗ 1.6 355.5 1.6 291.8
Sweden∗∗∗ 3.6 352.8 3.4 257.6
Finland 3.5 334.1 3.4 276.1
Australia∗∗,∗∗∗ 2.1 305.4 1.5 245.7
Denmark 2.7 288.0 2.2 254.7
Switzerland∗ 2.9 280.7 2.6 227.0
France 2.0 276.1 2.0 254.5
Korea 3.5 272.6 2.2 156.2
Japan 3.4 258.2 3.0 261.3
Netherlands 1.7 253.6 1.9 261.8
Belgium 1.9 241.7 2.0 212.4
United Kingdom 1.9 241.5 1.6 181.5
Germany 2.5 239.3 2.4 205.6
Luxembourg 1.6 206.7 1.7 96.1
New Zealand 1.2 176.8 1.0 157.3
Spain 1.3 170.9 0.8 110.1
Italy∗∗∗ 1.1 164.5 1.0 133.2
Czech Republic 1.5 146.2 1.2 96.2
Portugal 1.2 121.0 0.8 117.0
Slovak Republic 0.5 52.2 0.6 25.4
Weighted average 2.5 286.9 2.1 232.5
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data. The table reports: i) gross domestic expenditure on
R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP for the years 2007/08 and 2000; ii) absolute public research expenditure
per capita in constant USD prices of 2000. These amounts are calculated as follows: From the absolute
GERD we subtract the business expenditure on research and development (BERD) excluding direct and
indirect government subsidies to private firms. This leaves us with the public expenditure on research
and development (PubGERD) which we then divide by population size in the respective year. In the
last row we report the average across all countries weighted by population size. Due to missing data we
use different years in some cases: ∗ data for 2004 and ∗∗ data for 2006, ∗∗∗ data for 1999.
Table 4.1: R&D spending in selected OECD countries
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domestic firms in maintaining competitiveness on global markets.1 Yet, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no theoretical literature which has formally studied these issues.
In this paper, we develop a two-country general equilibrium model of trade with
heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003).2 In our framework, entrepreneurs can enter a
monopolistically competitive manufacturing industry subject to a sunk cost. Upon entry,
they randomly draw their productivity level from a known distribution. As in Demidova
(2008), we consider this distribution to be country-specific, but in contrast to that paper
we allow for endogenous technology differences across countries. In particular, the gov-
ernment of either country can invest into basic research. These research investments raise
the country’s technological potential, which is modelled as a right-shift of the support of
the distribution from which the domestic entrants draw their productivity level. By rais-
ing the technological potential of a country, these public investments initially lead to an
increase in the expected value of entry. Entrepreneurs still face uncertainty about their
individual productivity, and may end up with a draw that is too low to be able to remain
in the market. The public research investments therefore do not offset idiosyncratic risks
of business failure, which is consistent with the evidence that even the most highly de-
veloped and advanced economies (like the US, Germany or Japan) are characterized by
substantial exit and churning rates among firms (Geroski 1995). If these investments do
not benefit every firm ex post, they do raise the ex ante premises for entrepreneurs, how-
ever. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of this policy thus necessarily requires
a model with firm heterogeneity and ex ante uncertainty among entrants.3
The motive for public research investments in our model is that the increase in the
country’s technological potential eventually leads to tighter firm selection and higher
average productivity of firms, which in turn lowers prices and raises welfare in equilibrium.
In the open economy, there is an additional strategic motive. If one country invests
more than the other, this yields tougher selection in the leading and softer selection
in the laggard country. Exporting becomes easier for firms from the leading country,
as the export market is now easier to capture. Firms from the laggard country face
1See, for example, the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2008): “Providing high-
quality education and investing more and more efficiently in human capital and creativity throughout
people’s lives are crucial conditions for Europe’s success in a globalized world” (p.9). Also see Zhou and
Leydesdorff (2006) for a discussion that particularly emphasizes the role of China’s rise in the world
economy in that regard.
2It is a well-established empirical fact that there is substantial firm heterogeneity even in narrowly
defined industries in such dimensions as productivity, size, or export activity. See, e.g., the empirical
studies by Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw et al. (2000), or Clerides et al. (1998). This empirical
observation has triggered a large theoretical literature on trade with heterogeneous firms, e.g. Melitz
(2003), Bernard et al. (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Demidova (2008). Strategic investments into
a country’s technological potential have not yet been considered in that literature, however.
3In a model with homogeneous firms and without ex ante uncertainty, such as Krugman (1980), a
technological improvement would be tantamount to a decrease in marginal costs of all firms. Our model
highlights different features, as it is crucially based on the extensive margin of firms’ entry, survival, and
exporting activities.
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tougher competition in their home market, and exporting becomes more difficult. Public
research investments thus give domestic firms – on average – a competitive advantage,
and countries tend to invest more the higher the level of trade openness is. This result
is consistent with the empirical observation that almost all OECD countries have raised
R&D spending during a period that was characterized by falling trade barriers. From a
normative perspective, the investments induce a negative cross-country externality so that
single countries over-invest. There are thus welfare gains from supranational coordination
of public research investments. We also allow for direct R&D spillovers across countries,
following a huge literature that has studied R&D spillovers across firms.4 That is, the
public research investment in one country may, to some extent, also raise the technological
potential of the other country, because the generated knowledge becomes at least partly
accessible across the border. With cross-country spillovers the socially optimal investment
level is higher the freer trade is, and the over-investment problem is reduced and may
even turn to an under-investment problem if the spillover is strong enough.
This chapter is related to the large literature on public investments into research and
development, e.g., Gonzales and Pazo (2008), Kleer (2008). We add to this literature
by analyzing the positive and normative consequences of those investments in an open
economies context, and by studying how trade liberalization affects the strategic invest-
ment incentives in general equilibrium. Our paper is also related to the small but growing
literature on policy issues in models of international trade with heterogeneous firms, e.g.
Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), Chor (2009), or Pflueger and Suedekum (2009).
However, no paper has so far considered government investments into basic research and
endogenous cross-country differences in technological potentials. Finally, our paper is
related to the literature on international tax competition. The typical setup of those
models is that jurisdictions compete for mobile factors or firms, and there is an exten-
sive discussion whether tax competition then leads to under- or over-provision of public
goods (e.g., Zoodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2005). Our framework
differs in two important respects. First, there is no cross-country mobility but all policy
effects are transmitted via (costly) trade. Second and more importantly, though one may
think of the research investments as the provision of a public good that makes firms (on
average) more productive, our analysis relies crucially on firm heterogeneity and ex ante
uncertainty – features that have been rarely studied in the tax competition literature so
far.5
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.3 we consider a closed
economy version of our model, and in section 4.4 we introduce the open economy setting.
Section 4.5 derives the Nash-equilibrium and the cooperative policy for the case without
4See, e.g., Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Jaffe (1989), Adams (1990), Jaffe et al. (1998), O’Mahony
and Vecci (2009).
5The recent papers by Davies and Eckel (2009) and Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010) are
exceptions, but they do not consider public research investments and their trade-mediated effects.
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direct cross-country spillovers, while section 4.6 considers the case with spillovers. Section
4.7 concludes.
4.3 Closed economy
We first consider a closed economy which is populated by L workers who inelastically
supply one unit of labor each. Labor is the only factor of production and perfectly mo-
bile across two industries: a homogeneous goods sector A with constant returns to scale
and perfect competition, and a manufacturing industry C which is monopolistically com-
petitive and consists of a continuum of differentiated varieties. Each variety is produced
by a single firm under increasing returns to scale, and the firms are heterogeneous in their
productivities.
4.3.1 Preferences
The preferences of a household h are defined over the homogeneous good, which is used as
the numeraire, and the set of differentiated varieties Ω. Utility is represented by a quasi-
linear, logarithmic function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subutility over
the set of varieties:
U = β lnCh + Ah with Ch =
￿￿
z∈Ω
qh (z)ρ dz
￿1/ρ
,
where 0 < ρ < 1 and β > 0. The household’s consumption of a variety z is given by
qh (z). The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by σ ≡ 1/ (1− ρ).
The CES price index for the bundle of varieties can then be derived in the standard
way, and reads as P =
￿￿
z∈Ω p (z)
1−ρ dz
￿1/(1−σ). Utility maximization implies per-capita
expenditures PCh = β and Ah = yh − β for the manufacturing aggregate and the homo-
geneous good, respectively. We assume that β < yh, i.e., that the preference for varieties
is not too large. Indirect utility is then given by:
V h = yh − β lnP + β (ln β − 1) . (4.1)
We drop the index h from now on as all households are identical. Total demand and
revenue for a single variety z can then be computed as q (z) = βLp (z)−σ P σ−1 and
r (z) = p (z) q (z) = βL (P/p (z))σ−1, respectively.
4.3.2 Production and firm behavior
In sector A one unit of labor is transformed into one unit of output. Since the price for
that good is normalized to one, and since workers are mobile across sectors, this implies
that the wage in the closed economy is also equal to one. In the manufacturing industry,
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a firm needs l = f + q/ϕ units of labor to produce q units of output. The overhead cost
f is the same, but the marginal costs 1/ϕ are heterogeneous across firms. A higher value
of ϕ represents a higher firm-level productivity. Firms have zero mass and thus take the
price index P as given. Since consumers have iso-elastic demands, it is straightforward
to see that firms charge prices which are constant mark-ups over firm-specific marginal
costs, p (ϕ) = 1/ (ρϕ). As firms differ only in productivity, total demand and revenue
for a single variety can be rewritten as q (ϕ) = βL (ρϕ)σ P σ−1 and r (ϕ) = βL (ρϕP )σ−1,
respectively, and profits are given by π (ϕ) = r (ϕ) /σ − f . It is evident that a firm with a
higher productivity charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity, and has higher revenue
and profits. The CES price index can be rewritten as follows:
P = M1/(1−σ)p (￿ϕ) = M1/(1−σ) 1
ρ￿ϕ with ￿ϕ ≡
￿￿ ∞
0
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ) dϕ
￿1/(σ−1)
, (4.2)
where M is the mass of manufacturing firms (consumption variety), µ (ϕ) is the produc-
tivity distribution, and ￿ϕ is the average productivity across those firms in the market.
4.3.3 Entry, exit and the technological potential
We now embed this static model into a dynamic framework in continuous time. En-
trepreneurs can enter the manufacturing industry subject to a sunk entry cost fe. The
mass of entrants is given byME at each point in time. Upon entry, they learn about their
productivity level ϕ, which is randomly drawn from a common and known distribution.
In this paper, we assume that entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribu-
tion: G (ϕ) = 1 − ￿ϕMIN/ϕ￿k, with density g (ϕ) = k ￿ϕMIN￿k ϕ−(k+1). Here, k > 1 is
the shape parameter and ϕMIN > 0 is the lower bound.6
Figure 4.1 illustrates the fat-tailed shape of the Pareto distribution, and it particu-
larly focuses on the economic meaning of the parameter ϕMIN . We depict two Pareto
distributions with different lower bounds ϕMINhigh and ϕMINlow . As can be seen, with ϕMINhigh
firms draw their idiosyncratic productivity from a “better” ex ante distribution, as the
mass within the entire distribution is shifted to the right. We shall henceforth refer to
the parameter ϕMIN as the country’s technological potential.
After learning about the idiosyncratic productivity draw, every firm decides whether
to remain active in the market or to exit immediately. If a firm remains active, it earns
constant per-period profits as described above. Since a firm cannot cover the per-period
fixed costs f when ϕ is too low, it turns out that all firms with a productivity draw below
some cutoff level ϕ∗ decide to exit, while all firms with a draw above ϕ∗ remain active. As
6This modelling strategy where firms randomly draw their productivity follows Hopenhayn (1992)
and Melitz (2003). It has become the seminal approach for studying firm heterogeneity in a general
equilibrium model. The Pareto distribution is widely used in this literature, see Bernard et al. (2003) or
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and also fits empirical firm size distributions fairly well, see Axtell (2001).
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Figure 4.1: Pareto distribution with different lower bounds
in Melitz (2003), every active firm can then be hit by a bad shock with probability δ > 0
at each point of time, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the firms’ productivity
draws. If this shock occurs, the firm must shut down. In a stationary equilibrium without
time discounting, the mass of entrants which successfully enter the market equals the mass
of firms which are forced to exit: pinME = δM , where pin = 1 − G(ϕ∗) is the ex ante
survival probability of entrants. The endogenous productivity distribution among active
firms, µ (ϕ), is then the conditional ex ante distribution g (ϕ) on the domain (ϕ∗,∞],
which in the present case is also a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k.
4.3.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium can be characterized by two conditions. The free entry condition (FEC)
states that the value of entry, vE = E
￿￿∞
t=0 (1− δ)t π (ϕ)
￿ − fe, is driven to zero. This
in turn implies that:
π =
δfe
1−G (ϕ∗) = δfe
￿
ϕ∗
ϕMIN
￿k
. (FEC)
The zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC) pins down the revenue of the cutoff firm,
r (ϕ∗) = σf , which by using r (￿ϕ) /r (ϕ∗) = (￿ϕ/ϕ∗)σ−1 and π = r (￿ϕ) /σ − f leads to:
π = f
￿￿ ￿ϕ
ϕ∗
￿σ−1
− 1
￿
=
f (σ − 1)
k + 1− σ , (ZCPC)
with k > σ + 1. Using (FEC) and (ZCPC), we obtain the following equilibrium cutoff
productivity under autarky, denoted by ϕ∗AUT :
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ϕ∗AUT = Γ · ϕMIN , Γ ≡
￿
f (σ − 1)
δfe (k + 1− σ)
￿1/k
, (4.3)
where δfe must be sufficiently low and/or f sufficiently high to ensure that Γ > 1,
which is required for consistency. Under the Pareto distribution, the average produc-
tivity among all active firms is then proportional to the cutoff productivity, ￿ϕAUT =￿
k
k+1−σ
￿1/(σ−1)
ϕ∗AUT . Furthermore, since aggregate expenditure on varieties, βL, must
equal aggregate revenue of manufacturing firms, R = Mr = Mr (￿ϕ), we obtain M =
βL/r, where r = σ (π + f), and consequently ME = δM/ (1−G (ϕ∗AUT )). The equilib-
rium masses of entrants and of surviving firms can thus be expressed explicitly as:
MAUT =
￿
k + 1− σ
σkf
￿
βL and MEAUT =
￿
σ − 1
σkfe
￿
βL. (4.4)
Finally, using (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), indirect utility can be computed as follows:
VAUT = y + β lnϕ
∗
AUT +
β
σ − 1 lnL+ κ1, (4.5)
where κ1 = β (ln (βρ)− 1)+ βσ−1 ln (β/σf) is a constant. Notice that welfare is increasing
in the population size L and in the cutoff productivity ϕ∗AUT . Notice further that an
increase in the technological potential leads to a proportional increase in the cutoff and
the average productivity, and hence to a welfare gain, while the masses of entrants MEAUT
and of surviving firms MAUT are independent of ϕMIN . To understand this, consider the
effect of an increase in the technological potential in the short run. For a given cutoff
productivity, this raises the survival probability and, hence, the firms’ expected profits.
More entry is induced, and more firms appear in the market in the short run. This
increases competition and causes exit of the least productive incumbent firms, which in
turn raises the cutoff, lowers again the ex ante survival probability, the expected profits
and, hence, the value of entry. Under the assumed Pareto distribution, these opposite
effects turn out to be of equal magnitude, so that an increase in the technological potential
eventually leaves the masses of entrants and surviving firms unaffected in the long run,
but increases the cutoff and average productivity among the surviving firms. In other
words, an increase in the technological potential does not lead to more but to better
firms in the long run equilibrium. These better firms charge lower prices and sell more
output, which implies a welfare gain for consumers. Aggregate spending on varieties (i.e.,
aggregate revenue of manufacturing firms) remains constant at βL, however.
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4.3.5 Investments into basic research and the technological po-
tential
We now consider the government which levies a lump-sum tax on households and spends
the tax revenue on basic research, i.e., on public research foundations, labs, innovation
funds, higher education, and so on. In our model, those public research investments lead
to an increase in the country’s technological potential ϕMIN . Notice that this provision
of basic research does not lead to ex post gains for all firms, which still face idiosyncratic
risks of business failure. The gains of this policy arise from an ex ante perspective, by
improving the premises for domestic entrepreneurs.
For simplicity we normalize the country size to one, L = 1. The tax rate is denoted
by t, and since w = 1 and L = 1, total tax revenue is given by T = t. The variable T also
denotes the total public research expenditure, since we assume a balanced budget and
an efficient government. The total amount of basic research is denoted by H (T ), and
in the case of zero expenditure we have H (0) = 0. For positive expenditure levels, we
assume that there are positive but decreasing marginal returns, i.e., H ￿ = ∂H/∂T > 0,
and H ￿￿ = ∂H ￿/∂T < 0, and we impose a mild condition on the curvature of this schedule,
(H ￿ )2 < −H ￿￿, which facilitates our analysis below. The country’s technological potential
depends positively on the level of basic research, and for concreteness we assume the
following specification:7
ϕMIN = exp {H (T )} , (4.6)
which normalizes the technological potential to unity if the country conducts no basic
research. It is then straightforward to show that public research expenditure raises the
technological potential with decreasing marginal returns:
ϕMIN ￿ =
∂ϕMIN
∂T
= H ￿ϕMIN > 0 and ϕMIN ￿￿ =
∂ϕMIN ￿
∂T
= ϕMIN
￿
(H ￿)2 +H ￿￿
￿
< 0.
Finally, turning to welfare in the closed economy, we can rewrite expression (4.5) in the
following way by using (4.3), L = 1, and y = 1− T :
V = 1− T + β · lnϕMIN (T ) + κ2, (4.7)
where κ2 = κ1 + β lnΓ is a constant. The government maximizes this expression with
respect to T . The condition for a welfare maximum is given by
∂V
∂T
= −1 + βϕ
MIN ￿
ϕMIN
= −1 + βH ￿ = 0, (4.8)
and from equation (4.8) we can disentangle the different effects of higher research ex-
7The exponential specification of ϕMIN in (4.6) is analytically convenient, but our subsequent results
do not crucially hinge on this functional form.
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penditure on welfare. A higher T raises the technological potential of the country, and
thereby the cutoff and the average productivity of firms in the market. This in turn
lowers the price index, increases physical consumption of the differentiated varieties, and
eventually leads to a welfare gain at the margin βH ￿. On the other hand, the required
lump-sum taxes have a negative unit welfare burden at the margin, since the consumption
of the homogenous good is reduced. Using (4.8), we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 i) The government invests into basic research if βH ￿ > 1 for any 0 <
T < 1, which is the case if consumers have a sufficiently strong preference for varieties
β. ii) The higher β is, the higher is the optimal expenditure level and tax rate T ∗AUT .
The proof of part i) follows directly from (4.8). The comparative static result ii) can be
derived by the implicit function theorem. Define ζ ≡ H ￿ − 1/β, so that we have:
∂T ∗
∂β
= −∂ζ
∂β
￿
∂ζ
T ∗
￿−1
= − 1
β2H ￿￿
> 0. (4.9)
To illustrate proposition 1, consider the example H =
√
T which satisfies the aforemen-
tioned curvature condition. In that case we have H ￿ = 1/
￿
2
√
T
￿
, and solving H ￿ = 1/β
then leads to T ∗AUT = β2/4 > 0.
Notice that the implementation of this policy affects the manufacturing sector only
at the intensive margin in the long run equilibrium: firms become more productive but
consumption variety MAUT does not change. In the short run there are instantaneous
changes at the extensive margin, however, as we have discussed above. Notice also that
this policy affects the resource allocation as it increases the share of the workforce that
is employed in the manufacturing sector.8
4.4 Open economy
We now consider a scenario with two countries r = 1, 2. These countries are identical in
population size (L1 = L2 = 1), but may differ in their technological potentials. Ultimately
we are interested in the determination of the endogenous public research investments
that imply those differences, see sections 4.5 and 4.6 below. In this section, we first
neglect taxes and analyze the open economy equilibrium when the countries’ technological
potentials are exogenously given. Specifically, we assume that entrants in both countries
8In the homogeneous goods sector, aggregate revenue needs to equal aggregate factor payments due
to perfect competition. Since the tax lowers the consumers’ disposable incomes, and since all income
effects of demand accrue in the A-sector, this implies that (1− β − t)L = (1− γ)L, where γ is the
manufacturing employment share. This implies γ = β + t, i.e., higher taxes increase the manufacturing
share because aggregate physical output of the manufacturing sector increases which requires more labor
there.
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draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution with the same shape parameter k, but
country 1 has a higher technological potential than country 2, i.e., ϕMIN1 > ϕMIN2 .
In the A-sector there are no trade costs. This ensures factor price equalization pro-
vided both sectors are active in both countries after trade. In sector C there are two types
of trade costs. First, there are per-period fixed costs of exporting, fx, that arise if a firm
decides to serve the market in the other country. Second, there are the standard iceberg
trade costs, i.e., for one unit of output to arrive the firm needs to ship τ > 1 units. The
open economy equilibrium can be determined similarly as in the closed economy case,
also see Melitz (2003), Demidova (2008), and Pflueger and Suedekum (2009) for more
details. The (FEC) remains unchanged for country r, and reads as πr = δfe
￿
ϕ∗r/ϕ
MIN
r
￿k.
The (ZCPC) changes due to the fact that firms can now engage in exporting. Ex ante
expected profits in country r (conditional on survival) can now be written in the follow-
ing way: πr = πr (￿ϕr) + pxrπxr (￿ϕxr), where pxr = (ϕ∗r/ϕ∗xr)k is the probability to be an
exporter among all active firms from country r, πxr (￿ϕxr) is the corresponding expected
export profit level, ￿ϕr is the average productivity among all active domestic firms, and￿ϕxr is the average productivity among all exporting firms from country r.
Using ￿ϕr/ϕ∗r = ￿ϕxr/ϕ∗xr = ￿ kk+1−σ￿1/(σ−1), which holds under the Pareto distribution,
the (ZCPC) can be rewritten as follows, πr = f(σ−1)k+1−σ
￿
1 + φ (ϕ∗r/ϕ
∗
s)
k
￿
, where s = {1, 2} ￿=
r and where φ ≡ τ−k (f/fx)
k+1−σ
σ−1 is a measure of trade openness. Substituting the (FEC)
into the (ZCPC) then leads to a system of two equations, which can be solved for the
equilibrium cutoff productivities in the two countries:
ϕ∗1 =
￿
χ (1− φ2)
χ− φ
￿ 1
k
· Γ · ϕMIN1 and ϕ∗2 =
￿
1− φ2
1− φχ
￿ 1
k
· Γ · ϕMIN2 , (4.10)
where Γ > 1 is as defined above, and where χ =
￿
ϕMIN2 /ϕ
MIN
1
￿k
< 1 measures the
relative technological potential of country 2. We assume fx ≥ f , which is sufficient for
0 < φ < 1. A higher φ then indicates a higher level of trade openness, with φ → 1 and
φ→ 0 capturing the borderline cases of free trade and autarky, respectively. We need to
impose that the technological asymmetry is sufficiently small relative to the level of trade
openness, namely χ > φ, to ensure that ϕ∗r > 0 for r = 1, 2. Provided this condition
holds, we also have ϕ∗r > Γ · ϕMINr for r = 1, 2, i.e., both countries have a higher cutoff
productivity in the open economy than under autarky, which illustrates the selection
effect of trade emphasized by Melitz (2003). Furthermore, domestic and export cutoffs
can be linked as follows: ϕ∗xs = Λϕ∗r, with Λ ≡ τ (fx/f)1/(σ−1) > 1 due to fx ≥ f . This,
in turn, implies the following ranking of productivity cutoffs: ϕ∗x2 > ϕ∗x1 > ϕ∗1 > ϕ∗2. In
words, there is tougher selection in the technologically leading country 1. Firms from
country 1 hence have a higher cutoff and average productivity than firms from country
2.
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To complete the description of the equilibrium we need to determine the share of the
workforce that is employed in the manufacturing sector in either country. As in Demidova
(2008) and Pflueger and Suedekum (2009) we use the aggregate trade balance condition
for country 1 to solve for γr for r = 1, 2. In the Appendix we show that they are given
by:
γ1 = β
￿
1− 2φχ
1− φχ +
φ
χ− φ
￿
and γ2 = β
￿
1
1− φχ −
φ
χ− φ
￿
. (4.11)
It follows from (4.11) that γ1 = γ2 = β if countries are symmetrical (χ = 1), or if trade
costs are prohibitive (φ → 0). In the asymmetrical case (χ < 1) we need to impose
parameter restrictions such that both sectors are active in both countries after trade,
0 < γr < 1 for r = 1, 2. These conditions are spelled out in the Appendix. Using γ1
and γ2 as given in (4.11), it is then straightforward to derive the equilibrium masses of
entrants (MEr ), surviving firms (Mr), exporting firms (Mxr), and consumption variety
(Mtr = Mr +Mxs) for both countries – also see the Appendix. The CES price index in
the open economy is given by Pr = M1/(1−σ)tr / (ρ￿ϕtr), where ￿ϕtr is the average productivity
among all (domestic and foreign) firms active in market r. Finally, welfare in country r
can be written as follows:
Vr = 1 + β · lnϕ∗r
￿
ϕMINr
￿
+ κ1, (4.12)
which is sufficiently described by the domestic cutoff productivity ϕ∗r that, in turn, de-
pends positively on the country’s technological potential ϕMINr , as can be seen from
(4.10). Proposition 2 summarizes the main insights for the case where the two countries
differ exogenously in their technological potentials. The proof is also relegated to the
Appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose country 1 has a higher technological potential than the identically
large country 2. Furthermore, assume that the parameter restrictions (A3) hold (see the
Appendix), so that 0 < γr < 1 for r = 1, 2. The technologically leading country 1 then has:
i) more entrants (ME1 > ME2 ), ii) more surviving firms (M1 > M2), iii) more exporting
firms (Mx1 > Mx2) and a higher exporting probability (px1 > px2), iv) greater consumption
diversity (Mt1 > Mt2), v) higher average productivity of domestic firms (￿ϕ1 > ￿ϕ2), vi)
higher productivity of firms active in the domestic market (￿ϕt1 > ￿ϕt2), and vii) higher
welfare (V1 > V2).
These results illustrate the benefits of having a higher technological potential in
an open economy setting. Those benefits play a crucial role when thinking about the
government incentives for basic research investments that will be analyzed in the next
section. It is also instructive to consider the role of trade in amplifying those bene-
fits. Specifically, consider two autarkic economies 1 and 2 that are identical, except
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that country 1 has a higher technological potential. Using (4.3) the relative cutoff pro-
ductivity across the two countries, which is a measure for relative welfare, is given by
(ϕ∗1/ϕ
∗
2) = (ϕ
MIN
1 /ϕ
MIN
2 ) > 1 under autarky. When the two countries trade with each
other, it follows from (4.10) that the relative cutoff becomes (ϕ∗1/ϕ∗2) = Φ ·(ϕMIN1 /ϕMIN2 ),
with Φ ≡ [χ(1− φχ)/ (χ− φ)](1/k) > 1 and ∂Φ/∂φ > 0. That is, the difference in do-
mestic cutoffs (and, hence, in welfare) is larger with trade than under autarky, and is
increasing in the level of trade openness.
The reason is that the technological difference leads to a competitive advantage for
the firms from the leading country: Since the market in country 1 has tougher selection,
it is more difficult for firms from country 2 to export to the market in 1 than vice versa.
This, in turn, reduces the incentives for entry in country 2 and leads to looser selection in
that market, which even boosts the expected exporting profits for firms from country 1.
The freer trade is, the more important are these considerations, and the stronger is the
endogenous welfare difference for a given exogenous disparity in ϕMINr across countries.
4.5 Basic research investments without spillovers
We now turn to the analysis of endogenous basic research investments among two identi-
cally large countries (with L1 = L2 = 1). The tax revenue and public expenditure level in
country r is denoted by Tr. Analogous to the closed economy case, the amount of basic
research is given by H (Tr) with H (0) = 0, H ￿ > 0 and H ￿￿ < 0. We assume in this section
that there are no spillovers across countries. That is, the research conducted in country
r does not affect the technological potential of the other country s, or vice versa. The
technological potential in country r is consequently described by ϕMINr = exp {H (Tr)}.
4.5.1 Nash-equilibrium
We first consider the scenario where both countries set their public research investments
non-cooperatively. Taking into account (4.12) and the lump-sum taxes, welfare in country
r can be written as follows:
Vr = 1− Tr + β · lnϕ∗r + κ1 = 1− Tr + β · ln
￿
ϕMINr
￿
+
β
k
· ln
￿
χˆr
χˆr − φ
￿
+ κ3, (4.13)
where κ3 = κ1+β lnΓ+ βk ln (1− φ2) is a constant and χˆr =
￿
ϕMINs /ϕ
MIN
r
￿k is a measure
of the relative technological potential of country r, with χˆr > φ to ensure ϕ∗r > 0 for
r = 1, 2. The condition for a welfare optimum is given by:
∂Vr
∂Tr
= −1 + βH ￿ (Tr) + φβH
￿ (Tr)
(exp {H (Ts)−H (Tr)})k − φ
= 0. (4.14)
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There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium where both countries set the same tax rate
Tr = Ts = T . In that case, (4.14) simplifies to:
∂V
∂T
= −1 + βH ￿ + φ
(1− φ)βH
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
trade effect
= 0. (4.15)
Using (4.15) we can disentangle the different effects of higher research investments on wel-
fare. First, the required lump-sum taxes imply a marginal cost equal to unity. Second,
the investments increase the own technological potential, which tends to raise the domes-
tic cutoff and average productivity as well as welfare. This is the marginal benefit βH ￿
that we have already discussed in the closed economy case. Finally, there is a new “trade
effect”, φβH ￿/ (1− φ), which depicts the marginal effect of the research investments on
the relative technological potential of the two countries. As discussed above, a higher
relative technological potential is beneficial for country r, as it leads to a competitive
advantage for domestic firms relative to their competitors from the other country s. This
mirrors the strategic incentive for governments to invest into basic research. The higher
the trade openness φ is, the greater is the governments’ incentive to give domestic firms
this competitive advantage. Trade liberalization thus increases the research investments
in the Nash-equilibrium. To see this analytically, define ζ = βH ￿/ (1− φ)−1 and use the
implicit function theorem to obtain:
∂T
∂φ
= −∂ζ
∂φ
￿
∂ζ
∂T
￿−1
= − H
￿
(1− φ)H ￿￿ > 0. (4.16)
We can hence state the following result:
Proposition 3 i) The tax and public research expenditure in the open economy Nash-
equilibrium with two identical countries, T ∗, is higher than under autarky. ii) Trade
liberalization leads to higher taxes and public research expenditure T ∗.
To illustrate proposition 3, consider again the example where Hr =
√
Tr. We then
have H ￿ = 1/
￿
2
√
T
￿
, and solving (4.15) which reads as H ￿ = (1− φ) /β, leads to
T ∗ = β2/ (4 (1− φ)2) in the Nash-equilibrium, which is larger than T ∗AUT derived above.
4.5.2 Cooperative policy
Now consider the scenario where the countries cooperatively set their policies. Given the
quasi-linear preferences with identical marginal utility of income, joint welfare can be
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precisely measured by a utilitarian social welfare function. Joint welfare Ω is given by:
Ω = V1+V2 = 2−T1−T2+β lnϕMIN1 +β lnϕMIN2 +
β
k
·ln
￿
χˆ1χˆ2
(χˆ1 − φ)(χˆ2 − φ)
￿
+2κ3, (4.17)
where the interaction term in squared parentheses encapsulates the cross-country exter-
nalities of the research investments. The condition for a welfare optimum is given by
∂Ω
∂Tr
= −1+βH ￿ (Tr)+ φβH
￿ (Tr)
(exp {H (Ts)−H (Tr)})k − φ
− φβH
￿ (Tr)
(exp {H (Tr)−H (Ts)})k − φ
= 0
for r = 1, 2. Imposing T1 = T2 = T due to symmetry, the last two terms on the right
hand side of this equation just cancel out, so that the simplified first-order condition for
the cooperative policy simply reads as
∂Ω
∂T
= −1 + βH ￿ = 0. (4.18)
We can hence state
Proposition 4 Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic
research investments. Without cross-country spillovers the cooperative policy is equivalent
to the policy that each country would choose under autarky.
A comparison of propositions 3 and 4 directly implies that the Nash-equilibrium policy
is characterized by over-investments into basic research from a social perspective, and
that trade liberalization exacerbates this problem. The reason is that every government
tries to give domestic firms a competitive advantage in trade, but the effects of the own
research investments are just offset by the impact of the foreign investments. When
coordinating the research expenditures, those negative cross-country externalities are
internalized. With policy coordination the average productivity of firms is thus lower than
in the Nash-equilibrium, but this is optimal since the excessively high research investments
in the non-cooperative scenario imply too little consumption of the homogenous good.
4.6 Basic research investments with spillovers
We now turn to the analysis where the basic research conducted in one country does affect
the technological potential of the other country. We assume that the technological po-
tential in country r is described by ϕMINr = exp {H (Tr) + φ · F (Ts)}, where the amount
of basic research in the foreign country s is given by F (Ts). Analogously as before we
assume that F (0) = 0, F ￿ > 0 and F ￿￿ < 0. Notice that the strength of the spillover
depends on the level of trade openness, φ, which we consider to be a broad measure of
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the level of economic integration between the two countries.9
4.6.1 Nash-equilibrium
Considering first the non-cooperative policy determination, the necessary condition for a
welfare maximum can now be written as
∂Vr
∂Tr
= −1 + βH ￿ (Tr) + φβH
￿ (Tr)− φ2βF ￿ (Tr)
(exp {H (Ts)−H (Tr) + φF (Tr)− φF (Ts)})k − φ
= 0. (4.19)
There exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium policy where both countries set the same tax
rate Tr = Ts = T , in which case (4.19) simplifies to
∂V
∂T
= −1 +
marginal benefit￿ ￿￿ ￿
1
(1− φ)βH
￿ − φ
2
(1− φ)βF
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
spillover effect
= 0. (4.20)
It follows from (4.20) that the marginal benefit is composed of two terms, i) the term
βH ￿/ (1− φ) that is already known from the case without spillovers (see section 4.1),
and the new “spillover effect”. Both terms increase in trade openness but have opposite
signs. Comparing (4.20) with (4.15), it immediately follows that the Nash-equilibrium
expenditure T ∗ is lower with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. The reason is
that the competitive advantage for domestic firms is smaller when foreign entrepreneurs
also benefit from the domestic public research expenditure.10
With higher trade openness this “free rider” problem becomes more severe, which
dampens the government incentive to invest. On the other hand, freer trade raises the
term βH ￿/ (1− φ) which tends to increase the Nash-equilibrium expenditure. The ques-
tion is thus if trade liberalization leads to an overall increase or decrease of T ∗ when
direct cross-country spillovers play a role. To address this question, let ∆ ≡ H ￿ − F ￿.
One would typically expect that domestic research expenditure has a stronger impact on
the domestic than on the foreign technological potential, i.e., ∆ > 0. We refer to this
case as the “weak spillover” scenario. For this case it is straightforward to show that the
Nash-equilibrium expenditure level is increasing in φ. Define ζ = β1−φH
￿− βφ21−φF ￿− 1 and
use the implicit function theorem to obtain:
∂T
∂φ
=
∂ζ
∂φ
￿
∂ζ
∂T
￿−1
=
H ￿ + (−2 + φ)φF ￿
(1− φ) (φ2F ￿￿ −H ￿￿) = −
H ￿ (1− φ2) +∆ (2− φ)φ
(1− φ) (1− φ2)H ￿￿ . (4.21)
9See Adams (1990), Jaffe (1989) and Branstetter (2001) for empirical evidence that knowledge
spillovers (e.g. from patent citations) exhibit a rapid spatial decay, but flow more rapidly across ecomi-
cally well integrated areas.
10This parallels the well known result that single firms have lower incentives to invest into R&D when
there are direct spillovers to other firms, see Spence (1984) as a seminal reference.
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This term is unambiguously positive with ∆ > 0. Nevertheless, there may be instances
where domestic research investments have a stronger impact on the foreign than to the
home country.11 For situations like this we have ∆ < 0 and refer to it as the “strong
spillover” case. Solving ∂T/∂φ = 0 for φ leads to φ¯ = 1 − ￿−∆/F ￿ with φ¯ < 1 if
∆ < 0. The Nash-equilibrium expenditure level T ∗ is increasing (decreasing) in φ if
the level of trade openness is below (above) φ¯. In other words, there is a hump-shaped
pattern between φ and T ∗ when ∆ < 0, and the downward-sloping range starts earlier
the stronger the spillover is (the lower ∆ is). Summing up, we can state the following
result:
Proposition 5 i.) For any given φ the Nash-equilibrium research expenditure, T ∗,
is lower with direct cross-country spillovers than without it. ii.) Trade liberalization
increases T ∗ if spillovers are weak. iii.) In the case of strong spillovers, trade liberalization
first leads to an increase and then to a decrease of T ∗.
To illustrate this result, suppose that H =
√
T and F = s
√
T , where s denotes the
strength of the spillover. With 0 < s < 1 we have a weak, and with s > 1 we have a
strong spillover. Solving (4.20) yields T ∗ = β
2(1−sφ2)2
4(1−φ)2 , which achieves a global maximum
at φ =
￿
1/s. Hence, there only exists a maximum for T ∗ in the admissible range
0 < φ < 1 if s > 1, while T ∗ is monotonically increasing in φ for all s < 1.
4.6.2 Cooperative policy
Finally, turning to the cooperative policy determination for the case with direct cross-
country spillovers, it follows from (4.17) that the condition for a welfare optimum now
reads as
∂Ω
∂Tr
= −1 + βH ￿ (Tr) + φβH
￿ (Tr)− φ2βF ￿ (Tr)
exp {·}− φ +
φβF ￿ (Tr)− φβH ￿ (Tr) exp {·}
1− exp {·}φ = 0,
(4.22)
for r = 1, 2, where the argument of the exponential function is suppressed to simplify
notation and is given by exp {·} = exp {k (H (Ts)−H (Tr) + φF (Tr)− φF (Ts))}. Im-
posing Tr = Ts = T due to symmetry, this expression simplifies to
∂Ω
∂T
= −1 + βH ￿ + βφF ￿ = 0. (4.23)
Define ζ = βH ￿ + βφF ￿ − 1 and use the implicit function theorem to derive
∂T opt/∂φ = −F ￿/ (φF ￿￿ +H ￿￿) > 0. We hence have
11What we have in mind here are small countries like Hong Kong with a strong inflow of Chinese and
other foreign students. Depending on the degree of economic integration, research investments in Hong
Kong may actually lead to stronger effects in those foreign countries than in Hong Kong itself.
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Proposition 6 Consider two identical open economies that cooperatively set their basic
research investments. With direct cross-country spillovers, trade liberalization leads to a
higher optimal research expenditure T opt.
The reason is that investments not only improve the domestic technological potential,
but they now also generate a positive externality for the foreign entrepreneurs. The latter
effect is stronger the higher the level of trade openness is. In comparison to the Nash-
equilibrium policy, the spillover thus does not dampen the incentive to invest. Exactly
the opposite it true. Due to the positive externality, the optimal research expenditure
level is actually higher with than without spillovers. To compare the cooperative with
the Nash-equilibrium policy, we can rewrite the first-order conditions (4.20) and (4.23)
as follows:
∂V
∂T
= −1 + βH ￿ + βφF ￿ + φ
1− φβ∆ = 0 and
∂Ω
∂T
= −1 + βH ￿ + βφF ￿ = 0.
Those expressions differ only in the last term of ∂V/∂T . The sign of this term depends
on ∆, i.e., on whether the spillover is weak or strong. If the spillover is weak (strong),
the public research expenditure in the Nash-equilibrium, T ∗, is higher (lower) than the
optimal expenditure level, T opt. Summing up, we have
Proposition 7 i.) The Nash-equilibrium is characterized by over-investments into basic
research if the direct cross-country spillover is weak, T ∗ > T opt with ∆ > 0. ii.) When the
spillover is strong, there are too little basic research investments from a social perspective
in the Nash-equilibrium, T ∗ < T opt with ∆ < 0.
This result represents the interplay between two cross-country externalities. Domestic
basic research hurts the foreign entrepreneurs as it gives domestic firms a competitive ad-
vantage in trade. On the other hand there is a positive impact on the foreign technological
potential. Depending on which impact dominates there is either a net over-investment or
a net under-investment problem from a social perspective, and proposition 7 shows that
the latter arises when the spillover is strong.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-country model with heterogeneous firms where
governments can invest into basic research. These public research investments improve
the country’s technological potential and thereby benefit domestic entrepreneurs who
start up a business. They do not equally benefit all domestic firms from an ex post
perspective, however, since firms are still exposed to idiosyncratic risks of business fail-
ure. There are two motives for this public research policy. First, the benevolent motive
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(present already in an autarky scenario) is to tighten firm selection which in turn raises
the average productivity of firms in the market, decreases the average price, and ul-
timately benefits consumers. Second, there is a strategic motive in an open economy
setting, as firms obtain a competitive advantage in trade when the domestic country
has a higher technological potential. Due to this strategic motive, countries invest too
much from a social perspective, so that there are welfare gains from coordinating public
research investments. This over-investment problem only disappears, and turns to an
under-investment problem, when there are sufficiently strong direct spillovers of research
investments across countries.
We observe in the data that most OECD countries have increased public research
spending over the last ten years. Our model provides a possible theoretical rationale for
this empirical observation. The recent decade was certainly characterized by falling trade
barriers and a deepening of globalization. The model predicts that this tendency of higher
trade freeness raises the strategic incentives for governments to invest into basic research,
and it is thus well consistent with the stylized facts. From a normative perspective,
however, it is unclear if this tendency is welfare improving. Our model predicts that
global competition induces single countries to over-invest into basic research, and trade
liberalization tends to exacerbate this problem.
However, in practice further trade liberalization probably also leads to a stronger
diffusion of basic knowledge across countries. That is, cross-country knowledge spillovers
may also become more important as globalization proceeds. These spillovers have two
basic consequences: They lower the incentives for single countries to invest due to a
standard free rider problem, but they also tend to reduce the over-investment problem.
From a policy perspective, the optimal regime seems to be one where countries coordinate
their research investments in order to internalize cross-country externalities, and where
they also try to foster the cross-country diffusion of the knowledge created in those
coordinated public research efforts.
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4.8 Appendix
Appendix: Open Economy Model
Equilibrium Firm Masses in the Open Economy
Aggregate earnings in the manufacturing sector must equal aggregate revenue of man-
ufacturing firms in each country, γr = Mrr¯r, where r¯r = rr (￿ϕr) + pxrrxr (￿ϕxr). This
yields Mr = γr/r¯r for r = 1, 2. Plugging these terms into the aggregate trade balance
condition for country 1, M1px1rx1 (￿ϕx1) = M2px2rx2 (￿ϕx2) + (1− β) − (1− γ1), and into
the analogous trade balance condition for country 2 yields:
γ1
1 + b1
=
γ2
1 + b2
+ γ1 − β γ2
1 + b2
=
γ1
1 + b1
+ γ2 − β, (A1)
where
b1 =
r1 (￿ϕ1)
px1rx1 (￿ϕx1) = τσ−1px1
￿ ￿ϕ1ϕ∗2
ϕ∗1￿ϕx1
￿σ−1
=
1
φ
￿
ϕ∗2
ϕ∗1
￿k
=
1
φ
￿
χ− φ
1− φχ
￿
b2 =
r2 (￿ϕ2)
px2rx2 (￿ϕx2) = τσ−1px2
￿ ￿ϕ2ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2￿ϕx2
￿σ−1
=
1
φ
￿
ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2
￿k
=
1
φ
￿
1− φχ
χ− φ
￿
.
Solving (A1) for γr yields:
γ1 = β
(1 + b1) (1− b2)
1− b1b2 γ2 = β
(1− b2) (1− b1)
1− b1b2 , (A2)
and plugging in b1 and b2 then leads to the expressions given in (4.11). To ensure that
0 < γr ≤ 1 for r = 1, 2 we need to impose the following parameter restrictions:
0 < β < βmax ≡ (χ− φ)(1− φχ)
χ (1 + φ2 − 2φχ) and
2φ
(1 + φ2)
< χ < 1. (A3)
The conditions in (A3) require that the per-capita manufacturing expenditure, β, is
sufficiently small, and they put an even stricter limit on the degree of asymmetry, χ,
relative to the level of trade openness, φ, than the previously mentioned condition φ < χ,
which is automatically satisfied when (A3) holds. Using Mr = γr/r¯r and γ1, γ2 then
yields the masses of entrants, surviving firms, and exporting firms for both countries:
ME1 =
δM1
(ϕMIN1 /ϕ
∗
1)
k =
(σ − 1) β
σkfe
χ (1 + φ2 − 2φχ)
(χ− φ) (1− φχ) (A4)
ME2 =
δM2
(ϕMIN2 /ϕ
∗
2)
k =
(σ − 1) β
σkfe
(χ (1 + φ2)− 2φ)
(χ− φ) (1− φχ)
M1 =
γ1
σ (π¯1 + f + px1fx)
=
(k + 1− σ) β
σkf
1 + φ2 − 2φχ
(1− φ2) (1− φχ) (A5)
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M2 =
γ2
σ (π¯2 + f + px2fx)
=
(k + 1− σ) β
σkf
(χ (1 + φ2)− 2φ)
(1− φ2) (χ− φ)
Mx1 =
￿
ϕ∗1
Λϕ∗2
￿k
M1 =
(k + 1− σ) β
σkfx
φ (1 + φ2 − 2φχ)
(1− φ2) (χ− φ) (A6)
Mx2 =
￿
ϕ∗2
Λϕ∗1
￿k
M2 =
(k + 1− σ) β
σkfx
φ (χ (1 + φ2)− 2φ)
(1− φ2) (1− φχ)
From these expressions, the mass of firms active in country r, Mtr = Mr + Mxs,
(i.e., consumption variety) can then be easily obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the scenario in which country 1 has a higher technological potential than country
2, i.e., ϕMIN1 > ϕMIN2 . Under the parameter restrictions (A3) we can show that:
(i)
ME1
ME2
=
χ (1 + φ2 − 2φχ)
χ+ φ(φχ− 2) > 1 (A7)
(ii)
M1
M2
=
(χ− φ) (1 + φ2 − 2φχ)
(1− φχ)(χ+ φ(φχ− 2)) > 1 (A8)
(iii)
Mx1
Mx2
=
(1− φχ) (1 + φ2 − 2φχ)
(χ− φ)(χ+ φ(φχ− 2)) > 1 and (A9)
px1
px2
=
(1− φχ)2
(χ− φ)2 > 1
(iv)
Mt1
Mt2
=
(χ− φ) (fx (1 + φ2 − 2φχ) + fφ(χ+ φ(φχ− 2)))
(1− φχ) (fφ (1 + φ2 − 2φχ) + fx(χ+ φ(φχ− 2))) > 1. (A10)
Furthermore, since the relative cutoff productivities can be written as follows:
ϕ∗1
ϕ∗2
= Φ · ϕ
MIN
1
ϕMIN2
with Φ ≡ [χ(1− φχ)/ (χ− φ)](1/k) > 1, (A11)
it follows directly that (v) ϕ˜1/ϕ˜2 = Φ ·
￿
ϕMIN1 /ϕ
MIN
2
￿
> 1, (vi) ϕ˜t1 > ϕ˜t2, since ϕ˜1 > ϕ˜2
and ϕ˜x2 > ϕ˜x1, and (vii) V1 > V2, since Vr is proportional to ϕ∗r.
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Chapter 5
Trade, Wages, FDI and Productivity
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5.1 Abstract
We extend the Behrens et al. (2009) general equilibrium heterogeneous firms framework
by horizontal foreign direct investment. The model features endogenously determined
firm entrants, wages, productivity cutoffs, flexible price markups and allows for wage
differentials across countries in equilibrium. The framework is especially suitable to
analyze the welfare consequences of attracting FDI since it allows to study through which
channels FDI might raise welfare - including the not yet explored impact on the wage
differential and the price markups. From a policy perspective we compare a strategic
and a cooperative FDI policy scenario and find that supranational coordination leads to
welfare gains.
5.2 Introduction
The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been one of the major trends in the
global economy for decades. As the World Investment Directory of the UNCTAD in 2002
reports, the world FDI stock has increased to over $7 trillion in 2002, which is about ten
times the level of 1985. The tremendous expansion in worldwide FDI outflows since the
mid-1980s was so remarkable that it outpaced the growth in the worldwide gross domestic
product, domestic investments and even exports. According to the data, the sales of all
FDI firms in 2001 are about $18 trillion, whereas the sales of all exporting firms amount
to only $7 trillion. The empirical stylized facts about the growth of FDI go hand in hand
with policy interventions that promote FDI. As reported in UNCTAD (2003) politicians
try to attract FDI with tax holidays, job-creation or facility subsidies. Politicians do
so, since they typically assume positive welfare effects of FDI. The arguments given are
that FDI-liberalization leads to industry knowledge spillovers or technology transfers and
lower consumer prices due to cross-border transport cost savings. Although the positive
welfare arguments in favor of FDI are predominant, UNCTAD (2001) also notes that
“assessing the consequences of promoting FDI for national welfare is a big task [...].”
We contribute to this discussion by constructing a rich general equilibrium framework
and call into question, whether promoting FDI is able to raise welfare, and if so, through
what channels. In order to examine this question we develop a general equilibrium model
of international trade with heterogeneous firms that differ in their marginal labor require-
ment. Those heterogeneous firms choose, conditional on their productivity, whether to
serve their domestic market and/or a foreign market either through exports or horizontal
greenfield FDI. Our framework is especially suitable to analyze the welfare consequences
of attracting FDI since it features endogenously determined firm entrants, wages and
productivity cutoffs. In particular, it allows for wage differentials across countries in
equilibrium and flexible price markups. Such a “rich” general equilibrium framework with
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heterogeneous firms and FDI has, to the best of our knowledge, not been established yet.
The focus of our paper is to study the welfare effects of FDI-liberalization. Along
the lines of Chor (2009) we examine a country’s incentive to lower the fixed costs of
FDI. We distinguish between two policy scenarios. In the strategic FDI policy scenario,
a country chooses the welfare maximizing degree of FDI-liberalization, taking the FDI
policy in the other country as given. In the cooperative scenario both countries jointly
choose the total welfare maximizing degree of FDI-liberalization. In the strategic FDI
policy scenario we find that a country has an incentive to unilaterally attract FDI. The
intuition is that lower fixed costs of FDI lead to a greater mass of consumed varieties and a
lower normed average price (which is the average price over the choke price). Both effects
unambiguously raise welfare in the FDI attracting country. Conversely, in the other
country consumption varieties shrink, the normed average price increases and welfare
decreases. This cross-country comparison clearly illustrates the benefits of attracting
FDI firms. In the Nash-equilibrium both countries choose a FDI-liberalization policy
that brings down fixed costs of FDI to zero.
In the cooperative scenario we find that countries also do have an incentive to lower
the fixed costs of FDI, however not down to zero. Compared to the Nash-equilibrium,
countries jointly maximize total welfare by choosing a strictly positive level for the fixed
costs of FDI. The economic intuition is as follows. FDI-liberalization raises the mass
of consumed varieties but does not unambiguously decrease the normed average price.
To illustrate this ambiguous price change consider an initial scenario where fixed costs
of FDI are prohibitively high. FDI-liberalization now leads to the creation of the first
multinational that charges a relatively low price since this firm is highly productive com-
pared to the average domestic firm. However, further reductions in the fixed costs of FDI
also induce relatively underproductive firms to become multinationals. As a result, the
normed average price increases and FDI-liberalization can actually decrease welfare if the
new consumption varieties do not compensate for the higher normed average price.
Comparing the strategic with the cooperative scenario, we can clearly conclude that
there are welfare gains from supranational coordination. However, since coordination is
difficult to achieve, it is likely that countries over-invest into attracting FDI. For policy
makers this is an important result since it implies that besides the indisputable positive
aspects of FDI there are also potential welfare losses. Our model also identifies a clear
difference between trade- and FDI-liberalization that leads to different policy recommen-
dations. Jointly decreasing variable trade costs unambiguously increase welfare while
our model predicts that for the fixed costs of FDI countries should rather commit for a
strictly positive level to restrict the mass of multinationals.
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5.2.1 Related literature
First, our model is closely related to the seminal contribution on heterogeneous firms by
Melitz (2003). His work incorporates heterogeneous firms, i.e. firms that differ in their
marginal labor requirement, into the monopolistic competition framework by Krugman
(1980). In particular, Melitz shows that trade liberalization leads to a selection effect such
that only the most productive firms start exporting, firms with intermediate productivity
serve the domestic market only, and the least productive firms exit.1
Although the Melitz model has substantially deepened our understanding of intra-
industry reallocations, it relies on two restrictive assumptions: factor price equalization
(FPE) and constant price markups. The assumption of symmetric countries induces FPE
while a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference specification implies constant
markups. The more recent heterogeneous firms literature has focused to forego either
one of those assumptions. Bernard et al. (2003) introduce exogenous wage differences
across countries in a Ricardian framework with Bertrand competition. Melitz and Otta-
viano (2008) provide a model with endogenous markups, where markups decrease with
trade liberalization. Although trade liberalization now leads to pro-competitive effects,
the model does not allow for income effects as in Melitz (2003). Behrens et al. (2009)
propose a new general equilibrium model of international trade that avoids both of the
previous restrictive assumptions. It incorporates heterogeneous firms, endogenously de-
termined firm entrants, wages and productivity cutoffs. Furthermore, the model does
not rely on CES but instead uses a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) specification,
introduced by Behrens and Murata (2007). Moreover, the model does not feature FPE in
equilibrium. It therefore incorporates endogenous wages and flexible markups in which
trade integration leads to both income and pro-competitive effects. From a theoretical
point of view our model builds up on Behrens et al. (2009) and extends it by introducing
horizontal greenfield FDI.
Second, the Melitz model was also influential for the FDI literature. The seminal
contribution is provided by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). Building up on the
original Melitz framework they develop the first general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous firms and horizontal FDI as an alternative to exporting. They are able to show
that only firms with a relatively high productivity are able to serve a foreign market by
exporting and only the most productive firms are able to adopt the FDI strategy. The
latest strand of the heterogeneous firms literature is concerned about the welfare effects of
1The Melitz framework was motivated by an enormous literature that explored empirical patterns of
firms’ behavior. Starting from the mid-nineties, Bernard and Jensen (1999) observe that firms serving
the foreign market via exporting are larger and exhibit a higher productivity than firms that refrain from
foreign trade. Aw et al. (2000) verify that plants with a higher productivity take part in exporting whilst
plants with low productivity exit the export market. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) show that international
operating firms are rare, bigger, pay higher wages, generate higher added value and employ more capital
per worker. Furthermore, multinationals are on average even more productive than exporting firms.
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FDI-liberalization. The important contribution by Chor (2009) analyzes the implications
of governments’ subsidies to attract FDI. The key result is that a country can raise its
welfare by unilaterally introducing a small subsidy. This leads to a consumption gain
similar as in our approach. Our model enriches the FDI-liberalization discussion since it
allows for additional, potentially welfare increasing channels such as lower price markups
or a higher relative wage. Although these arguments are often used in the political dis-
cussion, the Chor (2009) model cannot account for these arguments, due to the fact of
CES preferences and FPE in equilibrium. Moreover, our approach is also different from
a normative perspective. Chor (2009) does not discuss competition among countries for
FDI while we focus on that issue and differentiate between a strategic and cooperative
policy. As a result, our approach allows the identification of supranational gains from
coordination.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.3 establishes the model framework while
in section 5.4 we discuss the strategic and the cooperative FDI policy regime. Section
5.5 concludes.
5.3 The model
5.3.1 Preferences and demand
In our model, we consider two potentially asymmetric countries. Consumers derive utility
from the consumption of a final good which is provided as a continuum of horizontally
differentiated varieties. The mass of consumers in country r is denoted by Lr. Let psr (i)
and qsr (i) denote the price and the per capita consumption of variety i when it is produced
in country s and consumed in country r. In the following we differentiate between three
types of firms: Domestic firms that solely produce for their domestic market, exporters
that additionally sell in the foreign market and FDI multinationals. To avoid confusion
we note that with respect to consumption varieties in country r, both domestic and FDI
firms produce in country r and sell in country r while export varieties are produced in
s and consumed in r. Hence, the per capita consumption in country r of a domestic or
FDI variety i is denoted by qrr (i) while for an export variety i per capita consumption is
denoted by qsr (i). Similar the price of a variety i in country r is denoted by prr (i) if it
is provided by a domestic or FDI firm while the price of an export variety i from country
s is given by psr (i).
The underlying preference structure, established in Behrens and Murata (2007), dis-
plays love-for-variety and is the same for all consumers. The utility maximization problem
of consumers in country r is given by
max
qsr(j),j∈Ωsr
Ur ≡
￿
s
￿
Ωsr
￿
1− e−αqsr(j)￿ dj s.t. ￿
s
￿
Ωsr
psr(j)qsr(j)dj = Er, (5.1)
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where Er denotes expenditure, α > 0 is a parameter measuring the strength of love-
for-variety and Ωsr denotes the set of varieties produced in country s and consumed in
country r. The solution of the maximization problem given in (5.1) yields the following
demand functions
qsr(i) =
Er
N cr p¯r
− 1
α
￿
ln
￿
psr(i)
N crpr
￿
+ hr
￿
, ∀i ∈ Ωsr, (5.2)
where N cr is the mass of consumed varieties in country r, and
pr ≡
1
N cr
￿
s
￿
Ωsr
psr(j)dj and hr ≡ −
￿
s
￿
Ωsr
ln
￿
psr(i)
N crpsr
￿
psr(j)
N cr p¯sr
dj (5.3)
denote the average price and the differential entropy of the price distribution of all vari-
eties consumed in country r. With the help of (5.2) and (5.3) we can derive the country
specific reservation price pdr . The demand for variety i in country r will be positive if and
only if the price of the respective variety is lower than this reservation price, no matter
whether the variety is produced by a domestic firm, a foreign FDI firm or is exported
from abroad. Formally,
qrr (i) > 0 ⇔ prr (i) < pdr and qsr (j) > 0 ⇔ psr (j) < pdr , (5.4)
where the reservation price
pdr ≡ N crpreαEr/(Ncr p¯r)−hr (5.5)
is a function of the price aggregates pr and hr. Using (5.2) and (5.5), the demands can
be expressed as follows
qrr(i) =
1
α
ln
￿
pdr
prr(i)
￿
and qsr(j) =
1
α
ln
￿
pdr
psr(i)
￿
. (5.6)
The price elasticity of demand for a variety i, derived from (5.6), is given by 1/ [αqrr (i)]
and 1/ [αqsr (i)], respectively. Hence, if individuals consume more of any variety (which
is e.g. the case if their expenditure increases), they become less price sensitive. With the
help of (5.6), the utility function in (5.1) simplifies using eαqsr(i) = psr (i) /pdr and we can
rewrite indirect utility as
Ur = N
c
r −
￿
s
￿
Ωsr
psr (j)
pdr
dj = N cr
￿
1− pr
pdr
￿
. (5.7)
5.3.2 Technology and market structure
On the firm side, each producer provides one unique final good variety. The only factor
used for production is labor, with each consumer supplying one unit of labor. The total
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labor force in country r is therefore given by its country size Lr. The labor market is
assumed to be characterized by perfect competition such that firms in country r take the
wage wr as given. In order to discover a product variety, firms invest the country’s specific
fixed costs Fr for research and development (R&D) paid in labor at the market wage.
This investment enables the firm to discover its unique variety along with its firms specific
marginal labor requirement m (i) ≥ 0, where a lower m (i) reflects a higher productivity.
This productivity is drawn from a country-specific distribution Gr. Besides serving the
domestic market, the firm may choose to serve the foreign market either by exporting or
greenfield FDI. As will be shown, the decision whether and how to serve the foreign market
depends on a firm’s productivity draw. Exports from country s to r are subject to iceberg
type trade costs τsr > 1, which incur in terms of labor. Setting up a new production plant
in the foreign country r is assumed to increase the fixed costs of production by Pr. Hence,
as it is discussed at length in the literature the classical “proximity-concentration” trade-
off emerges: FDI saves variable trade costs, while exporting saves additional overhead
costs for building up a foreign production plant.
In our model, there are three possible sources for operating profits. First, the operating
profits of firm i originated in country s from domestic sales are given by
πDs (i) = Lsqss (i) [pss (i)− τssm (i)ws] . (5.8)
Second, the operating profits from exporting to country r are given by
πXs (i) = Lrqsr (i) [psr (i)− τsrm (i)ws] . (5.9)
Third, the operating profits for using FDI in country r are given by
πFs (i) = Lrqrr (i) [prr (i)− τrrm (i)wr]−m (i)wrPr. (5.10)
where qss (i), qsr (i) and qrr (i) in equations (5.8)-(5.10) are given by (5.6). Note that
in our specification FDI “fixed” costs decrease in a firm’s productivity level. We do so
to countervail the fact that the most productive exporters have zero marginal costs in
the limit. This implies that also the iceberg type trade costs vanish in the limit. To
balance this artifact of iceberg type trade costs, we assume fixed FDI costs dependent
on the marginal labor requirement as given by (5.10). Both, the variable trade costs and
the fixed FDI costs now decrease with a lower marginal labor requirement. With this
assumption, the model exhibits the “classical” ranking that the most productive firms use
FDI while the medium productive firms export to foreign markets.2
2At first sight, a more classical definition of FDI profits would be πˆFs (i) =
Lrqrr (i) [prr (i)− τrrm (i)wr]−wrPr with fixed costs independent of the productivity level. However, if
we consider the most productive firms we get limm→0 πXs = Lrwrτrreα m
D
r , limm→0 πˆFs = Lrwrτrreα m
D
r −Prwr,
limm→0 πFs =
Lrwrτrr
eα m
D
r . Hence, with the classical definition the most productive firms would use
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We assume segmented markets without the possibility of arbitrage or resale. Hence,
firms maximize profits with respect to their price psr (i) separately for each market, taking
into account the demand function as given by (5.6). The continuum of firms takes the
reservation price pdr as given and the first-order condition for (operating) profits are
ln
￿
pdr
psr (i)
￿
=
psr − τsrm (i)ws
psr (i)
, i ∈ Ωsr. (5.11)
Using (5.11) we can now show how productivity maps into the firm’s price setting, sales
revenue and profits.
Lemma 1 For a given type of firm (domestic, export, FDI), more productive firms i.)
charge lower prices, ii.) sell larger quantities and iii.) earn higher operating profits in
each market.
Proof. Using the Lambert W function, defined as ϕ = W (ϕ) eW (ϕ), the first-order
condition (5.11) can be solved for the profit-maximizing prices, quantities and operating
profits. Those values can be expressed in terms of m, as firms differ only in their marginal
labor requirement.3 For a firm originated in country s they are given by
pss (m) =
τssmws
WDs
, qss (m) =
1
α
￿
1−WDs
￿
, πDs =
Lsτssmws
α
￿
1−WDs
￿2
WDs
, (5.12)
psr (m) =
τsrmws
WXs
, qsr (m) =
1
α
￿
1−WXs
￿
, πXs =
Lrτsrmws
α
￿
1−WXs
￿2
WXs
, (5.13)
prr (m) =
τrrmwr
W Fs
, qrr (m) =
1
α
￿
1−W Fs
￿
, πFs =
Lrτrrmwr
α
￿
1−W Fs
￿2
W Fs
−mwrPr,
(5.14)
where we suppressed the arguments of the Lambert W function in order to alleviate
notation.4 The arguments are given by
WDs = W
￿
eτssmws
pds
￿
, WXs = W
￿
eτsrmws
pdr
￿
and W Fs = W
￿
eτrrmwr
pdr
￿
(5.15)
Since W ￿ > 0, we readily obtain ∂p/∂m > 0, ∂q/∂m < 0 and ∂π/∂m < 0. ￿
An important issue in the heterogeneous firms literature is to determine the so-called
cutoff productivity for each market. A firm with a lower productivity as the respective
cutoff productivity would set a price above the reservation price and would therefore
face zero demand. Hence, serving this market is not profitable. To derive the cutoff
exporting instead of FDI. See also Behrens and Ottaviano (2009) for a related problem within an FDI
extension of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework.¸
3See Corless et al. (1996) for a survey concerning the properties of the Lambert W function.
4It is shown by Behrens et al. (2009) that W ￿ > 0 increases for all non-negative arguments and that
W (0) = 0 and W (e) = 1. Hence, 0 ≤W ≤ 1 if and only if 0 ≤ m ≤ mD.
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productivity we need the sales quantity of a firm, conditional on its productivity. Using
(5.6) and (5.11) the sales quantity is given by
qsr (i) = (1/α) [1− τsrm (i)ws/psr (i)] . (5.16)
The sales quantity given by (5.16) helps us to determine the maximum output of a
firm, which is given by qsr (i) = 1/α for a firm with the highest productivity draw
m = 0. Contrary, the upper bound for m is given by the minimum output qsr (i) = 0 at
psr (i) = τsrm (i)ws. It then follows from (5.11) that pdr = τsrm (i)ws.
For domestic firms, this gives their cutoff marginal labor requirement, defined as
mDs ≡ pds/wsτss. A domestic firm that draws mDs is indifferent between producing and
not producing, whereas only firms with a draw below mDs remain active in the market.
For exporters, this condition tells us that a firm located in s with a productivity draw
mxsr ≡ pdr/ (τsrws) is just indifferent between selling and not selling in country r via
exporting. All firms in s with productivity draws below mxsr are productive enough to
export to country r. In what follows, we refer to mxrr ≡ mDr as the domestic cutoff in
country r, whereas mxsr ≡ mXs with s ￿= r is the export cutoff. Export and domestic
cutoffs are linked as follows
mXs =
τrr
τsr
wr
ws
mDr . (5.17)
It is now clear from expression (5.17) that the “classical” ranking, namely that ex-
porting requires a higher productivity than selling domestically, does not necessarily hold
anymore. The usual ranking only prevails if and only if τrrwr < τsrws. An example for
that case would be if wages are equalized (ws = wr) and internal trade is costless while
trade between countries is costly.
We cannot use (5.16) to determine the FDI cutoff for two reasons. First, the profit
maximizing quantity does not secure positive profits for FDI firms due to the fixed costs
Pr. Second, FDI will not be chosen as soon as exporting is the more profitable strategy.
Therefore, we need to determine the productivity level above which a firm would choose
FDI instead of exporting. As it can be seen by Figure 5.1, firms will choose exporting over
FDI for a productivity draw m > mTs since the transport cost savings do not compensate
for the fixed costs of FDI.5 For this we have to compare FDI versus export profits,
conditional on the productivity draw. Therefore, the FDI cutoff mTs is the solution of
πFs
￿
mTs
￿
= πXs
￿
mTs
￿
. However, we cannot solve for mTs in general and have to rely
5It remains to show that mTs exists (in the positive range) and is unique. First, from mTs > 0 it
directly follows that ∂πFs /∂m < ∂πXs /∂m, i.e. profits increase stronger with a higher productivity for
FDI than for exporting in the domain of m > mTs . Due to the fact that we have iceberg type trade costs
a higher productivity also leads to a vanishing of trade costs and we have ∂πFs /∂m > ∂πXs /∂m for very
high productivities (m close to zero). Second, there might exist a second threshold. We can ensure that
this threshold is the corner solution at m = 0 from (5.13) and (5.14). Now we can conclude that the
threshold mTs is unique. Firms with a productivity draw m < mTs (m > mTs ) consistently choose FDI
(exporting) over exporting (FDI).
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Figure 5.1: Export and FDI profits conditional on the marginal labor requirement m.
on numerical methods.6 Using this information about the cutoff productivities, we can
reconsider the mass of firms. Given a mass of entrants NEs and export cutoffs mXsr (recall
that mXss = mDs ) as in (5.17), only Nps = NEs Gs (max {mxsr}) firms survive in country
s, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market (which does
not have to be the local market).7 Furthermore, we can determine the mass of varieties
consumed in country s as
N cs =
￿
r
NEr Gr (m
x
rs) , (5.18)
which is the sum of all firms that are productive enough to serve market s. Multiplying
both sides of (5.11) by prs (i), integrating over Ωsr and summing the resulting expressions
across s, the average price across all varieties sold in market r can be written as
ps ≡
1
N cs
￿
r
￿
Ωrs
prs (j) dj =
1
N cs
￿
r
τrswr
￿
Ωrs
mr (j) dj +
αEs
N cs
, (5.19)
where the first term is the average marginal delivered costs, and the second term is the
average markup in the market s. Expression (5.19) shows that the average markup is
decreasing in the mass N cs of firms competing in country s and increasing in expenditure
Es. Hence, similar to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the average price displays a pro-
competitive effect for a greater mass of firms. Furthermore, the average markup rises
with expenditure because demand becomes less price elastic for larger quantities.
6We cannot solve for mTs since the Lambert W function has different arguments, see Corless et al.
(1996).
7Since mTs < mXs we do not need to consider FDI firms for this reasoning.
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5.3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of our model is characterized by the mass of entrants NEs , the domestic
cutoff mDs in each country and the relative wage ω ≡ ωs/ωr between the two countries.
Those determinants are derived by solving the zero expected profit condition, the labor
market clearing condition and the current account balance.
In the Appendix we state the general equilibrium conditions without assuming a spe-
cific assumption about the productivity distribution. In what follows, we adopt the com-
monly made assumption that firms’ productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution.8 We
assume identical shape parameters k ≥ 1, but to capture differences in technological pos-
sibilities, we allow the upper bounds to vary across countries, i.e. Gs (m) = (m/mmaxs )
k.
A lowermmaxs implies that firms in country s have a higher probability of drawing a better
productivity. With the Pareto distribution and the help of equations (5.12)-(5.15), we
can simplify the equilibrium conditions. First, using the general equilibrium conditions
given in the Appendix the labor market clearing condition can be written as
Ls = N
E
s
￿
κ1
α (mmaxs )
k
￿
Lsτss
￿
mDs
￿k+1
+ Lrτsr
￿￿
mXs
￿k+1 − ￿mTs ￿k+1￿￿+ Fs
￿
+
NEr κ1Lsτss
α (mmaxr )
k
￿
mTr
￿k+1
+
NEr Prκ4
(mmaxr )
k
￿
mTr
￿k+1
. (5.20)
The terms κ1 to κ4 are positive constants that solely depend on the shape parameter k
of the Pareto distribution and are also stated in the Appendix. Second, zero expected
profits imply
µmaxs ≡
Fs (mmaxs )
k α
κ2
= Lsτss
￿
mDs
￿k+1
+ Lrτsr
￿
mXs
￿k+1
− Lsτsr
￿
mTs
￿k+1
+ Lrτrrwr/ws
￿
mTs
￿k+1 − κ4
κ2
αPrwr/ws
￿
mTs
￿k+1
, (5.21)
where the term µmaxr can be interpreted as a measure of “technological possibilities”: the
lower the fixed labor requirement for entry Fr or the lower the upper bound mmaxr , the
lower will be µmaxr . Third, the current account balance requires that CArs = CAsr with
CAsr =
NEs Lrτsrwsκ3
α (mmaxs )
k
￿￿
mXs
￿k+1 − ￿mTr ￿k+1￿
+
NEr ws
α (mmaxr )
k
￿
Lsτss
￿
mTr
￿k+1
κ2 − αPs
￿
mTr
￿k+1
κ4
￿
. (5.22)
8The Pareto distribution is motivated by studies that examine the firm size distribution, see Axtell
(2001), and often used in the theoretical literature, for instance in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or
Bernard et al. (2003).
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Note that if we consider infinitely high fixed costs of FDI, the threshold productivity mTs
approaches zero. In this case the zero expected profit condition, labor market clearing
and trade balance reduce to the terms that are given in Behrens et al. (2009).
5.4 FDI-liberalization
In the previous section we have developed the theoretical framework to study the wel-
fare effects of FDI. In this section, we use this framework to examine a country’s in-
centive to lower the fixed costs of FDI. We distinguish between two policy scenarios.
In the strategic FDI policy scenario, a country chooses the welfare maximizing degree
of FDI-liberalization, taking the FDI policy in the other country as given. In the co-
operative scenario both countries jointly choose the total welfare maximizing degree of
FDI-liberalization.
In the following we solve the model by using both analytical and numerical methods
to derive comparative static results with respect to the fixed costs of FDI. To develop
the economic intuition for the rich set of general equilibrium effects we start in section
5.4.1 and section 5.4.2 with the assumption of prohibitively high trade costs. With this
assumption the classical productivity ranking of firms, i.e., low productive firms only
serve their domestic market, medium productive firms export and high productive firms
become multinationals, still prevails but the mass of exporters shrinks to zero. Therefore,
firms that are productive enough to serve the foreign market become multinationals. In
section 5.4.1 we consider the cooperative policy scenario where countries can commit to a
specific degree of FDI-liberalization, e.g. to jointly grant the same level of tax holidays for
foreign FDI firms. In section 5.4.2 we study the incentive to deviate from the cooperative
policy and determine the strategic Nash-equilibrium policy. In the following sections 5.4.3
and 5.4.4 we consider low trade costs, such that a positive mass of firms exports. We
derive the strategic FDI policy in section 5.4.3 and finish the welfare analysis in section
5.4.4 where we study the cooperative policy.
5.4.1 High trade costs: cooperative policy
We start with the following assumptions that lead to closed form solutions of the equi-
librium determinants: First, we assume that inter-country trade costs are prohibitively
high such that mXr < mFr holds where mFr is given by πFr
￿
mFr
￿
= 0. As a result, the
mass of exporters shrinks to zero and only multinationals serve a foreign market. Sec-
ond, we consider symmetrical countries, i.e., countries are identical in their country sizes,
technological possibilities, internal and external trade costs, entry costs and fixed costs
of FDI. This directly implies that all endogenously determined cutoffs, wages and masses
of firms are also identical and the relative wage is one. Finally, to simplify the notation
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we assume zero intra-country trade costs and set the income to one, i.e. τrr = τss = 1
and Er = Es = 1. Given these assumptions we can drop the indices and the FDI cutoff
can be derived by solving πF
￿
mF
￿
= 0 for mF . The solution is given by
mF = mD · (ξ + 1) · eξ with ξ ≡ αP −
￿
αP (αP + 4Lτ)
2Lτ
. (5.23)
In the following it is convenient to use the following monotonic transformation of (5.23):￿
mF
￿k+1
= χ · ￿mD￿k+1 with χ1/(1+k) ≡ (ξ + 1) · eξ. It directly follows from (5.23) that
∂χ/∂P < 0. Hence, infinitely high fixed costs P → ∞ lead to mF → 0 while infinitesi-
mally low fixed costs P → 0 lead to mF → mD. In words, if the fixed costs of FDI are
large no firm uses FDI while if the fixed costs vanish all surviving firms are multination-
als. Using this transformation, the labor market clearing condition (5.20) and the zero
expected profit condition (5.21) reduce to
µmax = L
￿
mD
￿k+1
+ Lχ
￿
mD
￿k+1 − κ4
κ2
αPχ
￿
mD
￿k+1
, (5.24)
and
L = NE
￿
κ1L
α (mmax)k
￿
mD
￿k+1
(1 + χ) + F +
κ4
(mmax)k
Pχ
￿
mD
￿k+1￿
. (5.25)
Using (5.24) and (5.25) we can uniquely solve for the mass of entrants NE and the
domestic cutoff mD given by
￿
mD
￿k+1
=
µmaxκ2
Lκ2 (1 + χ)− Pακ4χ and N
E =
κ2
(κ1 + κ2)
L
F
− ακ4
(κ1 + κ2)
χP
(1 + χ)F
.
(5.26)
Note that NE, as given by (5.26), differs fundamentally from NE = κ2L/ [(κ1 + κ2)F ]
as derived in Behrens et al. (2009). In particular, they find the mass of entrants to be
independent of any trade costs. We can directly conclude from (5.26) that in the presence
of some FDI the mass of entrants is always lower since the second term of NE in (5.26)
is strictly positive for P > 0. Intuitively, the easier it is for highly productive firms to
penetrate foreign markets, the lower will be the expected profits of all firms. Furthermore,
FDI firms behave like domestic firms in their price setting and do not have to account for
variable trade costs like exporters. This accelerated competition effect leads to the fact
that lower expected profits yield to a lower mass of entrants.
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After having derived the mass of entrants and the domestic cutoff, the mass of con-
sumed varieties NC and the average price p are crucial for a welfare analysis. Both are
given by
NC =
α
￿
1 + χ
k
1+k
￿
(κ1 + κ2) (1 + χ)
· 1
mD
and p =
(1 + χ)￿
1 + χ
k
1+k
￿ · k
1 + k
· pd + α
NC
, (5.27)
where the first term of p in (5.27) are the average marginal costs, and the second term
is the average markup. Finally, using (5.26), (5.27) and the term κ3 ≡ κ1 + κ2 we can
define
pN ≡ p
pd
=
(κ3 + k (1 + κ3)) (1 + χ)
(1 + k)
￿
1 + χ
k
k+1
￿ (5.28)
as the normed average price. Using this we can simplify indirect utility to
U = NC
￿
1− pN￿ = α
mD
￿
1− kχ+ (1 + k)χ k1+k
(1 + χ) (k + 1)κ3
− 1
￿
. (5.29)
It is evident from (5.29) that welfare increases in the mass of consumed varieties NC
and a lower normed average price pN . In the following we show that for some parameter
values FDI-liberalization leads to an unambiguous welfare increase while for others there
exists a trade-off between the normed average price and the mass of consumed varieties.
We now analyze how the fixed costs of FDI impact the equilibrium mass of entrants,
surviving firms, consumed varieties, average and normed average price, markup and most
important welfare. For all variables we state two polar cases in Table 5.1. First, the free
trade scenario where FDI is costless (P → 0 denoted by OPEN ) and second the autarkic
scenario where FDI is infinitely costly (P →∞ denoted by AUT ). A comparison of the
autarky and free trade scenario is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
i.) The domestic cutoff mD is higher under autarky than under free trade.
ii.) The masses of entrants NE under autarky and under free trade are equal.
iii.) The mass of surviving firms NS under autarky is higher than under free trade.
iv.) The mass of consumed varieties NC under autarky is lower than under free trade.
v.) The average price p under autarky is higher than under free trade.
vi.) The normed average prices pN under autarky and under free trade are equal.
vii.) Welfare under autarky is lower than under free trade.
Starting from an initial autarkic scenario and introducing FDI-liberalization, i.e. a grad-
ual reduction of P , leads to the following comparative static results summarized in Propo-
sition 2.
Proposition 2
FDI-liberalization leads to
i.) an ambiguous change in the domestic cutoff: mD (P ) is humped-shaped.
ii.) an ambiguous change in the in the mass of entrants: NE (P ) is U-shaped.
iii.) a lower mass of surviving firms NS.
iv.) a higher mass of consumed varieties NC.
v.) a lower average price p.
vi.) an ambiguous change in the normed average price: pN (P ) is U-shaped.
vii.) an ambiguous change in welfare: U (P ) is humped-shaped.
Some comparative static results of Proposition 2 are different compared to bilateral
trade liberalization in Behrens et al. (2009). First, consider statement i.) in Proposi-
tion 2. Starting from an initial autarkic scenario, FDI-liberalization first leads to softer
competition, i.e. a higher domestic cutoff mD. The reason is that for fixed costs of FDI
larger than a threshold P > P ∗, FDI-liberalization allows some rare multinationals to
break-even at a lower productivity level.9 As a result, the domestic cutoff mD increases
at first. Below this threshold P ∗, further decreases in the fixed costs of FDI trigger the
classic competition effect of trade liberalization (lower domestic cutoff), like it would be
the case with falling variable trade costs in Behrens et al. (2009), Melitz (2003) or Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). This new non-monotonic effect how FDI-liberalization impacts
the equilibrium productivity cutoff has, to the best of our knowledge, not been explored
in the literature yet.
Second, consider statement vii.) of Proposition 2. Welfare as given by (5.29) increases
in the mass of consumed varieties and a lower normed average price. As illustrated in
the left graph of Figure 5.2, FDI-liberalization rises the mass of consumed varieties but
does not unambiguously lower the normed average price. The normed average price
actually increases for sufficiently low levels of P and has a negative impact on welfare
everything else equal. How can we explain this U-shaped normed average price? Consider
an initial scenario where fixed costs of FDI are prohibitively high. FDI-liberalization now
leads to the creation of the first multinational that charges a relatively low price since
this firm is highly productive compared to the average domestic firm. However, further
reductions in the fixed costs of FDI also induce relatively underproductive firms to become
multinationals. As a result, the normed average price increases. This trade-off between
relatively underproductive multinationals that introduce new consumable varieties but
also increase the normed average price uniquely determines the welfare maximizing degree
of FDI-liberalization. The right graph of Figure 5.2 clearly illustrates, that if countries
can cooperatively commit themselves for a total welfare maximizing FDI policy, countries
9The threshold level is given by P ∗ = (L/α)
￿
6κ2 + κ4 −
￿
4κ22 + 12κ2κ4 + κ
2
4
￿
/ (4κ4).
92
i.) mDAUT =
￿
µmax
L
￿ 1
k+1 mDOPEN =
￿
µmax
2L
￿ 1
k+1
ii.) NEAUT = κ2κ3
L
F N
E
OPEN =
κ2
κ3
L
F
iii.) NSAUT = ακ3
￿
L
µmax
￿ 1
k+1
NSOPEN =
α
κ3
￿
L
2kµmax
￿ 1
k+1
iv.) NCAUT = ακ3
￿
L
µmax
￿ 1
k+1
NCOPEN =
α
κ3
￿
2L
µmax
￿ 1
k+1
v.) pAUT =
κ3+k(1+κ3)
1+k
￿
µmax
L
￿ 1
k+1 pOPEN =
κ3+k(1+κ3)
1+k
￿
µmax
2L
￿ 1
k+1
vi.) pNAUT =
κ3+k(1+κ3)
1+k p
N
OPEN =
κ3+k(1+κ3)
1+k
vii.) UAUT = α
￿
1
κ3(k+1)
− 1
￿￿
L
µmax
￿ 1
k+1
UOPEN = α
￿
1
κ3(k+1)
− 1
￿￿
2L
µmax
￿ 1
k+1
Table 5.1: Comparison of the autarky and free trade scenario.
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Figure 5.2: Welfare, normed average price and consumed varieties.
would set a strictly positive level for the fixed costs of FDI. That is, they would not reduce
the fixed costs of FDI to zero. In the following Section 5.4.2 we now explore whether
countries have a unilateral incentive to deviate from a cooperative policy by further
decreasing fixed costs of FDI.
5.4.2 High trade costs: Nash-equilibrium
In this section we examine the strategic FDI policy and determine the Nash-equilibrium.
To derive a home country H’s best response, i.e., the welfare maximizing fixed cost level
PH for a given fixed cost FDI level PF in the other foreign country F , we have to study
asymmetrical countries that differ in their fixed costs of FDI. Similar as in Section 5.4.1
we can express the foreign country’s FDI cutoff by solving πFF
￿
mFF
￿
= 0 for mFF in terms
of the home country’s domestic cutoff mDH . Under the assumption that countries differ
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solely in their fixed costs of FDI the cutoff mFF is given by
mFF = m
D
H · (ξF + 1) · eξF with ξF ≡
αPH −
￿
αPH (αPH + 4L)
2L
. (5.30)
Again it is convenient to use a monotonic transformation of (5.30):
￿
mFF
￿k+1
= χF ·￿
mDH
￿k+1 with χ1/(1+k)F ≡ (ξF + 1) · eξF and ∂χF/∂PH < 0. Similar to the case of bilateral
changes, attracting FDI by the home country H leads to the fact that firms in the foreign
country F , that are at least as productive as the domestic cutoff firm in the home country,
become multinationals.10 Using the labor market clearing condition (5.20) and the zero
expected profit condition (5.21), we can solve for the domestic cutoff in the home country
H that is given by
￿
mDH
￿k+1
=
F (mmax)k α [PFwFακ4χH + Lκ2 (wF − wHχH)]
wFL2κ22 − wF (Lκ2 − PHακ4) (Lκ2 − PFακ4)χHχF
, (5.31)
which still is a function of the countries’ wages. However, for a complete characterization
of the model we need the relative wage for which we cannot derive closed form solutions.
Therefore we rely on numerical simulations.
In Figure 5.3 we have depicted the case of constant fixed costs of FDI PF in the foreign
country while the home country marginally deviates and attracts FDI by lowering fixed
costs PH . The cross country comparison reveals that further decreasing the fixed costs of
FDI PH leads to a greater mass of consumed varieties and a lower normed average price
in the FDI attracting home country H. Both channels unambiguously increase welfare.
Hence, there exists an incentive for the country H to marginally attract more FDI firms
than the foreign country F . The intuition is that lower fixed costs of FDI in country H
increase expected profits for country F ’s firms. This leads to a greater mass of entrants
and tougher competition in the foreign country. For country H firms, serving country
F is now less attractive, due to the tougher competition in country F . Therefore, the
mass of entrants in country H decreases and the domestic cutoff increases. As a result,
the relative wage in the country with a greater mass of entrants is higher. Nevertheless,
more FDI firms in the home country H increase the mass of consumption varieties and
decrease the normed average price. We can conclude that in a policy scenario where both
countries set the level of fixed costs of FDI independently, the Nash-equilibrium policy is
zero fixed costs of FDI in both countries. To further check whether there is no incentive to
deviate from the Nash-equilibrium policy we provide Figure 5.4 where we have depicted
the case of zero fixed costs of FDI in both countries. Marginally increasing fixed costs
of FDI PH in the home country lowers welfare in both countries and we can therefore
conclude that the Nash-equilibrium is stable.
10Note that in case of perfect FDI-liberalization all domestic firms are multinationals since PH → 0
implies mFF → mDH .
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Figure 5.3: Comparative statics, lower fixed costs of FDI in country H. The black solid
line indicates country F , the dashed line indicates country H. Parameters: LH = LF =
10, τHH = τFF = 1, τHF = τFH = 1.3, FF = FH = 1, PF = 0.25, α = 1, k = 2,
mmaxH = m
max
F = 10. Note that the productivity cutoffs are monotonically transformed
to mk+1.
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Figure 5.4: Comparative statics, lower fixed costs of FDI in country H. The black solid
line indicates country F , the dashed line indicates country H. Parameters: LH = LF =
10, τHH = τFF = 1, τHF = τFH = 1.3, FF = FH = 1, PF = 0, α = 1, k = 2,
mmaxH = m
max
F = 10. Note that the productivity cutoffs are monotonically transformed
to mk+1.
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5.4.3 Low trade costs: Nash-equilibrium
In the following we examine the case of low trade costs to secure that our results also
holds in the presence of exporters. We now consider the comprehensive model where
countries are potentially asymmetric with respect to their fixed costs of FDI and some
firms choose exporting rather than FDI. Hence, we assume that inter-country trade costs
are sufficiently low such that mXs > mTs > 0 with s = H,F holds where mXs is given by
πXs
￿
mXs
￿
= 0 andmTs is the solution of πFs
￿
mTs
￿
= πXs
￿
mTs
￿
. As discussed in Section 5.3.2
we cannot solve πFs
￿
mTs
￿
= πXs
￿
mTs
￿
for the FDI cutoff mTs . Hence, we cannot provide
closed form solutions for the endogenously determined productivity cutoffs, wages and
masses of firms. We rather provide numerical simulations.
As in the previous section 5.4.2, we consider the case that countryH marginally lowers
the fixed costs of FDI PH below PF and thereby attracts more FDI firms than country
F . All the results are qualitatively summarized in the graphs provided by Figure 5.5. We
conclude from the cross country comparison that marginally attracting more FDI firms
than the foreign country leads to a greater mass of consumed varieties and a lower normed
average price in the attracting country. Both channels unambiguously increase welfare
in the attracting home country. Note that Figure 5.5 provides one numerical example,
however further parameter constellations confirm this to be a stable pattern.
What follows is a detailed discussion of the comparative statics with respect to PH .
We start with a qualitative discussion of the domestic cutoffs and the mass of entrants.
As the graphs indicate marginally lowering the fixed costs of FDI in the home country H
translate into a higher (lower) domestic cutoff in country H (F ). At the same time the
mass of entrants in country H (F ) decreases (increases). The economic intuition is that
more firms are attracted to enter country F due to higher expected profits from serving
the foreign market. Hence, the toughness of competition increases in country F while we
find softer selection in country H. With regard to foreign market entry the export cutoff
in country H (F ) decreases (increases) while both FDI cutoffs unambiguously increase.
Intuitively, the FDI strategy for country F firms becomes more profitable due to the
lower fixed costs of FDI. Country F firms therefore substitute exports by FDI. This is
the standard “proximity-concentration” trade-off prediction. However, with endogenous
wage differentials in equilibrium, we can identify a new wage effect that dampens the
reallocation: As production is shifted from the foreign country F to the attracting home
country H, labor demand increases (decreases) in country H (F ). This reallocation
of production changes the relative wage, i.e. the relative wage level in country H (F )
increases (decreases). This wage effect now leads to repercussions of FDI costs to the
export cutoffs. The lower relative wage in country F favors exports since exporting firms
located in country F now benefit from relatively lower labor costs. On the other hand,
the lower relative wage in country F also favors FDI in that country while exporters from
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PH = 0.55 ω mTF m
T
H N
E
F N
E
H UF UH
-10% -0.42 12.87 0.99 1.33 -1.58 -1.16 0.46
-20% -0.89 27.81 1.79 3.09 -3.46 -2.64 0.57
Table 5.2: Percentage changes for the wage, cutoffs, entrants and welfare for lower fixed
costs of FDI in country H. Other parameters: LH = LF = 10, τHH = τFF = 1,
τHF = τFH = 1.3, FH = FF = 1, PF = 0.55, α = 1, k = 2, mmaxH = mmaxF = 10.
P = 0.55 mT NE U
-10% 13.81 -0.24 -0.09
-20% 29.23 -0.33 -0.43
Table 5.3: Percentage changes for the wage, cutoffs, entrants and welfare for lower fixed
costs of FDI. Other parameters: LH = LF = 10, τHH = τFF = 1, τHF = τFH = 1.3,
FH = FF = 1, α = 1, k = 2, mmaxH = mmaxF = 10.
the attracting country H suffer from relatively higher labor costs.
It is crucial to note that this effect on the endogenously determined wage differential
cannot be found in the strand of literature that incorporates factor price equalization as
e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Chor (2009). In contrast to this strand of
the literature we find that FDI-liberalization is a double-edged sword: FDI-liberalization
introduces new FDI varieties but simultaneously yields to tougher foreign market entry
for the own exporters. Now consider the welfare effects in detail. Everything else equal
welfare in a country increases in the mass of consumed varieties and a lower normed
average price. Since FDI in country H and exporting into country H (F ) becomes easier
(harder), the mass of consumed varieties increases (decreases) in country H (F ). Average
marginal costs and markups decrease (increase) in country H (F ). As a result the normed
average price decreases (increases) in country H (F ). Both effects yield to the fact that
welfare in country H (F ) unambiguously increases (decreases). Hence, we confirm our
result of Section 5.4.2 that countries actually have a unilateral incentive to marginally
lower the fixed costs of FDI.11
Proposition 3 The strategic Nash-equilibrium policy is zero fixed costs of FDI (PNashH =
PNashF = 0) in both countries.
11To provide some numerical reading examples, consider for example a 20% decrease in FDI costs as
given in Table 2. The relative wage ω = wF /wH decreases only 0.42% while there is a strong effect on
the FDI cutoff for country F with 27.81%, compared to a small increase of 1.79% in country H. Welfare
in country H (F ) increases (decreases) 0.57% (2.64%).
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Figure 5.5: Comparative statics, lower fixed costs of FDI in country H. The black solid
line indicates country F , the dashed line indicates country H. Parameters: LH = LF =
10, τHH = τFF = 1, τHF = τFH = 1.3, FH = FF = 1, PF = 0.55, α = 1, k = 2,
mmaxH = m
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F = 10. Note that the productivity cutoffs are monotonically transformed
to mk+1.
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Figure 5.6: Comparative statics, lower fixed costs in both countries. We start with
PH = PF = 0.55. Parameters: LH = LF = 10, τHH = τFF = 1, τHF = τFH = 1.3,
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5.4.4 Low trade costs: cooperative policy
In the foregoing Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 we found that there exists a unilateral incentive
to marginally lower the fixed costs of FDI. The strategic Nash-equilibrium policy is zero
fixed costs of FDI. In this section we study the cooperative policy that maximizes joint
welfare to determine whether there are gains from supra national coordination. The
qualitative results for P ≡ PH = PF are given in Figure 5.6. Similar to Section 5.4.1,
lower fixed costs of FDI lead to softer competition and less entrants. Concerning foreign
market entry firms face less competition in each market. Therefore the export as well as
the FDI cutoff increase.
Concerning the welfare analysis, FDI-liberalization unambiguously leads to a larger
mass of consumed varieties while the change in the normed average price is ambiguous as
in Section 5.4.1. The normed average price only decreases and leads to an unambiguous
welfare decrease if the fixed costs of FDI are high. Further FDI-liberalization below a
fixed cost threshold now attracts relatively underproductive multinationals that increase
the normed average price. As a result, FDI-liberalization can lead to a welfare decrease,
if too many multinationals are attracted. A cooperative policy would therefore set a
strictly positive level for the fixed costs of FDI.12
Proposition 4 The cooperative FDI policy sets a strictly positive fixed costs of FDI
(PCoopH = P
Coop
F > 0) in both countries.
5.5 Conclusion
We extended the Behrens et al. (2009) framework by horizontal FDI. This allows to assess
the welfare consequences of FDI-liberalization in two, commonly not studied, channels:
FDI-liberalization changes the relative wage and the price markup. Although both chan-
nels are commonly not studied in theoretical models they are present in the political
discussion. As our model highlights, both channels are also important in a theoretical
discussion. Wage differentials are important since they deepen our understanding of the
classical “proximity-concentration” trade-off. We find that the unilateral attraction of
FDI rises the relative wage in the attracting country, which in turn dampens the real-
location of production. As a result, foreign exporters benefit while domestic exporters
suffer from relatively higher labor costs. Price markups are important since we can con-
firm the argument given by policy makers that FDI-liberalization can lead to trade cost
savings. Those trade cost savings can lead to lower average marginal costs, markups,
12After having discussed the qualitative results, we again provide some numerical reading examples.
Consider for example a 20% decrease in FDI costs as given in Table 3. Although the effect on FDI cutoff
is strong (increases 29.23%) welfare in both countries decreases by 0.43%.
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average prices and quite naturally might increase welfare in turn.
Compared to the existing theoretical literature, in particular Chor (2009), we consider
strategic competition and collaboration among countries for FDI. This new element brings
our model closer to the political discussion, where the dynamic aspects of competition
for FDI are vividly discussed. In that context the comparison between the strategic FDI
policy and the cooperative solution can be relevant for policy makers. Our model predicts
that there a potential welfare gains from supranational coordination. However, since
coordination is difficult to achieve, it is likely that countries over attract FDI. For policy
makers this is an important result since it indicates that besides the indisputable positive
aspects of FDI there are also potential welfare losses. However, our simple model relies
on various critical assumptions. In reality, decreasing fixed costs of FDI involves some
sort of subsidy that needs to be refinanced or implies a tax loss. With the assumption
of a balanced budget the over attraction of FDI in the Nash-equilibrium will likely be
dampened. Other simplifying assumptions like identical country size and technology
potentials keep the analysis short, but are left for further research. As always, reality
is much more complex but our simple model still clearly illustrates the potential welfare
losses of FDI. Furthermore, our model also identifies a clear difference between trade-
and FDI-liberalization that implies different policy recommendations. Jointly decreasing
variable trade costs unambiguously increase welfare while our model predicts that for
fixed costs of FDI countries should rather commit for a strictly positive level.
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5.6 Appendix
Equilibrium conditions: In Section 5.3.3 we state the equilibrium conditions (5.20)-
(5.22) assuming a Pareto distribution for the productivity distribution. Without assuming
this specific distribution the zero expected profit condition for each firm in a country s
is given by
Fsws =
￿ mDs
0
Ls [pss (m)− τsswsm] qss (m) dGs (m)
+
￿ mXs
mTs
Lr [psr (m)− τsrwsm] qsr (m) dGs (m)
+
￿ mTs
0
(Lr [prr (m)− τrrwrm] qrr (m)− Prwrm) dGs (m) ,
where Fs is the country-specific fixed labor requirement. The first term are domestic prof-
its, the second term are export profits and the third term are FDI profits. Furthermore,
each country’s labor market clears in equilibrium, which requires that in each country s
Ls = N
E
s
￿
Ls
￿ mDs
0
mτssqss (m) dGs (m) + Fs
￿
+ NEs Lr
￿ mXs
mTs
mτsrqsr (m) dGs (m)
+ NEr
￿￿ mTr
0
(Lsmτssqss (m) + Psm) dGr (m)
￿
holds. The first term is “firms from country s serve their domestic country s”, the second
term is “firms from country s that serve foreign country r via exporting” and the third
term is “firms from country r that serve country s via FDI”. Last, the current account is
balanced for each country if CAsr = CArs with
CAsr = N
E
s Lr
￿ mXs
mTs
psr (m) qsr (m) dGs (m)
+ NEr
￿ mTr
0
(Ls [pss (m)− τsswsm] qss (m)− Pswsm) dGs (m) .
The first term is “exports from the domestic country s to the foreign country r” and the
second term is “transfer of FDI profits from the foreign country s back to the domestic
country r”. To derive the equilibrium conditions (5.20)-(5.22) we separate integrals, use
(5.12)-(5.14) and assume a Pareto distribution. Then we use the change in variables as
proposed by Behrens et al. (2009): z = W
￿
emI
￿
, emI = ze
z, m = Izez−1 and dm =
(1 + z) ez−1Idz. We use the following abbreviations κ1 = e−(k+1)k
￿ 1
0 (1− z2) zkezkezdz,
κ2 = e−(k+1)k
￿ 1
0 z
k (z−1 + z − 2) (1 + z) ezkezdz, κ3 = e−(k+1)k
￿ 1
0 z
k (z−1 − z) ezkezdz
and κ4 = e−(k+1)k
￿ 1
0 z
k (1 + z) ezkezdz, to further simplify the expressions. Note that
κ1 − κ4 are constants and only depend on the shape parameter k of the Pareto distribu-
tion. This directly yields to (5.20)-(5.22).
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Algorithm: In Sections 5.4.2-5.4.4 we discuss various numerical simulations. We solve
numerical by using the following algorithm: Let ω denote the relative wage. The zero
expected profit conditions (5.21) only depend on the cutoffs and the relative wage, so
we can solve for the cutoffs mDr
￿
ω,mTr ,m
T
s
￿
with r ￿= s. Then, using the labor market
clearing conditions (5.20) we can solve for the mass of entrants NEr
￿
ω,mDr ,m
D
s ,m
T
r ,m
T
s
￿
.
In the next step we use the cutoffs mDr
￿
ω,mTr ,m
T
s
￿
in NEr
￿
ω,mDr ,m
D
s ,m
T
r ,m
T
s
￿
to elim-
inate the domestic cutoffs. The mass of entrants simplifies to NEr
￿
ω,mTr ,m
T
s
￿
. Using
the expression in the current account balance (5.22) and the two indifference conditions
Zr ≡ πFr
￿
ω,mTr ,m
T
s
￿ − πXr ￿ω,mTr ,mTs ￿ = 0 we can solve for the equilibrium allocation
numerically. We secure uniqueness of our allocation since we start in a symmetric scenario
with Pr = Ps where ω = 1 and mTr = mTs must hold.
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